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Abstract
This thesis has four separate but connected areas o f interest: multiculturalism, 
autonomy, equality and feminism. These are brought together by considering an 
important critique o f multiculturalism: that o f the paradox o f multicultural 
vulnerability. The case o f minorities within minorities challenges whether 
multiculturalism does indeed help within minority groups. One of the ways these 
disputes have been resolved is through the evaluation o f the alleged autonomy 
women practice in choosing illiberal practices. Whether women (and other at risk 
members) are considered to be autonomous will determine whether the practice 
will be tolerated by liberal states or not. However, what do we mean by 
autonomy?
In the thesis I look at three different modem conceptions o f  autonomy through 
two intervening variables: socialisation and multiple identities. Theories of 
autonomy have been criticised by feminists because o f the reliance on the idea of 
atomistic selves. The notion of socialisation places autonomy within embodied 
experiences, but it also brings to light the issue o f adaptive preferences. 
Intersectionality or multiple identities also highlights the plural self as variable, 
conflicting and contradictory -  all qualities that aptly describe the realities of 
lived experience. In the thesis I defend a tripartite understanding o f autonomy 
that correlates with a differential understanding o f the self. Through this it might 
become possible to speak about autonomy without essentialising identities, 
whilst simultaneously being sensitive about inequality.
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I. Introduction: Multiculturalism, Feminism and Autonomy
1. Arguments for Multiculturalism
Like many o f the “isms” that characterise social and political theory, 
multiculturalism defies easy definition. As Charles Mills notes,
there is multiculturalism as state policy (itself varying from nation to 
nation) and multiculturalism as minority activist demand, 
multiculturalism as applied generally to the political theorization of 
society as a whole and multiculturalism as applied specifically to 
tertiary education and curriculum reform, multiculturalism as including 
the politics of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, 
and multiculturalism as excluding at least some of these, 
multiculturalism self-described, or hostilely described by others as 
weak, strong, liberal, conservative, corporate, ‘managed’, critical, 
radical, insurgent... and the list goes on.1
The object of multiculturalism varies. At its heart is a concern with difference -  
but the particular meaning o f what difference entails is somewhat contested. The 
particular shape o f multicultural politics can also vary. As Andrew Mason points 
out, the different arguments might call for group representation, exemption from 
laws and policies or simply recognition of groups based on basic human needs or 
flourishing.2
Despite the variety in multicultural justifications, all proponents have in common 
what Paul Kelly takes to be a “similar endorsement of the communitarian ‘social 
thesis’ -  namely, that individual identity is shaped by and provided through
1 Charles M ills, “Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism?”, in Multiculturalism and Political 
Theory, ed. Anthony S. Laden and David Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
0 . 221.
Andrew Mason, “Multiculturalism and the Critique o f  Essentialism”, in Multiculturalism and  
P olitical Theory, ed. Anthony S. Laden and David Owen, p. 232-42.
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membership of groups”.3 The social matters because it is through the social that 
life is rendered intelligible. Individuals are not atomistic beings, but rather are (at 
least) partly formed by the social processes around them.
A concern with autonomy underlies many o f the justifications of 
multiculturalism, although other considerations, such as equality, may well also 
be part o f the justifying rationale. Charles Taylor’s defence o f multiculturalism 
focuses on ontological questions. He argues that, given the pluralism inherent in 
modem societies, recognition o f cultures is crucial. Following a Hegelian 
understanding o f the self, Taylor defends the importance o f recognition as a 
means o f reclaiming the individual’s capacity to “listen to this inner voice”, to be 
oneself. His politics of recognition demand “that we all recognize the equal value 
o f different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their 
worth”.4 Multiculturalism in this sense is a political endeavour that better reflects 
the ontology o f being. Culture matters because autonomy matters -  we require 
access to our cultures as a means of being, o f understanding what is going on 
around us.
Iris Marion Young’s early multiculturalism was based on an ontological belief in 
the importance o f the social in the formation o f the self. Although autonomy 
underlies her account, for Young, multiculturalism was justified on egalitarian 
grounds. She argued that given that “oppression happens to social groups”, 
equality requires affirmative action or special rights.5 Multiculturalism is 
necessary because redistribution is not sufficient: recognition o f cultures is 
necessary in order to “foster the inclusion and participation o f all groups in 
public life”.6 Young’s work was not overly concerned with the relation between 
individuals and groups: her aim was to redress inequality in a way that did not 
solely focus on the material distributive paradigm.
3 Paul Kelly, “Introduction: Between Culture and Equality”, in M ulticulturalism Reconsidered , 
ed. Paul Kelly (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 2002), p. 7. Festenstein makes a similar 
point in Matthew Festenstein, Negotiating Diversity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 8 -13.
4 Charles Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition”, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  
Recognition, ed. Am y Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 64.
5 Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1990).
6 Ibid., p. 11. A similar point was made by Anne Phillips in The Politics o f  Presence (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 45.
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This viewpoint is echoed in Amy Gutmann’s definition of multiculturalism. For 
Gutmann, multiculturalism is intrinsically linked to notions o f equality.
Recognising and treating members of some groups as equals now seems 
to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural 
particularities, at least for those people whose self-understanding 
depends on the vitality of their culture. This requirement of political 
recognition of cultural particularity -  extended to all individuals -  is 
compatible with a form of universalism that counts the culture and 
cultural context valued by individuals as among their basic interests.7
Seen in this light, it seems that (some) theories o f multiculturalism seek to 
challenge the justice o f mere equality o f opportunity. If egalitarianism is indeed 
the reduction or elimination o f arbitrary forms of inequality (such as gender, 
race, ethnicity, political allegiance, religion, etc.), it seems that equality of formal 
rights is not enough to achieve practical equality. The inequalities o f outcome 
that persist in the current system of distributive justice are systematic and, as 
such, point to the existence o f well-established identifiable processes that both 
feminist and multicultural theories seek to challenge.
Multicultural theorists challenge the homogeneity o f the “normal citizen”, 
pointing out that mere redistribution of resources is not enough to do away with 
the systematic inequalities that persist in society.8 Because o f the importance of 
cultures in allowing choice and developing autonomy, culture cannot remain a 
private affair. Expecting cultures to be exclusively private forecloses “any 
engagement with the fundamental question of representation o f minorities in the 
political and cultural institutions of the public arena”.9 This in turn matters 
because, as Will Kymlicka points out, governments are not neutral in terms of 
culture:
7 Amy Gutmann, “Introduction”, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition , by 
Amy Gutmann and Charles Taylor (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 5.
8 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus (N ew  York: Routledge, 1997).
9 Clive Harris, “Beyond Multiculturalism? Difference, Recognition and Social Justice”, Patterns 
o f  Prejudice, Vol. 35, N o .l (2001), p. 16.
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The idea of responding to cultural differences with ‘benign neglect’ 
makes no sense. Government decisions on languages, internal 
boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve 
recognising, accommodating and supporting the needs and identities of 
particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes 
certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. Once we 
recognise this, we need to rethink the justice of minority rights claims.10
Cultural groups are also in need of recognition, of “calling attention to, if not 
perfomatively creating, the putative specificity o f some group and then affirming 
its value”.11 The ability to choose is circumscribed by culture. For Avishai 
Margalit and Joseph Raz, multiculturalism matters because it can enable human 
flourishing. In this sense,
membership of such groups is of great importance to individual well­
being, for it greatly affects one’s opportunities, one’s ability to engage 
in the relationships and pursuits marked by the culture. Secondly, it 
means that the prosperity of the culture is important to the well-being of 
its members. If the culture is decaying, or if it is persecuted or 
discriminated against, the options and opportunities open to its members 
will shrink, become less attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be 
successful.12
The group to which one belongs will severely affect the opportunities one has, 
the choices one is able to make. As a result, certain cultural communities ought 
to be protected in an attempt to avoid disadvantaging those whose culture is 
dissimilar to that o f the majority.
Although notions o f autonomy permeate multicultural accounts, it was Kymlicka 
who took it to be the most important element in justifying different multicultural 
rights. According to Kymlicka, autonomy is central to liberalism.
10 Will Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 108.
11 Fraser, Justice Interruptus, p. 16.
12 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination”, Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 
87 no. 9 (1990) reprinted in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights o f  M inority Cultures (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 87.
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The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental 
freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide 
freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives.13
The most important characteristic of liberalism is its commitment to freedom. 
What matters is the freedom to choose, and which choices are available to us 
hinge on the surroundings. We are all not only deeply enmeshed in social 
relations and cultural patterns, we are also partly defined by such relations. 
Culture is thus central in the formation o f liberal autonomy.14
Kymlicka recognised this when he claimed groups were in need o f special 
recognition. For him, the grounds for recognition are based on the importance of 
societal cultures for autonomous development. The value of cultural membership 
rests on its central position in enabling autonomous reflection. It follows that
Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not 
because they have some moral status of their own, but because it is 
through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can 
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and 
intelligently examine their value.15
In Kymlicka’s view, multiculturalism is necessary for individuals, not for groups. 
The point is not to protect groups but rather individuals “qua members o f 
cultures”.16 In this sense, multiculturalism is grounded on respect for individuals 
-  another central liberal concern. Lack o f recognition can harm the formation and 
development o f autonomy. Self-image, dignity, self-respect and self-identity are
13 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 80.
14 It must however be noted that not all multiculturalists justify multiculturalism through a 
commitment to autonomy or equality. See Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal A rchipelago  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural 
Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
However, it remains the case that concerns about autonomy permeate most accounts o f  
multiculturalism.
15 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 165. 
It is in chapter 8 o f  this book that Kymlicka defends cultural rights on the grounds o f  their 
importance for autonomous development in the most clear way.
16 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 167.
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all crucial elements o f autonomy which might be impaired when cultures are 
devalued or valued to a lesser degree than others.17
The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can 
actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is 
internalized.18
Special rights are conceived o f as a way o f ensuring, and even promoting, the 
autonomy o f individuals within minority groups. Thus understood, 
multiculturalism is not the singling out o f certain groups for special treatment, 
but rather the creation o f circumstances that enable individuals within groups to 
access more substantial versions o f equality.
Multiculturalism is justified through a number o f commitments. Concerns about 
equality figure in a number of these, as does a concern with the formation and 
development o f autonomy. Theorists have prioritised either autonomy or equality, 
but, given the central place o f the social in the formation o f liberal selves, and its 
importance in enabling choice, it seems that autonomy, albeit not always central, 
underlies many o f the accounts.
2. M ulticulturalism  and Feminism
a. Okin
Although feminism and multiculturalism spring from similar egalitarian 
concerns, some feminists have challenged whether multiculturalism is indeed the 
best strategy through which to pursue equality. According to Susan Moller Okin, 
one o f the prominent critics o f multicultural theories, multiculturalism can be bad 
for women since it fails to uphold its commitment to equality by treating cultural
17 See Lisa Schuster, “Common sense or racism? The treatment o f  asylum-seekers in Europe”, 
Patterns o f  Prejudice , Vol. 37, No. 3 (2003); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993); Margalit & Raz, National Self-Determination; Taylor, The 
Politics o f  Recognition.
18 Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition”, p. 36.
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groups as monoliths, failing to recognise how these are themselves gendered.19 
By not paying attention to the private sphere, multiculturalism fails to consider 
the inequalities that permeate what is usually considered the private: the nomos 
group and the family.20
What thus emerges is what is referred to by Ayelet Shachar as the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability. This is the situation whereby “pro-identity group 
policies aimed at levelling the playing field between minority communities and 
the wider society unwittingly allow systematic maltreatment o f individuals 
within the accommodated group”.21 By allowing multicultural groups jurisdiction 
over certain group matters, women and other ‘at-risk members’ might find 
themselves under a more unequal position compared to the situation they would 
face if  they did not belong to the cultural group in question. Okin’s essay was 
pointing at a very real problem that needs to be addressed.
Okin’s problems with multiculturalism had partly to do with autonomy. Whilst 
agreeing with Kymlicka’s claims about the importance o f autonomy for liberals, 
she disagreed that being able to access one’s cultural group (whatever it may be) 
is a requirement for exercising autonomy. According to Okin,
Surely self-respect and self-esteem require more than simple 
membership in a viable culture. Surely it is not enough for one to be 
able to ‘question one’s inherited social roles’ and to have the capacity to 
make choices about the life one wants to lead, that one’s culture be 
protected. At least as important to the development of self-respect and 
self-esteem is our place within our culture. And at least as pertinent to
19 Susan M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women? (Princeton, N . J. : Princeton University 
Press, 1999), and “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions”, Ethics, Vol. 108, No.4  
1998), pp. 661-684.
20 According to Shachar, the term nomoi (nomos, singular) groups refers to collectivities that are 
said to “share a unique history and collective memory, a distinct culture, a set o f  social norms 
customs and traditions, or perhaps, an experience o f  maltreatment by mainstream society or 
oppression by the state, all o f  which may give rise to a set o f  group specific rules or practices”. 
Ayelet Shachar, M ulticultural Jurisdictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 2 
footnote 5.
21 Shachar, M ulticultural Jurisdictions, p. 2.
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our capacity to question our social roles is whether our culture instils in 
us and forces on us particular social roles.22
For Okin, autonomy requires certain substantive conditions. Not all cultures will 
provide the same choices and, according to her, certain cultures, given their 
inherent patriarchal ism, will restrict the very availability o f options accessible to 
women. Where we are in a culture is crucial for our autonomous development. It 
thus follows that, for her, certain cultures simply do not promote autonomy.
Okin’s essay was highly controversial. She claimed that “most cultures have as 
one o f their principal aims the control o f women by men” and that some women
might be much better off if the culture into which they were bom were 
either to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated 
into the less sexist surrounding culture), or, preferably, to be encouraged 
to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women -  at least to the 
degree to which this value is upheld in the majority culture.23
This was not well received by many. Leti Volpp criticised Okin for her 
assumption that minority cultures are more patriarchal than western liberal 
ones.24 According to her
We identify sexual violence in immigrant of color and Third World 
communities as cultural, while failing to recognise the cultural aspects 
of sexual violence affecting mainstream white women. This is related to 
the general failure to look at the behaviour of white persons as cultural, 
while always ascribing the label of culture to the behaviour of minority 
groups.25
For Volpp, it is crucial not to take cultures as static or rigid. Cultures are 
constantly reformed and challenged from within, and might well embody
22 Okin, Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, p. 22.
23 Ibid., pp. 13-23.
24 Leti Volpp, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism”, Columbia Law Review , Vol. 101, No. 5. 
(2001).
25 Ibid., p. 1189.
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feminist values too. Indeed, the danger o f over-emphasising the difference 
between liberal western cultures and others has also been highlighted by Uma 
Narayan’s Dislocating Cultures, where she compares the cases o f death caused 
by domestic violence in the US and dowry murders in India. Although the figures 
are statistically similar, there is a clear asymmetry in the way they are portrayed. 
According to Narayan,
Fatal forms of violence against mainstream Western women seem 
interestingly resistant to (...) ‘cultural explanations’, leaving Western 
women seemingly more immune to ‘death by culture’. I believe that 
such asymmetries in ‘cultural explanation’ result in pictures of Third 
World women as ‘victims of their culture’ in ways that are interestingly 
different from the way in which victimisation of mainstream Western 
women is understood.26
Indeed, perhaps Okin’s characterisation o f the problems encountered by 
multicultural feminists was too caricatural. As Raz commented, “the same social 
arrangements can have differing social meanings, and therefore differing moral 
significance, in the context o f different cultures. This leads [Okin] to judge other 
cultures more harshly than her own, for she is instinctively sensitive to the 
context o f her culture (and mine) and is less likely to misread it.”27 Non-western 
cultures are not necessarily and by definition more patriarchal than western ones, 
and there are clear dangers in thinking this is the case. As Bonnie Honig pointed 
out, such clear judgements rest on underlying assumptions on what is male 
violence and what constitutes sex inequality. Given that there is no clear agreed 
universal definition, Okin was perhaps too reliant on liberal characterisations.28 
Bhikhu Parekh went even further, and claimed that Okin was “wrong to claim the 
authority of the entire liberal tradition”.29 There are many kinds of liberalism and 
how the different values fit in is disputed matter. If Okin’s definition o f gender
26 Uma Narayan, D islocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism  (N ew  
York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 84-5.
27 Joseph Raz, “How Perfect Should One Be?”, in Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, ed. 
Susan M. Okin (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 98.
28 Bonnie Honig, “My Culture Made Me Do It”, in Is Multiculturalism Bad fo r  Women?, ed. 
Susan M. Okin (Princeton, N . J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 38.
29 Bhikhu Parekh, “A Varied Moral World”, in Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, ed. Susan 
M. Okin (Princeton, N . J . : Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 71.
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equality is one that minority cultures ought to respect, there is no reason why 
consensus should stop at that -  issues such as free speech, representation and 
individualism could all become matters that minority cultures could be expected 
to conform to.
Another line o f criticism befell Okin’s initial conclusion that multiculturalism 
and feminism were incompatible.30 According to Kymlicka, multiculturalism and 
feminism are related struggles that challenge liberal theories in similar ways, 
they are “allies engaged in related struggles for a more inclusive conception of 
justice”.31 Indeed, both multiculturalism and feminism can be seen to challenge 
the individualist conceptions o f justice that have characterised much political 
theory. They both emphasise the need for recognition o f those who have been 
discriminated against. As Oonagh Reitman suggests, there may be no need to 
choose between feminism and multiculturalism -  there could be a form of 
multicultural feminism that respects the concerns o f both literatures.32
b. Subsequent Debates
i. Kukathas
Okin’s essay gave way to a plethora of different proposals. Chandran Kukathas 
agreed that multiculturalism and feminism were in tension but, unlike Okin, 
argued that it should be multiculturalism that takes precedence.33 The 
multiculturalism he proposes is o f a different form to that o f Kymlicka. Kukathas 
argues that multiculturalism does not require special rights or protections. The 
state should have as little involvement as possible, and “groups, or religious or 
cultural traditions (...) have to survive by their own resources”.34 The idea is that
30 Okin maintained the two were incompatible unless (young) women were represented in 
negotiations about group rights. See Okin, Is Multiculturalism B a d fo r Women?, p. 24.
31 Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Complacencies” in Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, ed. Susan 
M. Okin (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 34.
32 Oonagh Reitman, “Multiculturalism and Feminism: Incompatibility, Compatibility or 
Synonymity?”, Ethnicities, Vol V, N o. 2 (2005).
33 Chandran Kukathas, “Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?”, Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 
15(2001).
34 Ibid., p. 92.
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if  individuals disagree with a culture they should be allowed to leave. The right 
o f exit is thus
nothing more or less that the right to repudiate authority. It arises out of 
what might be called the ‘no-right’ of any authority to coerce people 
into becoming or remaining members of a community or association.
No authority has the right to prevent anyone from dissociating from the 
community and seeking to leave it.35
For Kukathas, a good society must allow freedom o f association and 
dissociation. This is in itself the most important freedom since “not all 
associations found in society value freedom” and, even if  they do value freedom, 
they might not practice it, or might even be indifferent to it.36 So, in order to 
respect the rights o f all, a multicultural society must ensure that all individuals 
can freely associate or disassociate as they see fit. Ultimately, “what matters is 
that people not be required to live in or be a part o f ways they think wrong, or to 
participate in practices which (morally) they cannot abide”.37 States cannot, nor 
should they, guarantee the existence of any particular group -  the longevity of 
groups is something that should be kept out of the remit o f the state, given that 
whether or not the group exists is based on the needs o f its members. Kukathas 
acknowledges that his proposed form of multiculturalism might seem 
“insensitive to power differentials”, a key feminist concern. But nonetheless he 
believes that “it should be addressed by denying any greater authority, such as 
the state, the power to support or entrench existing power”.38 A minimal state is 
the best way to allow for freedom of conscience.
Kukathas’ multiculturalism is based on his belief of the centrality o f freedom of 
conscience. For him, “a good society is one in which agreement is not 
compelled; for it is recognised that people disagree, and it is accepted that those 
who cannot be persuaded to think and behave differently should be tolerated or
35 Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, p. 97.
36 Ibid, p. 93-4.
37 Ibid, p. 95.
38 Kukathas, “Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?”, p. 94.
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allowed to go their separate ways”.39 A society cannot enforce conformism -  
what is central is that individuals be able to decide how they want to live, 
regardless o f the normative content o f these decisions. For him,
A person’s preferences have no bearing on whether or not he is free.
People generally have different preferences and different preference
orderings; and they have preferences about their preferences.40
Many objections have been raised to the claim that freedom of exit is a sufficient 
means o f protecting the most at-risk group members. Kukathas accepts that the 
costs o f exit might be high, but nonetheless maintains that “if an individual 
continues to live in a community and according to ways that (in the judgement of 
the wider society) treat her unjustly, even though she is free to leave, then our 
concern about the injustice diminishes”.41 Indeed, although he maintains that 
“those who are most likely to exit are not the well-to-do or the powerful but the 
poor and powerless”, he still thinks that his minimalist freedom of exit is enough 
to ensure the rights o f individuals within cultures.42
Kukathas’ freedom of exit solution has been considered to be an important part 
o f the solution to the paradox o f multicultural vulnerability, but is considered by 
many to be insufficient. Four key problems can be identified. First is the under­
theorisation o f choice. Despite Kukathas’ belief that not all cultures value 
freedom, and that a multicultural theory must be able to accommodate 
associations without enforcing this value on them, freedom of exit seems to 
depend on the assumption that people can choose to leave or to remain. Is choice 
related to autonomy? According to Kukathas it is not. It seems that choices 
themselves are o f intrinsic value and something that all human beings will value 
regardless of the normative commitments o f their cultures. However, it remains 
unclear why choice and autonomy are unrelated, or why choice is of such value 
if  autonomy is a culturally-specific practice. Choice plays a central role in his
39 Ibid, p. 101.
40 Ibid, p. 109.
41 Chandran Kukathas, “Are there any cultural rights”, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2002), p. 
133. For a similar comment see Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, p. 107.
42 Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, p. 108.
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freedom of exit but both the actual practice o f choosing and its significance 
remain under-theorised.
Kukathas’ reliance on choice brings up a second consideration central to the 
study o f minorities within minorities: what are the effects of oppressive 
socialisation or learned or adaptive preferences? As Brian Barry pointed out, 
freedom of exit, albeit crucial, is of more use when agents are fully aware o f 
alternative possibilities, and are able to successfully choose them. Merely having 
choices might not be sufficient since “you may not be aware (or not clearly 
enough aware) o f the alternatives, or you may be too inured to ill-treatment to 
recognise it, or you may be held back from leaving by a sense of duty”.43 The 
very realisation of what choices there are and an individual’s knowledge of these 
can be seen to be dependent on the social structures and norms around her. Are 
all choices of equal value? Must there not be some consideration of the ways in 
which people make choices that make them truly their own? Freedom of exit, 
although a vital necessity of any multicultural theory, is insufficient in order to 
limit the potential negative consequences o f multicultural rights.
Thirdly, as Okin argues, exit is often less available to women. This means that 
they are significantly less able to steward the process o f the group (as Kukathas 
claims should be the case).44 Okin’s position is grounded on her earlier work on 
the difference between the public and the private. According to her,
to the extent that a more private, domestic sphere does exist, its very 
existence, the limits that define it, and the types of behaviour that are 
acceptable and not acceptable within it all result from political 
decisions.45
Kukathas’ conceptualisation springs from his preference for a minimal state. The 
public is the concern o f the state, the private is not: it is up to individuals to 
decide what is it they want to do with their private lives. It is crucial to note here
43 Brian Barry, Culture an d  Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 149.
44 Susan M. Okin, “Mistresses o f  Their Own Destiny: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights 
o f  Exit”, Ethics, Vol. 112 (2002), pp. 206-7.
45 Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 129.
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that Kukathas’ view o f the private sphere is quite broad, reflecting his quasi­
anarchist position regarding how much power the state ought to have. Okin’s 
comments on the public and the private were based on the consideration o f the 
family as private and the rest as public. Kukathas also considers the family a 
private matter, but, in addition, culture is also to be part o f the private sphere of 
non-intervention. Yet, as Shachar mentions echoing Okin, “this binary opposition 
leads us astray, however, not only because it ignores the web o f relations 
between the inside and the outside [public and private], as well as the fragility of 
these categorisations, but also because it obscures the fact that what constitutes a 
‘private affair’ is in itself defined by the state’s regime o f law”.46
A final point can be made in relation to Kukathas’ multiculturalism. According 
to Shachar, he is overly reliant on assumptions about the internal homogeneity of 
groups. It seems that Kukathas values the fact that cultural identities might be 
very important for individuals. However, the structure and form o f these 
identifications is left somewhat under-theorised.
Kukathas, like Okin, must downplay the fact that minority group 
members posses multiple affiliations -  to their minority groups, genders, 
religions, families, states and so on. These different facets of individual 
identity may overlap and crisscross in complex ways. None can be said 
to have absolute priority over all others at all times. Yet Kukathas 
consistently prefers to ignore this potentially fluid intersection of 
affiliations, reducing this richness of personal identity into a single 
opposition instead: minority group member vs. citizen.47
Although Shachar overemphasises how much internal unity Kukathas gives to 
groups, her observation still holds. If indeed freedom o f exit is to be of 
importance, there must be some recognition o f the plurality o f identities of 
individuals, and what kind o f challenges these might pose. The assumption that 
exit is the best way o f protecting individuals against practices they might 
disagree with seems somewhat reliant on the idea o f culture as a whole, instead 
o f analysing whether there are specific practices an agent might object to, and
46 Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p. 41.
47 Ibid., p. 70.
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others she feels strongly committed to. Cultural identifications are not static, nor 
are they necessarily over-arching. An agent might agree with one practice but 
disagree with another. Exiting a particular cultural community in order to avoid 
the practice she disagrees with means that the agent will lose out on other 
practices, commitments and relations that she might otherwise value.
Whilst this freedom of exit is a necessary part o f any multicultural theory, there 
is a need to go further than merely ensuring individuals can leave their cultures. 
We must conceptualise the role o f choice in a deeper way, taking into account 
the impact o f socialisation and problem of adaptive preferences. What does it 
mean to say that individuals ought to be free to choose their cultural 
attachments? And how can we theorise in a way that does not assume cultures as 
bound and homogeneous, but takes seriously the plurality that characterises 
individuals’ positions towards “their” cultural groups?
ii. Shachar
Shachar’s transformative accommodation is a feminist response to the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability that springs from her notion o f cultural identifications 
as multiple, overlapping and conflicting. Like Kukathas, Shachar agrees with 
Okin that feminism and multiculturalism are in tension. However, for her, the 
key to solving the paradox is in allowing for plural attachments to have different 
areas o f jurisdiction:
So long as women’s citizenship guarantees remain firmly in place, there 
are circumstances under which a degree of regulated interaction 
between secular and religious sources of law and identity may 
contribute to (rather than inhibit) the improvement of women’s equality 
and dignity under both systems, affording them an opportunity to 
express their commitment to both.48
48 A yelet Shachar, “What We Owe Women: The View from Multicultural Feminism”, in Toward  
a Humanist Justice: The Political Philosophy o f  Susan M oller Okin , eds. Debra Satz and Rob 
Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 143.
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For her, it is central that multicultural policies be sensitive to the plural 
attachments agents hold. This means thinking o f jurisdiction in terms o f different 
“sub-matters” which are “multiple, separable, yet complementary legal 
components”. Agents
...must have clear options which allow them to choose between the 
jurisdiction of the state and the nomoi group. Choice here means that 
they can remain within the sub-matter jurisdiction of the original power- 
holder (approval) or that they can resist that jurisdictional authority at 
predefined ‘reversal’ points (disapproval). ... As a last resort they can 
discipline the relevant power-holder by ‘opting out’ of a jurisdiction if 
the jurisdiction power-holders fail to effectively respond to constituent 
needs.49
Effectively what this means is that individuals decide themselves under which 
jurisdiction (or even cultural system) they want to operate. By dividing along 
sub-matters, agents can differentiate in practical ways between different practices 
that they might or might not agree to. Both the cultural group and the state retain 
authority -  only this authority is now “responsive to all its constituents”.50 This 
will in turn, according to Shachar, “allow cultural differences to flourish, while 
creating a catalyst for internal change”.51
Shachar’s proposal seems more appealing from the perspective o f minorities 
within minorities aiming to be sensitive to plural identifications. However, it still 
suffers from a number o f drawbacks. As Anne Phillips notes, the proposal could 
potentially work for countries that already have systems o f joint governance, but 
it would be more difficult, or there would be strong resistance to implementing 
this in countries that do not, such most European liberal states.52 Reitman goes 
even further, claiming that the difficulties o f the exit option remain even if  there 
are systems o f joint governance operating. Shachar’s partial exit would perhaps 
enable more choice in terms o f the different aspects that constitute cultural lives,
49 Ibid, p. 122.
50 Ibid, p. 117.
51 Ibid, p. 118.
52 Anne Phillips, M ulticulturalism without Culture (Princeton: N ew  Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), p. 152-3.
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but those who do decide to “opt out” in particular instances, such as women who 
obtain a divorce in Israel, “may well suffer negative consequences, in terms of 
social ostracism and communal reprimand, for deigning to flout the authority of 
the religious legal system”.53
As well as the practical difficulties involved in instituting a joint governance 
approach in countries that do not have it, there are also other problems. Firstly, 
there would be an increase in group membership regulation: individuals would 
have to enter and/or exit groups in order to be allowed to be under their 
jurisdiction. The question of ‘who is allowed to be a member’ could conceivably 
pose problems. Secondly, as Clare Chambers notes, it is not clear which group 
individuals with a variety of identifications should be affiliated to:
should a Jew by descent who is a believer in Islam be governed by 
Jewish or Muslim law? What (...) happens to those individuals (atheists, 
libertarians, comprehensive liberals?) who wish to be bound to no 
group? Should a Jewish atheist be governed by Jewish jurisdiction, or 
may she remove herself to the monopolistic rule of the state?54
A third point has to do with the practicality of the exit option. Reitman maintains 
that these systems o f joint governance would make exit in European liberal states 
more difficult than it currently is:
Groups would acquire compulsory and automatic jurisdiction over 
status determination. For these women, exit becomes a much more 
formal procedure since they would have compulsorily to submit to the 
minority’s regulation and then formally to exit from it after a given 
period of time.55
53 Oonagh Reitman, “On Exit” in Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and D iversity, 
eds. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 202.
54 Clare Chambers, Sex, Culture and Justice: The Limits o f  Choice (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
University Press, 2008), p. 152.
55 Reitman, “On Exit”, p. 203.
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Assimilation would become a highly regulated activity that entails effort on the 
individual’s behalf (not to mention state resources). Given the nature o f the 
process o f assimilation it seems rather demanding to expect individuals to submit 
formal appeals to ‘leave’ one’s religion, and a possible consequence might be a 
disparity between the numbers of those formally assimilating and those who do 
not submit the formal appeals but are nonetheless assimilating.
What is most striking about Shachar’s account is that despite her commitment to 
the fluidity and multiplicity o f culture, her language about individuals remains 
firmly within the rational actor tradition. As Phillips notes, both Kukathas and 
Shachar “depict the individual in abstractly ahistorical terms”.56 Indeed, 
Shachar’s idea about individuals choosing which jurisdiction they prefer on 
certain issues and assessing the costs and benefits o f different options is reliant 
on an implicit view o f rationally autonomous individuals. She does not seem to 
link choice and autonomy -  her book contains no discussion o f how these 
(omnipresent) choices are made,* or of what happens when two choices, 
originating from different identifications, conflict.
It seems Shachar does not take the implications o f her own argument seriously 
enough. Her critique o f Okin rests on the unfairness o f requiring women to 
choose between their culture and their rights. From that critique one would 
assume that she does indeed understand the difficulties o f wrenching oneself 
from one’s culture, and hence the complexities of choice. However, her 
conceptualisation o f choice remains under-theorised, in so far as there is no 
discussion of how choices are made or why they should matter. Shachar seems to 
understand the complexity of belonging and identification, but this does not seem 
to translate into the complexity o f making choices about those identities. 
Interestingly, one o f her “limiting principles” is what she calls the “clearly 
delineated choice options”.57 According to this proviso it is important that agents 
have “clear options which allow them to choose between the jurisdiction of the 
state and the nomoi group”.58 The choices available are limited and regulated: the
56 Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, p. 153.
57 Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p. 122-6.
58 Ibid, p. 122.
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individual can choose to belong to the jurisdiction o f the nomoi group or the 
jurisdiction of the state. However, this seems to obscure the complexity of 
identification, assuming an almost linear route in the decision-making procedure.
In this thesis I agree with Shachar’s view that we must avoid a strict dichotomy 
between cultural groups and citizenship, and with her insights into the plural 
identifications that agents hold. However, the crux o f my argument is to analyse 
some o f the conceptual matters that underpin Shachar’s proposals. What kind of 
autonomy are we talking about? Are all instances o f decision-making 
autonomous? What are the effects o f holding a variety o f identifications on a 
conception of autonomy? And is it possible that a non-decision, i.e. ambivalence, 
be an instance o f autonomy?
iii. Chambers
Whereas Shachar’s view of choice remains close to the rational actor tradition, 
Clare Chambers argues that the effects of socialisation must be taken seriously 
given the constraints these can put on our preferences. Choosing which 
jurisdiction to follow is not an adequate solution to the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability. For Chambers, Shachar’s proposed solution is problematic because 
it allows for practices that are simply not egalitarian. For Chambers
An unequal state of affairs cannot be justified simply by the observation 
that it came about as the result of the choices of those who are the least 
well off. ... Liberals should be concerned about cases where the 
disadvantage and influence factors are present because they illustrate the 
limitations of individuals’ ability to escape contexts that limit, rather 
than enhance, their choices.59
Liberals ought not to tolerate certain practices because it cannot be claimed that 
they are autonomously chosen. Free choices are not truly free in the relevant
59 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice: The Limits o f  Choice, p. 156-7.
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ways because o f the effects o f social construction. According to Chambers, 
social construction affects autonomy in two ways:
The ways in which individuals and their preferences are formed by 
social forces and the fact that individuals’ options are constrained by 
social norms -  some of which are harmful or epitomise inequality.60
Harmful norms need to be identified. Then it must be established whether there 
are good reasons for agents to follow these harmful norms -  for example, in 
terms o f future benefits received. If these benefits are dependent on a social 
norm, the state ought then to establish whether this social norm is unequal. If 
indeed it is, then the state ought to intervene since
the only way for most individuals to escape a social norm that is a 
requirement for achieving social status (...) is in a context of (near) 
universal noncompliance so that the norm ceases to function. Otherwise, 
there will always be an incentive for an individual to follow the norm 
and thus increase her status.61
Through an analysis o f Martha Nussbaum’s critique of the practice o f female 
genital cutting (FGC),62 Chambers argues that breast implants can also be seen as 
a product o f unequal social construction; if  so, she argues, then both practices 
should be banned. Chambers admits that her solution to the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability might be considered by some to be paternalistic, but 
nonetheless believes that it is the sort o f paternalism that is compatible with a 
liberalism sensitive to social construction.63 Following Joel Feinberg, she claims 
that paternalism
is always a good and relevant (though not necessarily decisive) reason 
in support of a criminal prohibition that it will prevent harm (physical, 
psychological or economic) to the actor himself.64
60 Ibid, p. 159.
61 Ibid, p. 194.
62 Martha Nussbaum, Sex and  Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
63 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice: The Limits o f  Choice, pp. 202-221.
64 Joel Feinberg quoted in Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice: The Limits o f  Choice, p. 209.
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Chambers’ paternalism combines the harm element with the idea of social 
construction. For her, “self-harming practices are unjust if they are performed 
only in response to a social norm, since in such cases society is both culpable for 
and able to remedy the harm caused”.65 The state has a responsibility to ensure 
that harmful social norms are not available to be chosen.
Chambers’ approach prioritises equality over autonomy concerns. She does not 
explicitly challenge that idea that autonomy ought to be the driving consideration 
because what appears to be an autonomous decision might not be so when 
analysed through the lens o f unequal social construction. For her,
concerns about equality, coupled with the theory of social construction, 
must lead to a modification of the liberal prioritization of choice and of 
some liberal accounts of autonomy.66
Autonomy ought not to be in tension with equality, but if it is, equality should be 
prioritised in order to have a truly liberal solution to the paradox o f multicultural 
vulnerability. Autonomy matters, but ought not to be the sole concern. 
Chamber’s conception o f autonomy is left considerably open. Autonomy has 
been thought to be divided into two kinds: procedural autonomy refers to 
content-neutral forms o f autonomy, whereas substantive refers to forms of 
autonomy that prioritise particular values. Chambers is committed to procedural 
autonomy, but a procedural autonomy that is substantive in so far as she believes 
that equality should be a key characteristic of autonomous decision making. This 
thesis argues that the relation between substantive and procedural autonomy 
needs to be unpacked in order to be clear about the kinds o f autonomy we are 
dealing with. To what extent do choices need to be substantive in order to render 
the decision an autonomous one? How can a conceptualisation o f autonomy be 
sensitive to socialisation without being too rigid?
65 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice: The Limits o f  Choice, p. 211.
66 Ibid, p. 229.
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A second issue with Chambers’ solution to the issues posed by the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability is her inflexibility in terms o f the kinds of 
multiculturalism she would allow. Despite her nuanced work on social 
construction, Chambers ignores the different meanings a single practice may 
have.
As I argue in section 3 o f this chapter, taking socialisation seriously requires 
awareness o f the various meanings practices might have. The same tradition or 
custom can represent a variety o f norms. These norms can only be understood 
with reference to the context in which they are exercised. It becomes apparent 
that Chambers is perhaps too quick to assign particular meanings to practices, 
without sufficient consideration o f the ways in which they might be seen and 
understood by those who choose them.
Ultimately, Chambers’ idea that symbols of inequality ought to be banned so that 
they no longer constitute a choice seems overly rigid, especially given her earlier 
preoccupation with the role of social structures in forming both the way agents 
choose and their actual choices. Her account o f social construction will be further 
discussed in chapter II, when her solutions to the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability will be seen to be insufficient in dealing with the consequences of 
oppressive forms o f socialisation.
iv. Saharso
Like Chambers, Sawitri Saharso also agrees that equality and autonomy can 
conflict when attempting to find a solution to the paradox. Saharso’s solution, 
however, focuses on using contextual understanding on a case by case basis in 
order to decide whether or not to tolerate practices. For her, “good feminism may 
well require acts o f multiculturalism”, leading her to espouse a broader form of 
multiculturalism than Chambers allows.67
67 Sawitri Saharso, “Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics o f  Multiculturalism”, Feminist 
Theory, Vol. 4, N o. 2 (2003), p. 201.
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Saharso has criticised what she calls the “deductive approach to tolerance” as too 
rigid.68 The deductive approach to tolerance operates by establishing abstract 
toleration principles and then analysing “whether or not a particular practice is 
consistent with them”.69 It is reminiscent o f Chambers’ focus on equality as the 
appropriate consideration when thinking about whether to tolerate a practice or 
not. In Sex, Culture and Social Justice Chambers argues against breast implants 
and female genital mutilation, and, in her response to Saharso, claims that sex- 
selective abortions also fall short o f respecting women’s equal status and, as 
such, should not be tolerated.70
Saharso claims that an approach that is not solely based on abstract principles is a 
better way o f finding solutions. The contextual approach to tolerance focuses on 
analysing on an individual basis in an attempt to gain “situational understanding” 
o f the problems faced and to include the perspectives o f all the parties involved. 
Saharso’s work recognises that practices can be grounded in a variety o f different 
social norms, making contextual analysis crucial so as to ensure that the pertinent 
norms are considered. If there is a decision to be made that involves prioritising 
one principle (equality, autonomy or tolerance, for example) over another, it 
ought to be made following a utilitarian calculus.71
Equality cannot trump autonomy a priori. According to Saharso, it is crucial to 
respect women’s own perspectives on their preferred choices and identifications. 
She argues for a relational understanding o f autonomy, criticising the assumption 
that choices are either autonomously chosen or imposed (and therefore not 
autonomous). For Saharso it is crucial to look at the reasons why women 
continue to choose inegalitarian or patriarchal options, remaining open about the 
ways women “negotiate oppressive social conditions”.72 For her, “if  women do
68 Sawitri Saharso and Odile Verhaar, “Headscarves in the Policeforce and the Court: Does 
Context Matter?”, A cta Politico, Vol. 41, No. 1. (2006).
69 Ibid, p. 68.
70 Clare Chambers, “Autonomy and Equality in Cultural Perspective: Response to Sawitri 
Saharso”, Feminist Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004).
71 Saharso and Verhaar, “Headscarves in the Policeforce and the Court”, p. 77.
72 Saharso, “Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics o f  Multiculturalism”, p. 201.
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not want to break with tradition it is inadequate to perceive this as a ‘forced 
choice’ made by ‘brainwashed’ victims o f culture”.73
Although for Saharso context is crucial, not all practices are to be tolerated. 
Respect for women means taking their choices seriously, without creating 
caricatures o f minorities: “The challenge is to be critical, yet not to add to the 
further demonization o f minority groups.”74 When thinking about autonomy we 
must consider the difference between
the right to autonomy and the capacity for autonomy when judging 
multicultural issues. While the first refers to the right to act 
autonomously in the outside world, the second refers to the 
psychological abilities that autonomy requires.75
Women might exercise autonomy even when their right to it is not upheld. They 
might choose to pursue practices and identifications that are sanctioned by law 
under the assumption that these customs must necessarily be forced upon them. 
However, as has been argued, respecting women’s own views on the meaning of 
different practices is a crucial necessity in a feminist multicultural framework.
Despite Saharso’s recognition of the importance o f respecting people’s own 
perspectives, and her mention that “some cultural contexts are more conducive to 
the mental capacity for autonomy than others”, 76 she does not elaborate on what 
kind o f autonomy is necessary in the evaluation o f permissible practices. Her 
work focuses on the analysis o f particular policy initiatives in the Netherlands, 
applying the aforementioned contextual approach instead o f a deductive 
approach over-reliant on formal abstract principles.77 In this thesis I share 
Saharso’s commitment to respecting women’s own self-understanding, and her
73 Ibid, p. 210.
74 Sawitri Saharso, “Sex Selective Abortion: Gender, Culture and Dutch Public Policy”, 
Ethnicities, Vol. 5, N o. 2 (2005), p. 249.
75 Saharso, “Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics o f  Multiculturalism”, p. 210.
76 Ibid.
77 See Saharso, and Verhaar, “Headscarves in the Policeforce and the Court: Does Context 
Matter?”; Sawitri Saharso and Baukje Prins, “In the Spotlight: A Blessing and a Curse for 
Immigrant Women in the Netherlands”, Ethnicities, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2008); Sawitri Saharso, and 
Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious Citizenship: Policies and Debates on the Veil in the Netherlands”, 
International Studies in Gender, State an d  Society, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2008).
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view that policy initiatives should be grounded in a contextual manner. However, 
further elaboration on autonomy is required -  it is necessary to understand 
autonomy in a contextual way given that it too can be considered an abstract 
principle. What kinds o f autonomy are we talking about? Do all instances of 
decision-making count as autonomous decisions? How much abstraction is 
required in a conception o f autonomy? Is it possible to think of autonomy in the 
contextual manner that Saharso advocates?
3. Autonomy and Contextual Understanding
Chambers and Saharso embody different approaches to the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability. Chambers’ account draws attention to the (sometimes 
unequal) norms that justify practices, emphasising the effects o f oppressive 
socialisation on autonomous choice. Saharso stresses the importance of 
respecting women’s autonomy given the plurality o f understandings that 
contextual interpretation involves. Both theorists highlight the importance o f the 
social in bestowing meanings on choices and attachments, but whereas Chambers 
seems to limit the range o f possible meanings, Saharso emphasises the 
importance o f considering context. It is useful at this stage to consider various 
examples in order to see the role that contextuality plays in interpreting 
autonomy. This is particularly important, given that autonomy is often taken to 
be a key factor in deciding the permissibility o f multicultural practices.
A paradigmatic case o f the equality vs. autonomy question has been that of 
permissibility o f the veil in liberal European societies.78 After the 2003
78 This debate has taken place at both theoretical levels and policy levels. For theory discussions 
on the permissibility o f  the veil see (for example) Anna E. Galeotti, “Citizenship and Equality: 
the Place for Toleration”, P olitical Theory, Vol. 21, N o.4 (1993); “A Problem with Theory: A  
Rejoinder to Moruzzi”, Political Theory, Vol. 22, N o. 4 (1994); Norma C. Moruzzi, “A Problem 
with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities o f  Political and Social Identity”, Political Theory, 
Vol. 22, N o. 4 (1994a); “A Response to Galeotti”, P olitical Theory, Vol. 22, N o. 4 (1994b). See 
also Cecile Laborde, “Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab”, Critical Review o f  
International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, N o. 3 (2006); “Secular Philosophy and 
Muslim Headscarves”, Journal o f  Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2005). In terms o f  policy 
there has been debate in Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Norway, the 
Netherlands and, recently, Spain. In France, veils are banned in public institutions: one may not 
attend or work in a public institution whilst wearing a veil.
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publication o f the Stasi report in France there was considerable debate over 
whether women were under undue pressure to wear the veil, thus showing 
conformity to patriarchal social norms.79 According to the Stasi report, the 
banning o f the veil was justified because it represented a sexist resurgence that 
called into question the liberty o f the girls forced to wear it:
Les jeunes filles se retrouvent d’une resurgence du sexisme qui se 
traduit par diverses pressions et par des violences verbales, 
psychologiques ou physiques. Des jeunes gens leur imposent de porter 
des tenues de porter des tenues couvrantes et asexuees, de baisser le 
regard a la vue d'un homme ; a ddfaut de s’y conformer, elles sont 
stigmatises comme «putes». (...) Des droits etementaires des femmes 
sont aujourd'hui quotidiennement bafoudes dans notre pays. Une telle 
situation est inacceptable.80
The veil is seen as an embodiment o f gendered norms that subject women and is 
widely seen as a means o f controlling female sexuality.81 Fatima Memissi, a 
Moroccan feminist, summarises this reading of the purposes o f the veil:
The woman is a dangerous distraction which must be used for the 
specific purpose of providing the Muslim nation with offspring and 
quenching the tensions of the sexual instinct. But the woman should not, 
in any way, be an object of emotional investment or the focus of 
attention, which should be devoted to Allah alone in the form of 
knowledge seeking, meditation and prayer.82
79 The Stasi Report was commissioned by President Jacques Chirac in order to investigate how  
the principle o f  laTcity should apply in practice. The report focused primarily on the veil and its 
permissibility in French public schools. The findings o f  the Stasi Commission were enshrined in 
law in what is known as law 2004-228 o f  15 March 2004, which came into practice on the 2nd o f  
September 2004.
80 Bernard Stasi, Laicite et Republique. Rapport de la Commission de Reflexion sur Vapplication  
du Principe de laicite dans la republique (Paris : La Documentation Fran^aise, 2003), p. 46-7.
81 It must be noted that the French ban was not justified exclusively by reference to the 
patriarchal, symbolism o f  the hijab. Concerns about lai’city and fraternity also figured prominently. 
See Cecile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and  P olitical Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) for an excellent, i f  critical, discussion o f  the republican 
justifications for the ban on the veil.
82 Fatima Memissi, Beyond the Veil: M ale-Female Dynamics in a  M odern Muslim Society 
(London: A1 Saqi, 1985), p. 14.
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In such accounts, the veil is conceived as part o f a series o f institutions or 
practices that seek to control women and sexuality. The veil separates women 
from the outside world; it creates a barrier that works to exclude women from 
civil and public life. This exclusion can be said to work in two ways. Firstly, it 
excludes women from public life following the norms of da’wa or piety. It
can be interpreted as a symbol revealing a collective fantasy of the 
Muslim community; to make women disappear, to eliminate them from 
communal life, to relegate them to an easily controllable terrain, the 
home, to prevent them moving about, and to highlight their illegal 
position on male territory by means of a mask.83
But it also excludes women, marking them as Muslim, and therefore part o f a 
minority. As Joan Scott argues
the veil denotes both a religious group and a much larger population, a 
whole ‘culture’ at odds with French norms and values. The symbolism 
of the veil reduces differences of ethnicity, geographic origin, and 
religion to a singular entity, a ‘culture’, that stands in opposition to 
another singular entity, republican France.84
There can be no denying that the veil can indeed be a symbol o f unequal 
gendered expectations: a marker o f oppression and patriarchy.85 Women might 
choose to wear the veil, but their reasons might not be egalitarian ones; they may 
not have “taken part in constructing the framework within which decisions about 
dress take place, but rather are forced to respond in conflicting directions to 
frameworks constructed by men”.86
It is important, however, not to essentialise the position o f women in Islam or the 
role o f the veil in sustaining inequalities. For Memissi, for example, the
83 Fatima M emissi, “Virginity and Patriarchy” in Women and Islam , ed. Aziza al-Hibri, (New  
York, Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 189.
84 Joan Scott, The Politics o f  the Veil (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
p . n .
5 Laborde, “Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab”, p. 355.
86 Nancy Hirschmann, “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling and the Question o f  Free Agency”, 
Constellations, Vol. 5. N o. 3 (1998), p. 351.
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disadvantages faced are “less Qu’ranic prescriptions and Islamic gendered 
institutions and more social and economic factors that privilege men over women 
and define the low status o f women”.87 In this view, the practice is an 
embodiment o f inequality, but not reducible to inequality alone. Veiling is better 
understood as the consequence rather than the source of inequality. It can be
both a marker of autonomy, individuality, and identity, and a marker of 
inequality and sexist oppression. (...) The veil itself is not so much a 
cause of women’s lack of freedom and control over their lives as it is a 
marker of it.88
The veil is not exclusively Islamic, nor is it necessarily only a religious symbol. 
Although many take it as a statement portraying the wearer’s Muslim identity, 
some studies argue that as a practice it emerged out o f eastern and Semitic 
cultures, and that it has similarities with other Mediterranean or Semitic 
practices. Catholic women in the Mediterranean veil on entering a church, and 
orthodox Jewish women shave their heads upon marriage, subsequently to wear a 
wig in public, for instance.89
Fadwa El Guindi shows, through her four-way topography o f the different 
historical meanings o f the veil, the changes that are geographically and 
historically located. Her research shows that the notion o f veiling is not unknown 
outside Islam, and that it can reflect a variety o f different meanings across 
political, historical, religious and class signifiers. Thus, in ancient Sumeria, the 
veil was a sign o f gender complementarity. This has been carried on to today’s 
Bahrain, whereby the keys to the household, a sign o f control and autonomy, are 
attached to women’s veils or braids. In Persia, the veil was a symbol of class 
exclusivity. It was only upper class women who were veiled -  if  lower classes or
87 Haideh M oghissi, “Introduction”, in Women and Islam: C ritical Concepts in Sociology, 
Volume / ,  ed. Haideh M oghissi (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 8.
88 Nancy Hirschmann, “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling and the Question o f  Free Agency”, 
pp. 352-3.
89 See Marie Aimde Hdlie-Lucas, “The Preferential Symbol for Islamic Identity: Women in 
Muslim Personal Laws”, in Feminist Theory Reader: Local and G lobal P erspectives , ed. Carole 
McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim (New York: Routledge, 2002); Azizah Al-Hibri “A study o f  
Islamic Herstory: or how did w e ever get into this mess?”, in Women and Islam , ed. Aziza al- 
Hibri, (N ew  York: Pergamon Press, 1982).
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slaves veiled, it was considered a criminal offence.90 Hellenic society, as 
represented by Leila Ahmed, veiled as an embodiment o f gender asymmetry, 
whereby women were admired for their silence as a symbol representing their 
submissiveness. Byzantines veiled out o f pious Christian beliefs, which held 
women as the probable sources of sin.91
Even if  we do take the veil to be a reflection of a woman’s Muslim identity, it 
cannot be considered that alone. Similarly, it cannot be exclusively considered a 
symbol of patriarchy. Understanding the contextual significance o f the veil 
means not seeing it as a static signifier. As Ruth Rubinstein points out, dressing 
has the following (if not more) purposes: to separate group members from non­
members; to place the individual in the social organisation; to place the 
individual in a gender category; to indicate desired social conduct; to indicate 
high status and rank; to control sexual activity; to enhance role performance; to 
give the individual a sense of activity and/or to indicate political position.92
Veiling encompasses all the above. Apart from clearly differentiating women in 
terms o f religious belief, it is also a symbol o f familiarity and position within 
kinship bonds. Women may change the position o f their veil in order to indicate
Q 'i
their different relationships with other agents surrounding them.
The hijab, the material it is made from, its colour and patterns are all locally 
contingent. Thus, the headscarf is often used as a common signifier of belonging 
to different tribes or villages. For instance, Palestinians have over twenty 
different veils, all made from different materials and worn differently according 
to the area the woman comes from.94 By seeing a particular embodiment, an 
observing agent will be able to locate the nomos group, and/or village to which 
the agent wearer belongs.
90 Fadwa El Guindi, “The Veil Becomes a Movement” in Women and Islam: Critical Concepts in 
Sociology Volume II, ed. Haideh Moghissi, (London: Routledge, 2005).
91 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: H istorical Roots o f  a  Modern D ebate (New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
92 Ruth Rubinstein, Society's Child: Identity, Clothing and Style (Boulder, Colorado: Westview  
Press, 2000).
93 Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy an d  Resistance (Oxford: Berg, 1999), p. 86.
94 Shelag Weir, Palestinian Costume (London: British Museum Publications, 1989).
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The hijab has also been said to be a matter o f class: veiling as a sign that the 
woman did not need to engage in manual labour, thus indicating the family’s 
socio-economic status.95 Different veils were worn by women in different socio­
economic strata, with some being considered as a symbol o f (economic) success, 
and thus desirable.
Veiling has also emerged as a clear political statement. In the aftermath of 
colonialism, in Algeria and Egypt, women who did not previously cover donned 
the hijab in order to show “that one was against colonialism or against the 
Western sympathetic elite regime and all that it stood for”.96 Similarly, the hijab 
has also been seen to be a symbol o f “political protest against elite 
Westernisation programmes and Western neo-imperialism [assuming] less 
dramatic forms than revolutionary coups”.97 The particular form o f the new dress 
could also signify the possibility of regarding Islam as an alternative system of 
government.
It emerges that the veil can represent a variety o f social norms and, importantly 
for my argument, could represent a number o f different ones simultaneously. It 
can be seen as a symbol of patriarchy, and it is undoubtedly true that some 
women are under undue pressure to wear it. According to Cecile Laborde, 
lai'cites tended to
insist that even in the more common cases when older adolescents 
voluntarily decide to wear headscarves on religious grounds, and are not 
subjected to obvious coercion or threats by either their parents or 
religious leaders, doubts must be cast about the authenticity and validity 
of their choice.98
The autonomy o f those who wore the veil was cast into doubt. However, despite 
the symbolism o f the veil as a symbol o f patriarchy, contextual understanding
95 Lois Beck and Nikki R. Keddie, eds, Women in the Muslim World  (Cambridge: Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1978).
96 Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging H istorical and  
Modern Stereotypes (London: International Institute o f  Islamic Thought, 2002), p. 88.
97 Ibid, p. 91.
98 Laborde, Critical Republicanism, p. 119.
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shows it can also represent a variety o f other norms such as religion, place of 
origin or political allegiance. Can contextuality help shed light on what 
autonomy means and how it might be reflected in practice?
The case o f the veil in France was just one example where the autonomy o f the 
individuals who chose to wear it was called into question. There have been 
several other examples in multicultural Europe that reflect the same 
phenomenon. One such example is evidence from court cases where cultural 
defence has been used." According to Paul Magnarella,
A cultural defense maintains that persons socialized into a minority or 
foreign culture, who regularly conduct themselves in accordance with 
their own culture’s norms, should not be held fully accountable for 
conduct that violates official law, if that conduct conforms to the 
prescriptions of their own culture.100
According to Volpp, cultural defence is useful because it provides a way of 
countering the belief that the law has no culture.101 If law is intended to be 
universal, it seems logical that factors that help explain behaviour in different 
contexts be taken into account. However, as Phillips argues, the use o f cultural 
defence can have unintended consequences. One such is the assumption that 
culture affects people differently: people from minority cultural groups are taken 
to be more affected by cultural norms than members of the majority.
99 See Moira Dustin and Anne Phillips, “Whose Agenda Is It? Abuses o f  Women and Abuses o f  
‘Culture’ in Britain”, Ethnicities, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2008); Alison Renteln, “A Justification o f  the 
Cultural Defense as a Partial Excuse”, California Review o f  Law and  Women's Studies, Vol. 2 
(1993); Dorianne L. Coleman, “Individualising Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberal’s 
Dilemma”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95 (1996); Julia P. Sams, “The Availability o f  the 
‘Cultural Defense’ as an Excuse for Criminal Behaviour”, G eorgia Journal o f  International and  
Comparative Law, Vol. 16, (1986); Jeroen Van Broeck, “Cultural Defence and Culturally 
Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences)”, European Journal o f  Law an d Crim inal Justice, Vol. 9 
(2001); Nancy S. Kim, “The Cultural Defense and the Problem o f  Cultural Preemption: A  
Framework for Analysis”, N ew M exico Law Review, Vol. 27 (1997); Daina Chiu, “The Cultural 
Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation and Guilty Liberalism”, California Law Review, Vol. 
82(1994).
100 Paul Magnarella, “Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The Cultural D efense on Trial”, 
Journal o f  Ethnic Studies, Vol. 19, N o. 3 (1991), p. 67.
101 Leti Volpp, “(M)isdentifying Culture: Asian Women and the ‘Cultural D efence’”, H arvard  
Women's Law Journal, Vol. 17 (1994).
40
Individuals from the dominant cultural group might be led astray or 
make mistakes, but are usually deemed as in some way responsible for 
their actions. (...) Individuals from minority groups, by contrast, are 
more commonly conceptualized as defined by and definitive of their 
culture, so that even the most aberrant can become ‘typical’ products of 
their cultural norms.102
This in turn has two consequences. It can overstate the role o f cultural difference, 
justifying certain actions as cultural. Honour crimes or violence against women 
are explained by reference to cultural backgrounds where the role o f honour and 
piety are emphasised. Secondly, it can also “diminish women (and men) from 
minority cultural groups by mis-representing their cultures, and mis-representing 
the individuals as less autonomous beings”.103 It seems that the more the 
individual conforms to cultural stereotypes, the more she will be considered to be 
acting in a non-autonomous manner. It emerges that the relation between culture 
and autonomy is a complicated one that deserves further study.
Contextual understandings might help understand in which ways, if  at all, culture 
matters in the formation and development of autonomous capacities. As Saharso 
notes when considering the autonomy o f women who choose to have hymen 
repair surgery and sex selective abortions, it is important to see how women 
themselves see their attachments operating, and the significance o f their actions. 
Even if  Okin was right to point out that the politics o f multiculturalism can 
problematise the development o f feminist agendas, we must we wary o f jumping 
to assumptions regarding agency, such as: “If  a woman takes a decision that runs 
counter to the majority culture’s sense o f what is right and just, it cannot be her 
decision. It must be imposed by an outside source -  her husband, her culture, her 
religion.”104 The alleged autonomy o f agents emerges as one o f the 
considerations operating in decisions to do with the veil, but also hymen repair 
surgery, forced and arranged marriages, and criminal cases.105 As such, it seems
102 Anne Phillips, Gender and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 88.
103 Ibid, p. 89.
104 Saharso, “Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics o f  Multiculturalism”, p. 209.
105 See Phillips, Gender and Culture, Chapters 7 and 8 and Anne Phillips and Moira Dustin, “UK  
Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Exit and Dialogue”, P olitical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3
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necessary to see what we mean by autonomy and how it might be called into 
question by unequal gender norms.
4. Central Perspectives
Autonomy is, and should be, a central consideration in the study o f minorities 
within minorities. But whilst increasingly cited as a key concern in thinking 
through the dilemmas o f multiculturalism, it remains under-theorised. My own 
approach stresses sensitivity to context and individuality, and awareness o f the 
problems associated with adaptive preferences. In the following section I outline 
some o f these central concerns that drive and inform the approach taken in this 
thesis.
a. Understanding the Subject from her Own Perspective
A key challenge when thinking about autonomy is to think in terms of 
individuals’ own perspectives. Autonomy’s ultimate focus is individuals: how 
they perceive and see their own lives. Multiculturalism deals with socio-cultural 
practices that might be different from our own. As such, it is necessary to engage 
with others in a manner that places their attachments and preferences within 
social and historical contexts. Maleiha Malik posits that this form o f relational 
understanding must move away from neutral objectivity:
Rather than mere description of outer action, this method gives a better 
understanding of the subject from her own perspective. In this sense, it 
is an inter-subjective understanding rather than an objective description 
that is being forced from the outside.106
(2004) for discussions o f  how considerations o f  autonomy affect the policy initiatives and court 
rulings regarding forced and arranged marriages.
106 Maleiha Malik, “The Branch On Which We Sit; Multiculturalism, Minority Women and 
Family Law”, in Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, ed. Alison Didduck and Katherine 
O’Donovan (Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2006), p. 226.
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These claims are echoed in Saba Mahmood’s The Politics o f  Piety. She 
demonstrates that options that might seem inegalitarian at first sight are not 
necessarily so when analysed more closely. For Mahmood, the very fact that we 
term practices egalitarian or not is problematic, as human agency cannot be 
placed under a strict binary classification:
If the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically 
and culturally specific (both in terms of what constitutes ‘change’ and 
the means by which it is effected), then the meaning and sense of 
agency cannot be fixed in advance, but must emerge through an analysis 
of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, 
responsibility and effectivity. Viewed in this way, what may appear to 
be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist point 
of view, may actually be a form of agency -  but one that can be 
understood only from within the discourses and structures of 
subordination that create the conditions of its enactment. In this sense, 
agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist norms but 
also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.107
According to Mahmood it is crucial to understand the context in which decisions 
are taken: we must understand the agency o f the people that inhabit and render 
norms intelligible. In her study o f piety in Egypt she encountered a number o f 
women who donned the hijab despite their husbands’ opposition.108 For her, this 
must be an example o f autonomous action “precisely because they are enacting 
their own desires for piety, despite the social obstacles they face, and not 
following the conventional roles assigned to women”.109 For Mahmood, it is 
important to uncover how norms are “performed, inhabited and experienced in a 
variety o f ways”.110 The movement o f piety is not one that takes place only at a 
symbolic level. Piety, for the women who conform to it, requires a particular 
relation o f the self to the body. The different embodiments o f norms and the
107 Saba Mahmood, Politics o f  Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 14-5.
108 Ibid., pp. 174-188.
109 Ibid., p. 149.
110 Ibid., p. 22.
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different ways of understanding ritual obligations among Egyptian 
Muslims actually reveal radically different conceptualizations of the 
role bodily behaviour plays in the construction of the self, a difference 
that in turn has consequences for how the horizon of individual freedom 
and politics is imagined and debated.111
Understanding the subject from her own perspective means attempting to 
comprehend the various ways agents inhabit norms. Meanings and significance 
will vary, but nonetheless this shift in hermeneutical understanding can aid the 
understanding o f pluralism. As Malik states:
Attention to the purpose, intention and motivation which is necessary 
for us to make sense of our own practice also provides the basic 
modular frame within which the different practice is accommodated and 
made more intelligible.112
Indeed, it seems to be that autonomy must be sensitive to women’s own 
experience o f their cultures and practices. This in turn will have two different 
implications for a conceptualisation o f autonomy. In the first instance, practices 
will have to be analysed with sensitivity, placing them within historical and 
social discourses. Cultures, attachments and identifications cannot be seen in 
static or rigid ways -  understanding the subject’s own perspective requires that 
we understand the ways in which agents themselves see and interpret these 
preferences.
Secondly, understanding the subject from her own perspective means remaining 
relatively open about the kinds of attachments that might coexist in one agent’s 
identity. Particularly important for my argument is that it might be possible 
simultaneously to hold seemingly contradictory attachments. This involves 
understanding how agents themselves see their attachments operating; only in 
this way can we identify whether there is indeed a contradiction, or whether the 
appearance o f contradiction arises because we are thinking o f these attachments
111 Ibid., p. 121.
112 Malik, “The Branch on Which We Sit; Multiculturalism, Minority W omen and Family Law”,
p. 228.
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in essentialised or static ways. Rigid definitions o f identity are incompatible with 
respect for plural identifications.
b. Conceptualising New Paths
Understanding the subject from her own perspective will lead us to a richer and 
more complex way o f interpreting culture and cultural attachments. This is of 
particular importance given the origins o f multiculturalism within the liberal 
secular and Western traditions.113 This thesis argues that it is important to remain 
open about the possibilities of culture, autonomy and multiculturalism. Solutions 
to the paradox o f multicultural vulnerability might be discovered, but these need 
not follow pre-established paths. New possibilities might arise as a consequence 
o f considering subjects from their own perspective and attempting to gain 
situational understanding sensitive to agent’s own understanding. Madhavi 
Sunder’s work argues for a nuanced approach to thinking about the relation o f 
law and multiculturalism.114 She contrasts cultural survival with cultural dissent, 
arguing that the latter is the most appropriate method to deal with the 
particularities o f culture in our time. Cultural survival emphasises “old notions o f 
imposed identity over new normative visions of identity as a choice” 115, and 
refers to the understanding o f certain practices as necessarily imposed, or 
required, by particular cultural groups. The strategy o f cultural dissent recognises 
instead “that cultures are changing, in some ways for the better. By 
acknowledging plurality within culture, this approach facilitates a normative 
vision o f identity in which individuals can choose among many ways o f living 
within a culture.”116
Sunder’s cultural dissent emphasises how cultures are changed from within, by 
the individuals who live within them. Cultural dissent emphasises the plurality
113 Brenna Bhandar, “The Ties that Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism R econsidered”, 
Journal o f  Law and Society , Vol. 36, No. 3 (2009). Bhandar argues that despite the multicultural 
aim o f  respecting and accommodating difference, the manner in which it does is deeply rooted in 
Western liberal and thus secular thought.
114 Madhavi Sunder, “Cultural Dissent”, Stanford Law Review , Vol. 545 (2001). See also 
“Piercing the V eil”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 6 (2003).
1.5 Sunder, “Cultural Dissent”, pp. 499 -  500.
1.6 Ibid., p. 500.
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that characterises the experience o f identities, pointing out differences within 
cultures as well as opening up new spaces to think about what autonomy could 
mean. By thinking about the different forms o f contestation that might be 
possible, the approach o f cultural dissent allows for the possibility o f plural and 
potentially conflicting identities. These are all factors that a theory o f autonomy 
sensitive to the case o f minorities within minorities ought to be aware of.
By doing away with homogenising understandings o f culture and cultural 
identifications, it is possible to avoid the reductionism implicit in binary 
classifications o f action. Two separate issues arise here. Firstly, the idea is that 
agents do not belong to either culture A or culture B. Rather, agents might 
belong to both. This is linked to the second implication; that individuals can 
themselves choose and endorse those aspects o f a culture (or various cultures) 
they feel most drawn to, and might challenge those aspects they are not 
completely in accordance with.
By eschewing binary classifications, it is possible that new paths o f action 
emerge. Although Mahmood is right in pointing out that not all actions 
symbolise either resistance or subordination, there is still room to consider that 
there are other ways in which social norms are challenged. As Sunder claims, 
“women are (...) claiming their rights to challenge religious and cultural 
authorities and to imagine religious community on more egalitarian and 
democratic terms”.117 This is the kind o f work that is currently being carried out 
by feminist advocacy groups such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws 
(WLUML).118
Rather than advocate purely secular strategies for equality in the public 
sphere without addressing the growing inequality in the private (...), 
WLUML employs strategies that contest fundamentalist depictions of 
identity. This approach entails both critiquing the fundamentalist claims
117 Sunder, “Piercing the V eil”, p. 1403.
118 See http://www.wluml.org/english/index.shtml.
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about women’s religious identity and empowering women to reshape 
religious identity in more egalitarian terms.119
It emerges that there is a need to look at autonomy in closer detail, since its 
understanding will pave the way to comprehension of new possibilities o f action. 
This new form o f looking at autonomy focuses on the discontinuities rather than 
the similarities, thus destabilising static understandings o f both culture and the 
meanings o f emancipation, allowing for more nuanced and representative 
strategies that are either currently in use or could be used in the future.
c. Mediating (Strong) Universalism with (Soft! Relativism
Given the two considerations above, it is necessary that a satisfactory conception 
o f autonomy be able to mediate between the (soft) relativism that is intrinsic to 
contextual understanding and the universalism that egalitarian feminism requires.
Contextual understanding o f the sort advocated by both Mahmood and Sunder 
involves recognising and respecting the interpretations that individuals 
themselves might offer on their attachments. However, this could potentially lead 
to a relativism whereby everything can be ‘explained away’: a form o f value 
pluralism where all attachments have the same worth.
Strong versions o f relativism are not conducive to feminist frameworks of 
analysis. If  feminism indeed has as its object the elimination o f arbitrary forms of 
inequality based on gender and sexual discrimination, then it seems clear that not 
everything can count as a choice. This is particularly true given the importance of 
social construction: adaptive preferences can indeed lead to outcomes that are not 
autonomous.
However, as Monica Mookherjee points out, we ought not to think that relativism 
and feminism are two contradictory projects. In the same way that the contextual
119 Sunder, “Piercing the Veil”, p. 1436.
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approach rejects binary classifications, the conception of autonomy proposed 
here maintains that there is a possible balance between the two.
Feminists should not reject ideals such as equality and freedom, but 
would do well to recognise that they can be interpreted in non-liberal 
ways. Ascertaining the meaning of freedom and equality involves 
acknowledging that the imperfections in any society cannot be assessed 
objectively and that the content of gender justice cannot be articulated 
abstractly.120
In this thesis I argue that it is possible to hold a soft relativism coupled with a 
strong universalism. The conception o f autonomy proposed will be considered a 
universal capacity, but one that needs to be interpreted in context. The relation of 
universalism and relativism will be further discussed in Chapter VII.
5. Thesis Structure
Autonomy emerges as one of the central concerns in liberal multiculturalism, and 
one that is often invoked when discussing the paradox o f multicultural 
vulnerability. This thesis analyses different versions o f autonomy in an attempt to 
find which approaches are most conducive to a conception that is aware o f both 
the need for contextuality as well as the problems posed by unequal or 
oppressive forms o f socialisation.
Two considerations will be central. In chapter II I analyse the importance of 
socialisation for a theory o f autonomy. In this chapter I argue that socialisation is 
all-pervasive phenomena, which informs and gives meaning to what we do. The 
social is seen as crucial in constructing meaning, but also in enabling agents to 
understand the meaning of different values and practices. Despite its all­
pervasiveness, I argue that socialisation does not negate the existence of 
autonomy, especially when the latter is not conceived o f as an exclusively, or
120 Monica Mookherjee, W om en’s  Rights as M ulticultural C laims (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2009), p. 29.
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even primordially rational enterprise. Nonetheless, given the unequal nature of 
social and material relations, I argue that understanding the way socialisation 
operates is useful in showing how adaptive preferences can be particularly 
damaging for women. Having established that autonomy is not de facto negated, 
I show how it can be a useful for a feminist theory, and how considering 
contextuality is central to understanding the way collective identities are formed.
Understanding the importance of the social in forming collective identities will 
lead us to recognise how individuals can hold a variety o f attachments or 
different identities. Chapter III focuses on how individuals live through their 
multiple or intersectional identities. Here I argue that despite there being possible 
contradictions between attachments, this does not automatically negate the 
possibility o f being an autonomous agent. The ways individuals negotiate 
between different identities and attachments shows how a theory o f autonomy 
ought to be sensitive to individual variations in order to be true to embodied 
experiences. The structure o f the identitarian self is also analysed, in order to 
then see how the different kinds o f autonomy that permeate the literature are not 
so much contradictory, but rather focus on different parts o f the self.
Chapters IV, V and VI constitute the theoretical bloc within which key theories 
o f autonomy are analysed. Chapter IV focuses on procedural theories. These 
have often been popular amongst advocates of multiculturalism given their 
agnosticism about the content o f a choice. This chapter analyses the importance 
o f choosing, and I establish that although there is a moral imperative to respect 
choice, procedural autonomy alone is not able to deal with and accommodate the 
insights provided by socialisation and adaptive preferences.
Chapter V deals with relational theories o f autonomy. Despite considerable 
differences between different relational theories, they all have in common the 
recognition of the importance o f the social in creating or enabling autonomous 
individuals. In this chapter I argue that while relational theories provide an 
excellent starting point, they contain more substantive elements than they claim. 
Substantivity is not necessarily a problem since a conception o f autonomy must 
have a substantive underpinning in order to avoid the trap o f relativism. The
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issue is instead that the focus on capacities, albeit useful, is insufficient to deal 
appropriately with how to account theoretically for cases where choices are not 
autonomously chosen -  i.e. the deep effects o f oppressive socialisation.
Chapter VI deals with substantive theories o f autonomy that have dealt 
specifically with the paradox of multicultural vulnerability. This chapter deals 
with two types o f substantivism. The strongest kind demands a substantivism that 
is fixed in its content. I argue that this is unsatisfactory for a number o f reasons, 
the most important being the fact that it is too specific to be able to adequately 
account for the effects of oppressive socialisation. I argue that the second kind of 
substantivism discussed, often considered to be weaker, provides a good basis on 
which to consider the effects of oppressive socialisation: individual self-worth. A 
commitment to self-worth ensures an egalitarian substantive underpinning that 
eschews the potential relativism o f a commitment to content neutrality whilst still 
remaining relatively open about the ways equality might manifest itself.
Chapter VII brings the previous arguments together, showing how the different 
areas o f the identitarian self correspond with different kinds of autonomy. I argue 
that a conception o f autonomy needs to consider not only to which particular area 
o f the self the decision or attachment pertains, but also the timeframe it was 
developed in, what kind o f autonomy is being exercised and to what degree. I 
argue that this conception o f autonomy is able to accommodate the intuition that 
not all preferences are autonomously chosen, without being prescriptive about 
the contents of a choice. This universal but under-defined conception will be 
shown to have a certain emancipatory basis, but one that does not lead to 
particular consequences defined in an a priori way.
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II. Socialisation
1. What is Meant by Socialisation?
According to the Oxford Dictionary o f  Sociology, socialisation refers to
the process by which we learn to become members of society, both by 
internalising the norms and values of society, and also by learning to 
perform our social roles (as worker, friend, citizen and so forth). (...) It 
is (...) recognised that socialisation is not a one way process, in which 
individuals learn how to fit into society, since people may also redefine 
their social roles and obligations.121
This definition is particularly interesting. Sociologists tend to think that social 
processes are almost primordial to the self. This is not an accident. As Nancy 
Hirschmann points out, “contemporary scholarship on social constructivism is 
much more common in fields other than political theory”.122 Despite the 
communitarian critique,123 there is still a tendency in political theory to refer to 
the ‘se lf, a self that seems almost self-made and independent from all that is 
around. But surely the social has a place in the constitution o f who we are, in the 
formation o f autonomous selves?
In basic terms, I take socialisation to be a process that encompasses norms, 
values and practices that are sustained collectively and help make agents who 
they are. These operate throughout society and can be, and commonly are
121 Gordon Marshall, O xford D ictionary o f  Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 624-5. Interestingly, there is no definition o f  socialisation offered in the Oxford Dictionary o f  
Politics or the Oxford Dictionary o f  Philosophy.
122 Nancy Hirschmann, The Subject o f  Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory o f  Freedom  (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 75.
123 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982) and D em ocracy’s  D iscontent (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1995); Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983) and Interpretation and Social 
Criticism  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987); Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue (London, Duckworth, 1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  (London: 
Duckworth, 1988).
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invisible, operating without being codified in law. These social norms are often 
unspoken but known by (most) members of society. They cover a vast array of 
issues, ranging from eating habits to politics, manners, behaviour, speech, 
education and gender relations. These norms have effects on those who live 
within them: they inform and give meaning to many daily practices (both public 
and private) as well as the beliefs through which human beings sustain collective 
lives.
These social norms can also be visible, in terms o f being codified in law and 
politics. Valuing life is a social norm: most human beings would agree that 
unnecessary killing is unethical and wrong. This has also become codified in
law: most penal systems have provisions for the punishment o f those who
wrongfully kill others. These visible social norms also have effects on the 
individuals who live within them, shaping both their behaviour and their beliefs. 
As David Hume pointed out,
All laws are founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a 
fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform
influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil
• 124actions.
However, socialisation is not solely the notion that social norms and institutions 
influence the individuals who live within them. The process also works in 
another way: individuals themselves help maintain and constitute social 
processes.
I take socialisation and social construction to be synonymous. However, I believe 
the term social construction has important connotations that influence its 
reception. ‘Social construction’ implies that there might be an agent that does the 
constructing, that social processes have an aim and a logic that is different from 
the way individuals would otherwise behave. I do not believe the term 
socialisation has such connotations. I take it as given in this thesis that
124 David Hume, “O f Liberty and Necessity”, in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and  
Contem porary Readings, ed. John Perry and Michael Bratman (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 433.
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socialisation is an all-pervasive phenomenon, without (necessarily) having 
normative content. All forms o f social relations can be considered to constitute 
socialisation and, as such, the process should not be seen as a problem but rather 
a given fact o f human life.
However, the extent to which socialisation can be considered a problem has been 
a long-standing topic of debate.125 This chapter seeks to answer three questions. 
Firstly, what are the precise mechanisms o f socialisation? How does it operate? 
Secondly, does the fact o f socialisation mean that no one can be autonomous? 
And finally, does the nature o f socialisation mean that women might have less 
capacity, or fewer opportunities, to be autonomous?
2. Socialisation and Autonomy
The process o f socialisation is relevant to theories of autonomy not only in terms 
o f which choices are available, but also by deconstructing and explaining 
historically why those choices are such.
Emile Durkheim, writing in 1897, noted the importance o f the social in 
explaining apparently individual autonomous acts. His work on suicide argues 
that the act o f killing oneself, perhaps one o f the most salient and commonly 
used examples of an individual private decision, is not quite as private, or indeed 
as dissociated from society, as one might think.
Victims of suicide are in an infinite minority, which is widely dispersed; 
each one of them performs his act separately, without knowing that 
others are doing the same; and yet, so long as society remains 
unchanged the number of suicides remains the same. ...There must be
125 For instance, Sigmund Freud, in Civilisation and its Discontents, maintained that society 
operates so as to sublimate our natural inclinations (often sexual), creating a sense o f  unhappiness 
or displeasure. See Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents (Oxford: Penguin Classics, 
2002). For functionalists, socialisation might indeed have negative consequences but, overall, it 
ought to be considered a necessary process that enables the integration o f  society. See Emile 
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms o f  Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1995) and On 
Suicide (London, N ew  York: Penguin Books, 2006).
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then some force in their common environment inclining them all in the 
same direction, whose greater or lesser strength causes the greater or 
less number of individual suicides.126
Durkheim did not deny the existence o f autonomy. He did not believe that who 
commits suicide is in any way pre-determined by the social currents of the time, 
nor that the individual agents committing suicide were acting on something other 
their own impulse or decision-making. Instead, the aim of On Suicide was to 
show that the stability in suicide numbers shows that there are social norms that 
influence individuals. Suicide is a form o f social fact, defined as:
Any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the 
individual an external constraint; or which is general over the whole of a 
given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its 
individual manifestations.127
Social facts affect our decisions. Despite acts such as suicide being individual, 
the existence o f well established patterns shows that society has an effect on 
individual decision-making. This phenomenon has also been understood as the 
process o f adaptive preferences, or the internalisation o f exterior norms. The 
phenomenon o f adaptive preferences is central to the study o f autonomy. It 
maintains that what we wish for in life tends to be shaped -  and limited -  by 
what we see around us, or by the range o f possibilities o f which we are currently 
aware. For example, a woman who has been socialised into thinking that the role 
o f mother is what will give value to her life will probably wish for children, 
regardless o f what her other desires might be. Hence the question that 
socialisation poses for theories of autonomy: “Why should the choice between 
feasible options only take account o f individual preferences if  people tend to 
adjust their aspirations to their possibilities?”128 Does the fact that something has 
been chosen by an individual suffice for us to consider that choice pro tanto 
significant?
126 Durkheim, On Suicide, p. 304 - 5.
127 Emile Durkheim, The Rules o f  Sociological M ethod  (Glencoe: Free Press, 1966), p. 59.
128 Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion o f  Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 109.
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a. The Mechanisms of Socialisation
Before considering whether autonomy is compatible with the fact of 
socialisation, it is necessary to understand how socialisation operates. This is of 
particular importance if  we are to understand how oppressive and unequal 
socialisation processes harm women in ways that might negatively affect the 
development o f the capacities required for the exercise o f autonomous 
deliberation. How does socialisation affect our self-conceptions, identities and 
our ability to be autonomous?
Nancy Hirschmann explains that part o f the problem, when trying to elucidate 
what exactly it means to say we are socialised beings, is that social construction 
has no identifiable agent. Nonetheless, it is possible to see how the process of 
socialisation (or social construction, in her terms) works by reference to the 
following three mechanisms.
At the first level is what she calls the “ideological misrepresentation o f 
reality”.129 Following from Marx, this understanding o f social construction 
relates to those things that are socially created and not necessarily true -  they are 
artificial, constructed, false. An example o f an ideological misrepresentation o f 
reality would be the belief that women are less capable o f intellectual work than 
men. Many examples operate in our current societies, including the notions that 
black people are better at sport, that Jews are good with money and that 
Mediterraneans live life at a slower pace than northern Europeans. Though this is 
the most common way o f thinking about social construction, there are two 
separate problems inherent in thinking that this is the only thing socialisation 
refers to.
First, thinking social construction is false, that a sort o f false consciousness 
operates throughout society, might result in attempts to second guess what is 
actually true. For instance, norms o f feminine appearance have often been 
criticised as oppressive and non-conducive to self-worth. Choosing to engage in
129 Hirschmann, The Subject o f  Liberty, p. 77.
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these norms could be a reflection o f false-consciousness. However, “consider 
drag queens, transsexuals or transgendered individuals, for whom deployment o f 
such standards o f feminine appearance is a necessary ingredient o f [their] 
personal worth” .130 For drag queens, transsexuals and transgendered individuals 
it might be that traditional norms of feminine appearance help create and portray 
the identity they feel matters to them. In this instance, norms o f feminine 
appearance do not work in an oppressive manner but, on the contrary, they help 
to overcome some o f the traditional gender images that operate in society. Not all 
instances are examples o f harmful socialisation.
The false consciousness thesis also gives the impression that there is a certain 
natural truth that underlies these accounts. In Hirschmann’s words, this is the
implicit assumption that if patriarchy would just leave women alone, 
women would be okay. Beneath that is a further assumption that women 
could be not socially constructed at all, that there is some true identity 
and set of interests that women have as women -  an essentialist or 
naturalist thesis which, ironically, most feminists would consciously 
claim to reject.131
As I have already argued, social construction -  or socialisation -  is not 
something that can be avoided. There is no self that is prior to or independent o f 
the social relations through which we exist. A second level o f  social construction, 
and one intrinsically tied to the first, is that o f “materialisation”. This is the 
process whereby “the construction of social behaviours and rules takes on a life 
o f its own, and becomes constitutive not only o f what women are allowed to do, 
but o f what they are allowed to be”.132 The process o f materialisation speaks o f 
how these social norms become the reality -  how they are realised in actual life, 
and thus turn out to be more than ideal constructs: they become part o f the social 
reality in which we live. So, the first level, the ideological misrepresentation o f 
reality, becomes actualised. It is “not at odds with material reality; it actually 
produces it. It creates women’s reality;, it constructs women’s lives in the most
130 Benson quoted in Hirschmann, The Subject o f  L iberty, p. 79.
131 Hirschmann, The Subject o f  L iberty, p. 79.
132 Ibid.
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active sense o f the word.”133 It is this second level o f social construction, rather 
than the ideological misrepresentation o f reality, that is most significant for a 
conceptualisation o f autonomy. This level o f materialisation points to the need to 
look at the grounds and basis of agents’ self-worth, as well as the material 
circumstances in which choices are made. More precisely, it shows the need to 
challenge the opposition between the material and our ideas o f ourselves -  hence 
the term materialisation.
The third level is what Hirschmann refers to as “the discursive construction of 
social meaning”. This is the idea that “language is not merely the medium 
through which meaning is communicated; it is constitutive of the meaning itself’. 
This is reminiscent of Charles Taylor’s notion that life, social life, is
dialogical in character. We become full human agents, capable of 
understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an identity, through our 
acquisition of rich human languages of expression. ...We are inducted 
into these in exchange with others. No one acquires the languages 
needed for self-definition on their own. ...The genesis of the human 
mind is in this sense not ‘monological’, not something each 
accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.134
We need the social not just to construct meaning, but also to be able to 
understand the meanings themselves. Nothing exists in a vacuum -  it is our very 
being which is socialised into existing, choosing and making sense o f the options 
around us. For Hirschmann, this shows that it is nonsensical to speak of 
oppressed versus oppressors: “the idea of ‘them’ constructing ‘us’ is therefore 
too conspiratorial -  or conscious and active -  for men are socially constructed as 
well as women; they are as much the products of power as they are its agents.”135 
Socialisation affects all, and an awareness of the processes that affect us is 
beneficial to all.
133 Ibid, p. 80.
134 Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 33.
135 Hirschmann, The Subject o f  Liberty, p. 83,
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This also has consequences for the way we think about emancipatory politics.
Language, meaning, identity, and choice are made possible by whatever 
context exists. If self-definition and the construction of meaning always 
take place in and through language, it follows that women have 
participated in that language and responded to it throughout history with 
our own practices.136
Ways o f resistance have to be articulated through those means that are available 
to women. The veil, for example, can be reconstructed as a means to challenge 
oppression, as when it enables women to go out to work. As Arlene MacLeod 
notes,
The veil in some way compensates for and even alleviates the dilemma 
they experience. . . .‘The hijab is a protection from annoying people on 
the street,’ mentioned a married woman who had a long walk to her 
office building; ‘I don’t have to worry that men in the cafe or on the 
street are talking about me every day as I pass’.137
The veil becomes reconstructed as one o f the available means in which to 
challenge oppression, and not simply a marker of it.
Hirschmann’s analysis o f social construction usefully shows how social norms 
come to influence individuals. Her account demonstrates the importance o f being 
aware o f the grounds o f an agent’s self-worth, in order to ensure that the unequal 
process of socialisation has not harmed the agent’s capacities. But Hirschmann’s 
account does more than point at the potentially problematic areas in a 
conceptualisation o f autonomy. She also shows how choices themselves need to 
be carefully considered. For her, bringing social construction into an analysis of 
freedom will have two distinctive outcomes. In the first case, being aware o f the 
way we are affected by the social means that we will be concerned with “what
136 Ibid., p. 99.
137 Arlene E. MacLeod, “Hegemonic Relations and Gender Resistance: The N ew  Veiling as 
Accommodating Protest in Cairo”, Signs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1992), p. 550. Saba Mahmood makes a 
similar point. See Mahmood, The Politics o f  Piety, Chapter 4.
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choices are available; customs, laws, and practices make certain options possible 
and foreclose others”.138 Being aware of the processes of socialisation in a theory 
o f freedom also “requires us to consider the ‘why’ o f availability”.139 The 
historical context o f choice has to be considered in order to see how a choice 
comes to be a choice, and for what reasons. As Hirschmann maintains:
Not just women’s actual choices and how they interpret them, but the 
conceptual parameters of what ‘counts’ as a choice, are constructed by 
and through language, cultural norms and patriarchal assumptions about 
what it means to be an individual and a person.140
There is a fundamental need to take context seriously. The historical 
development o f choices will not only shed light on the socialisation process, but 
might also reveal how apparently inegalitarian choices can be reinterpreted and 
understood in ways that are not simple examples o f victimhood. Meanings are 
constantly changed by the way people use practices and symbols, and it is crucial 
that a theory o f autonomy be able to take these into consideration.
b. The Free Will versus Determinism Debate
So far we have seen that socialisation has deep effects on individuals’ decisions 
and self-conceptions. But does accepting socialisation mean that no one is 
autonomous? That question has long been a concern in philosophy, known as the 
the determinism vs. free will debate.141 Historically, the debate has centred on the
138 Hirschmann, The Subject o f  Liberty, p. 93.
139 Ibid., p. 94.
140 Ibid., p. 95.
141 See Peter Van Inwaagen, “The Incompatibility o f  Free Will and Determinism”, Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1975); Robert Young, “Autonomy and Socialisation”, Mind, N ew  Series, 
Vol. 89, No. 356 (1990), and “Compatibilism and Conditioning”, Nous, Vol. XIII (1979); 
Matthew Bernstein, “Socialisation and Autonomy”, Mind, N ew  Series, Vol. 92, N o. 365 (1983); 
George Strawson, “The Impossibility o f  Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 75:1/2 
(1994); Robert Kane, ’’Free Will: The Elusive Ideal”, Philosophical Studies 75:1/2 (1994); Harry 
Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal o f  Philosophy 66, 23 
(1969); Michael Otsuka, “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability o f  Blame”, Ethics 108 (1998); 
Gary Watson, “Free Agency”, Journal o f  Philosophy LXXII (1975); Richard Taylor, “Freedom 
and Determinism”, in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contem porary Readings, ed. 
John Perry and Michael Bratman (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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question o f responsibility: how much responsibility do agents truly have if the 
claims o f determinism are true? The specifics o f this debate are outside the scope 
o f this thesis. Nonetheless, as will become apparent, I hold a compatibilist 
position in so far as I believe it possible to uphold the existence o f autonomy 
whilst maintaining that many o f the choices we make are at least partially 
informed by the social world in which we live.
Compatibilists claim that it is possible to believe in the existence o f free will 
whilst simultaneously admitting that the social norms and laws under which we 
live influence what we choose and the way we choose it. This is reminiscent of 
Karl Marx’s claim that
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past.142
Consider this by analogy to the natural sciences. It is determined, we might say, 
that a plant grows in a particular way, requires water, is a certain colour. The 
plant does not choose to be green and pink, or green and blue -  this is a matter of 
evolution. As Richard Taylor argues, human beings are also somewhat 
determined, or at least limited, because o f evolutionary development. Our genetic 
makeup and bone structure mean that we can only bend our index fingers in 
particular ways. The movement of our fingers has been causally determined by 
an evolutionary process. However, whether or not we choose to bend our fingers, 
or attempt to train our index finger in order to make it move outside the realm of 
‘normal’ movement is a different matter.143 For autonomy too, it might indeed be 
true that we only have certain options to choose from, and that the way we 
choose is informed by the social structures and norms that surround us. However, 
in making these decisions there is still a deliberative process, there is the 
possibility o f doing (or not doing) something instead o f  something else. The 
particular choice is not determined -  there is an element o f choice that remains.
142 Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte (M oscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 
12.
143 Taylor, “Freedom and Determinism”, p. 441.
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Robert Young is a compatibilist philosopher. As he points out, even if the 
choices available are socially enabled, this does not mean that autonomy is non­
existent; there is what he terms the difference between “a person’s life being his 
(hers) and it being made his own”.144 For Young, socialisation means that 
autonomy needs to be considered as something we hold to various degrees, and 
we ought to distinguish between different constituent senses o f the terms: short 
term uses and long term uses. Autonomy, for him, emerges as a continuous 
process rather than a given or singular characteristic. Thus, socialisation does not 
preclude its own existence. Indeed, for Young, awareness o f the socialisation 
process is precisely a characteristic o f autonomy: something that enables agents 
to make identifications their own, rather than merely belonging to the agent:
once our motivational structure and its origins are laid bare there is a 
real possibility that it may no longer direct us -  the process of gaining 
evaluative self-awareness sometimes leads to active appropriation or 
rejection of hitherto effective desires.145
Paul Benson has a similar idea when he claims that autonomy is not de facto 
negated by taking socialisation seriously:
But if I can act because I accept these reasons as adequate grounds for 
so acting, then these reasons must also be capable of figuring in the 
explanation of my action .. .In short, because the reasons there are for an 
autonomous agent to act are reasons that she is capable of recognising 
and setting out to act upon, they must be capable of being her own 
reasons for acting.146
In these arguments it is the evaluative capabilities that we exercise in thinking 
and making choices that signify the existence o f autonomy. The point is to make 
choices our own, rather than claiming these choices are made in a vacuum.
144 Young, “Autonomy and Socialisation”, p. 572.
145 Ibid. p. 574.
146 Paul Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation”, Social Theory and  Practice , Vol. 17, 
No. 3 (1991), p. 402.
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Socialisation, seen in this way, is a necessary condition o f being (or even 
becoming) autonomous.
c. Unequal or Oppressive Socialisation
Though socialisation does not mean determinism, it can clearly involve limits, 
and these can be both unequal and oppressive in their effect. Factors such as the 
availability o f options, levels o f education and the bases o f self-worth for 
different groups o f individuals can affect the way decisions are reached. The way 
individuals are, or have been, socialised, will have consequences not only for the 
decisions they take, but also for how decisions are taken and the critical faculties 
used in order to reach them. Socialisation, moreover, affects not only the manner 
in which a decision is reached, but also the possible decisions or options 
available to the agent. Issues o f socialisation thus point to the need to consider 
how many options are available: if only one modality o f action can be envisaged 
is acting in such a way a choice per se?147 Is it possible that the effects of 
socialisation affect women more than men?
Two separate issues arise. Firstly, whether or not women’s autonomy is harmed 
by socialisation depends on the very definition o f autonomy. If autonomy is 
defined in an exclusively masculine way most women will be considered non 
autonomous. Secondly, even if autonomy is not defined in a way that emphasises 
masculine characteristics, the question remains whether oppressive socialisation 
tends to be more beneficial to men, harming women’s ability to exercise 
autonomous capacities.
147 The question o f  whether one choice actually constitutes a choice could potentially throw up 
other questions. For instance, existentialists could claim that there are always at least two 
choices: one can to kill oneself or one can choose to follow the prescribed monolithic mode o f  
action.
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i. The Metaphysics of Being and Rationality
Traditional female socialisation has been documented to be different to that of 
males. Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice, for instance, shows how boys and 
girls experience different paths of moral development, partly as a consequence o f 
different socialisation patterns.148 What is more, these differences seem to have 
major implications for the exercise of autonomy. Gilligan demonstrated that boys 
were encouraged to prize rational evaluative behaviour, whereas girls were 
encouraged to develop other virtues such as patience, attachment, nurturance and 
so forth. Boys are taught those skills that are widely thought to be crucial in order 
to practice autonomy. Girls’ skills, by contrast, are thought to represent an 
emotional side that is in tension with notions o f rational instrumentality:
The repeated finding of these studies is that the qualities deemed 
necessary for adulthood -  the capacity for autonomous thinking, clear 
decision-making and responsible action -  are those associated with 
masculinity and considered undesirable as attributes of the feminine 
self.149
A similar point was made by Simone de Beauvoir, who argued that the difference 
between women’s and men’s socialisation led to women being considered as “the 
Other”, i.e. a departure from “normality”, which is modelled on the male. As she 
famously argued, “one is not bom, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, 
psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female 
presents in society.”150 Biology does not determine the position o f women, but it 
is society, with its norms, social expectations and educational processes, that
148Gilligan’s work was devised in response to Lawrence Kohlberg’s prior analysis that claimed 
that boys reached a higher level o f  moral development, whereas Gilligan’s work suggested that it 
was not a matter o f  levels o f  moral development but rather a question o f  differential 
development. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Developm ent o f  M odes o f  Thinking and Choices in 
Years 10 to 16  (Ph. D. Dissertation, University o f  Chicago, 1958).
149 Carol Gilligan, In a  Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s  Developm ent 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts and London: England: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 17. The 
differential moral development, which can be said to explain different moral behaviours in 
adulthood has also been shown to be o f  interest for scholars o f  religious practice. See Susan Starr 
Sered’s article “Ritual, Morality and Gender: The Religious Lives o f  Oriental Jewish Women in 
Jerusalem”, in Women in Israel, ed. Yael Azmon and Dafna N. Izraeli (New Brunswick, N ew  
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009).
150 Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 295.
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forms not only the attitude o f others, but women’s own expectations of what is 
normatively preferable and expected.
Many feminists have objected to the concept o f autonomy when it is defined as 
an exclusively rational process. As Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar point 
out,
The charge is that the concept of autonomy is inherently masculinist, 
that it is inextricably bound with masculine character ideals, with 
assumptions about selfhood and agency that are metaphysically, 
epistemologically, and ethically problematic from a feminist 
perspective, and with political traditions that historically have been 
hostile to women’s interests and freedom.151
Autonomy in this light seems to be the result o f masculinist conceptions that do 
not take the experience o f women seriously. Rationality seems to be the defining 
feature in conceptions o f autonomy, thereby devaluing other aspects that 
characterise embodied lives, such as attachments, love and care.
According to Gilligan and de Beauvoir, the socialisation process can lead men 
towards autonomous thinking and women away from it. However, in much 
feminist literature this possibility is resisted by calling for the redefinition of 
autonomy. As Nedelsky points out:
Part of the critique is directed at the liberal vision of human beings as 
self-made and self-making men. ...The critics rightly insist that, of 
course, people are not self-made. We come into being in a social context 
that is literally constitutive of us. Some of our most essential 
characteristics, such as our capacity for language and the conceptual
151 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured”, in 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and  the Social Self, ed. 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 
3.
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framework through which we see the world, are not made by us, but 
given to us (or developed in us) through interactions with others.152
The idea is that autonomy defined as pre-eminently rational forgoes the reality of 
lived experience. It need not be defined solely in terms o f rational, profit- 
maximising behaviour. As Gilligan notes, it could be that
looked at from a different perspective, these stereotypes reflect a 
conception of adulthood that is itself out of balance, favouring the 
separateness of the individual self over connection to others, and leaning 
more toward an autonomous life of work than toward the 
interdependence of love and care.153
The notion o f affection, as well as attachment and love also need to be included -  
autonomy cannot be just the consequence o f rational decision-making. This 
viewpoint is also supported by Young, who claims that we need to
be wary of making autonomy too much of a philosopher’s plaything by 
over emphasizing the role of rationality either by making logical 
calculation too big a part of the cognitive or by stressing the cognitive at 
the expense of the affective (or the volitional for that matter). People 
don’t generally act in the manner of profit maximising firms, nor is it 
accurate to portray reason as locked in constant struggle with unruly 
emotion.154
Socialisation ultimately affects women and men, boys and girls. Taking 
socialisation as a central consideration in theories o f autonomy will result in a 
reconceptualisation o f the self, rejecting atomistic ideas o f individuals and giving 
meaning to the daily practices they follow. Thus, understanding the origin and 
normative significance o f the social structures around us becomes a central 
enterprise in trying to understand what autonomy means. The self emerges as
152 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, Yale 
Journal o f  Law and Feminism , Vol. 1, N o. 7 (1989), p. 8.
153 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, pg. 17.
154 Young, “Autonomy and Socialisation”, p. 567-8.
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something which is partly the product o f surrounding social forces, and not 
merely a disembodied soul, independent o f the material world around it. Indeed:
We must develop and sustain the capacity for finding our own law, and 
the task is to understand what social forms, relationships and personal 
practices foster that capacity [since ] the capacity to find one’s own law 
can develop only in the context of relations with others (both intimate 
and more broadly social) that nurture this capacity, and second, that the 
‘content’ of one’s own law is comprehensible only with reference to 
shared social norms, values and concepts.155
In order to understand where autonomy comes from, and in what ways it 
operates, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms that make it possible. 
This, as Benson maintains, enables us to avoid the narrow accounts that 
permeated literature on autonomy. The aim is to challenge “the assumptions 
about non-relationality, value-neutrality and hierarchical control that have 
governed nearly all theories o f free agency”.156
Rationality might indeed play a part in autonomy, but it need not be the defining 
characteristic. An account o f autonomy should “not demand the localisation o f 
control in some particular region of the will (e.g. the most rational or most 
impartial or the most objective part). It [should be] open to the possibility that a 
free agent’s normative competence may influence her motives by means o f quite 
partial, personal feelings as easily as by impersonal judgements o f principles. 
This also assists resistance to the patriarchal implications o f control centred 
theories.”157
Indeed, by considering socialisation as a necessary and potentially problematic 
aspect o f what it means to be autonomous, it might emerge that there are a 
variety o f ways on which the deliberative process rests: there is the affective side
155 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, p. 10 -11.
156 Paul Benson, “Feminist Second Thoughts about Free Agency”, H ypatia , Vol. 5, No. 3 (1990), 
p. 51.
157 Ibid., p. 56.
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but also the rational and perhaps also the general. Defining autonomy in a more 
plural way means that women are not considered de facto less autonomous.
The question is not simply an issue o f redefinition -  that is, redefining autonomy 
so as to ensure that it includes “feminine” characteristics. The point is an 
ontological one. Defining autonomy through traditional male characteristics, with 
an over-reliance on rationality as its defining raison d’etre fails to account for 
what autonomy is and the ways in which it might be practised. It is an incomplete 
conception of autonomy. For Meyers, given the effects o f socialisation,
it must be possible for people to act autonomously in isolated situations, 
and to adopt some projects and policies autonomously without having 
control over the basic direction of their lives.158
An account of autonomy needs to be able to explain those instances in which 
agents make autonomous decisions on some aspects o f their lives, but not in 
others. It must be able to consider the many ways in which human beings think 
about their own lives and the decisions they take. By over-emphasising the role 
o f rationality, a conception o f autonomy can fall into an essentialist trapping, 
subsuming a whole categorisation o f people under the rubric o f non-autonomous, 
rather than looking at all the characteristics o f the process o f autonomous 
deliberation. According to Diana Tietjens Meyers
The claim that feminine socialisation altogether excludes most women 
from the class of autonomous agents is both morally repugnant and 
factually unsubstantiated. What is needed is an account of personal 
autonomy which comprehends the experiences of traditional women but 
which also acknowledges the liabilities that curtail these individuals’
159autonomy.
158 Meyers, “Personal Autonomy and the Paradox o f  Feminine Socialization”, The Journal o f  
Philosophy, Vol. 84, N o. 11(1987), p. 624. Paul Benson holds a remarkably similar view  “The 
claim that normal feminine socialisation affects some women’s attitudes toward themselves in a 
manner which inhibits the autonomy o f  some o f  their actions is compatible with the claim that 
these women are autonomously moved to do many o f  the other things they do.” See “Autonomy 
and Oppressive Socialisation”, pg. 390.
159 Meyers, “Personal Autonomy and the Paradox o f  Feminine Socialization”, p. 621.
67
It is only by having a more plural understanding o f what autonomy means that 
we can take seriously the effects o f oppressive or unequal socialisation, allowing 
the conception o f autonomy to better reflect the reality o f lived experience for 
both women and men.
ii. Adaptive Preferences and Materiality
Even if we understand autonomy in a non-overly rationalist manner, taking 
socialisation seriously means acknowledging that not all choices will be freely 
chosen. Indeed, as Nussbaum points out
people’s preferences for basic liberties can itself be manipulated by 
tradition and intimidation; thus a position that refuses to criticise 
entrenched desire, while sounding democratic on its face, may actually 
serve democratic institutions less well than one that takes a strong 
normative stand about such matters, to some extent independently of 
people’s existing desires.160
Socialisation can mean that women are less able to exercise their autonomous 
capacities. This can happen for two distinct reasons. The first is the material, the 
external. As oppressive forms o f socialisation become materialised, that is, as 
they become real in peoples’ lives, enshrined not only in customs and traditions, 
but possibly in law as well, the possibilities of action become severely restricted. 
Given the many instances whereby the status o f women has been diminished 
through common laws and practices, feminists are right to restate the importance 
o f considering the particularities of the material objective situations women find 
themselves in. In doing so they highlight the importance o f the objective versus 
sole considerations o f the subjective when thinking about autonomy.
160 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 115.
68
Nussbaum has noted the interdependency o f poverty and gender inequality.161 
Amartya Sen has also noted how material circumstances, springing from social 
arrangements, have deep consequences in the outcome o f events. Writing about 
the Bengal Famine o f 1943, he noted that the tragedy was not so much a problem 
with food availability decline (FAD), but rather socially originated issues such as 
exchange entitlements that resulted in class-based destitution.162 It follows that a 
theory o f  autonomy must consider the material conditions under which a choice 
is made.
This is particularly important when thinking about women in minority groups. 
For example, a woman who chooses to undergo an arranged marriage, and does 
so by considering her options carefully and deciding that this is the best way to 
uphold her deepest values might be considered autonomous. Socialisation 
requires us to consider the material situation under which this decision was 
arrived at: if  she faced strong pressures to do so, if  her family demanded she did 
so, if she has been educated in such a way whereby any other decision would 
have been inconceivable, then the autonomy of her choice might be put into 
question.
There is a second way in which socialisation might harm individuals’ capacities 
to be autonomous. This is the problem created by the phenomenon o f adaptive 
preferences. Here the constraints are not external but internal. The agent, despite 
having a plurality o f options available, might choose some that are harmful. As 
Nussbaum notes, “disadvantaged groups ...internalize their second-class status in 
ways that cause them to make choices that perpetuate that second-class status”.163 
Gendered norms o f appearance, for instance, have been the subject o f much 
academic scholarship.164 For Paul Benson
161 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach, p. 3.
162 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation  (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1981).
163 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach, p. 127.
164 See Sandra Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity and the Modernisation o f  Patriarchal Power”, in 
Feminist Social Thought: A Reader, ed. Diana Tietjens Meyers (London: Routledge, 1997); 
Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Naomi Wolf, The 
Beauty Myth (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990); Nina Power, One D imensional Woman 
(Winchester: Zed Books, 2009); Diane Tietjens Meyers, Gender in the M irror, (Oxford: Oxford
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• “The socialisation of feminine appearance is oppressive not only 
because many women are motivated to comply due to coercive 
conditions, but also because it frequently yields compliance by 
systematically leading women to internalize false construals of their 
personal value and, in consequence, to misconstrue many of the reasons 
there are for them to act.”165
Benson regards the normative content of many (feminine) social norms as 
unacceptable. The socialisation processes affect all individuals, but negatively 
affect women in particular since (some of) these norms typically prove more 
beneficial to men. For Benson, the problem is not that socialisation exists, but 
that its unequal and oppressive forms reduce women’s capacities for autonomy. 
In particular, oppressive socialisation can harm the individual’s sense o f self. As 
a consequence, she might not value herself as an equal human being, deserving 
o f equal respect. These are the kinds o f instances where a conception of 
autonomy must question the effects o f oppressive socialisation.
It is worth noting that the issue o f adaptive preferences is indeed a constraining 
question in the study o f autonomy. It is possible, given the pervasive inequality 
that women face, that women might be more affected by oppressive forms of 
socialisation, resulting in adaptive preferences. This is one o f the issues that a 
conception o f autonomy ought to be sensitive to. However, as we have seen, this 
does not mean that autonomy needs to be ruled out completely.
3. A Theoretical Example: Cham bers
Clare Chambers’ recent work deals specifically with questions posed by taking 
socialisation seriously in a study o f free agency. Her book is an analysis o f the 
normative responses to cultural difference appropriate for liberal states. She sees
University Press, 2002); Natasha Walters, Living Dolls: The Return o f  Sexism, (London: Virago, 
2010).
165 Benson “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation”, p. 389.
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social construction as a way o f enabling “feminists to understand how patriarchy 
persists in liberal societies and despite formal equalities”.166
Following Foucault, Chambers notes how power operates from both the outside 
and the inside. As women internalise gender norms these are then “transferred 
onto our bodies and our bodies in their new forms act out these social norms, 
perpetuating them by example”.167 The social norms that regulate feminine 
appearance, for example, are not codified, yet most women undergo time 
consuming procedures (hair removal, hair styling, make-up and so on) in order to 
conform to these norms. While it can be argued that these norms o f appearance 
affect men as well, they are “more exacting and expensive (in both time and 
money) for women, [and] their effect is to cast women as inferior”.168 What 
matters is the operating asymmetry: not conforming to these social norms can 
result in women being disadvantaged, yet conforming to them also makes women 
the object o f ridicule or contempt.
Chambers’ depiction of social construction is informed by critical theory. 
However, she shares the liberal concern that post-modernism is liable to offer 
few normative solutions. For her, it is crucial to have a normative standpoint 
from which to criticise existing social practices. In her words:
The fact that culture is interwoven with practices means that, in 
choosing to perform a particular practice, an individual is participating 
in a social form. While not completely dominated or determined, the 
individual does not have control over the social form: she does not 
control its meanings and symbolizations. Moreover, she does not control 
her desire to participate in it.169
In Chambers’ view, the process o f social construction is depicted as one that has 
utmost importance: we cannot choose what social forms we participate in, nor
166 Chambers, Sex, Culture an d  Justice, p. 7.
167 Ibid., p. 26.
168 Ibid., p. 29. Whether these social norms are indeed more expensive in terms o f  money is 
contestable, since after all male grooming products are more expensive than the female 
equivalents.
169 Ibid., pp. 38 - 9.
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are we are able to affect these social forms through our own behaviour. She 
maintains that choice still exists, but argues that it does not “suffice to render an 
outcome just: there are circumstances in which a chosen practice remains unjust, 
and this is because practices are inherently social and thus do not depend on 
individuals’ choices”.170 We do have choice, but our having chosen something 
does not require that this must be respected.
The argument for not respecting, or not necessarily respecting, choices rests on 
the extended effects o f socialisation. Given the prominent position o f social 
construction in forming our desires and wishes, she argues it is not clear that a 
choice is properly ours, and if the choices are normatively objectionable, for 
instance, if  they disadvantage women, liberals have a duty to not respect them. 
According to Chambers, equality trumps autonomy, because it is not clear to 
what extent choices are ours, nor is it clear that we should ever tolerate practices 
that go against the liberal principle of equality.
This is one o f the problematic aspects in Chambers’ argument. She claims that 
one o f her guiding questions is whether the thesis o f social construction rules out 
autonomy.171 However, despite her careful work analysing the implications of 
social construction, she does not adequately explain how autonomy exists. 
Chambers seems to regard autonomy as important for feminists because through 
it change is possible: if we deny agency, or make social construction the 
primordial ordering factor, the possibilities for change become severely limited. 
However, because o f the effects of social construction, she does not seem to 
regard choice as carrying any normative value -  at least not until unequal norms 
and expectations are eradicated.
Chambers sees MacKinnon’s work on consciousness-raising as a good way o f 
avoiding the determinist trap of maintaining there is nothing that can be done,
170 Ibid., p. 39.
171 Ibid., p. 7.
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and that agents are unable to change the social structures around them.172 
Consciousness-raising focuses on the
minutae of women’s lives. ...As MacKinnon puts it, ‘Extensive attention 
was paid to small situations and denigrated pursuits that made up the 
common life of women in terms of energy, time, intensity, and 
definition -  prominently, house work and sexuality’. Attention was also 
paid to the habitualization of appearance and deportment norms.173
The idea is to make the underlying norms and their modes o f operation more 
explicit, and thus more amenable to change. However, for Chambers, although 
consciousness-raising is important, it alone cannot effect change. According to 
Chambers,
the most effective form of social change is the combination of an 
enforced, structural change together with active promotion of a new set 
of norms.174
Chambers focuses on the role o f the state in dealing with unequal social norms. 
In order to change the dominant systems o f inequality, the state ought to promote 
laws that enshrine or protect equality. However, these laws need to be 
accompanied by efforts to change people’s mentality through awareness-raising. 
An illustration o f how this could work in practice would be the recent Spanish 
legislation to penalise violence towards women. Gender violence, especially in 
marriages, has been historically widespread throughout Spain.175 A new law, 
formulated by feminist associations and advocacy groups rather than political 
parties, was passed in 2004. These kinds o f organisations can be seen to be doing 
the advocacy-raising that Chambers claims is necessary: they are aware o f the 
many ways in which gender violence is deployed and affects women. The 
government, following the specialists’ recommendations, introduced a law which
172 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a  Feminist Theory o f  the State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989).
173 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice, p. 59.
174 Ibid., p. 67.
175 Ley Org&nica 1/2004, 28th o f  December 2004, de Medidas de Protecci6n Integral Contra la 
Violencia de Gdnero. Chambers does not speak o f  this law per se, but nonetheless it seems to 
embody the key elements o f  her proposal.
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carried heavy penalties and where the burden of proof rested on the accused, in 
an attempt to facilitate the denouncing o f violence within the household.176 
According to Chambers, changes in law need to be accompanied by “symbolic 
changes in social reasoning (such as consciousness raising, the feminist 
movement campaigning for women’s rights)”.177 This is exactly what took place 
in Spain: the law’s introduction was coupled with an unprecedented level of 
public exposure through television, radio and written media in an attempt to 
engage with what Chambers would term the “symbolic normativity”, giving the
17ftnewly formulated law wider support than would have otherwise been the case.
For Chambers, since “gender is transmitted throughout society, it must be 
countered by a coordinated program of change in such institutions and in wider 
social norms”.179 In particular, it seems crucial that the state intervenes since 
“formal liberal freedoms embodied in state non-intervention do not truly 
emancipate”.180 Chambers is aware that state action need not necessarily change 
social norms. Furthermore, she is conscious o f the problems that state action can 
have in terms o f power and its wrongful deployment. It is her commitment to 
ideal theory which leads her to believe that state action is still necessary, without 
being particularly concerned about the ways in which the state should act in 
order to ensure the success o f such policies:
I am engaged with ideal theory at the level of state action: I propose 
paths that the state ought to take without specifying how to ensure that 
those paths are actually taken. The fact that the state may be an 
unwilling tool of feminism emphasizes rather than underdetermines the 
need to address and utilise it.181
176 The law assumes that most perpetrators are men. Interestingly, the law is written in a gendered 
way, containing only two clauses that address the possibility o f  reverse violence, i.e. women 
being violent towards men.
177 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice, p. 68.
178 There has been no official qualitative or quantitative research yet on the success o f  the law in 
eradicating long-standing social customs through the combination o f  legal and symbolic change. 
It is expected that this kind o f  research will take place in the future when there is enough 
evidence to establish the grounds o f  the new patterns o f  behaviour.
179 Chambers, Sex, Culture a n d  Justice, p. 69
,8° Ibid., p. 72.
181 Ibid., p. 76
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My contention with Chambers is a matter of nuance and focus. I am generally 
sympathetic to her arguments on the “need to recognise that individuals are 
strongly formed and constrained by their social circumstances and that this 
constraint increases the need for liberation”, and I agree that state action might 
indeed be necessary. However I also believe that autonomy can be useful in 
working against inequality. It is here where I believe Chambers and I have a 
different focus. Whereas she is concerned with appropriate normative responses, 
I am more concerned with what comes before this: the analysis of the practices in 
question. Chambers concedes that this step is important by mentioning that state 
action must be coupled with consciousness-raising. However, consciousness- 
raising is not the focus o f Chambers’ work -  it is briefly introduced so as to 
avoid the determinst trap. In some ways it is ideas such as consciousness-raising 
that a study o f autonomy appeals to, in that thinking about the minutae o f 
women’s lives requires some analysis o f how women themselves feel towards 
their choices and attachments.
My contention with Chambers’ account o f social construction is one o f nuance. I 
believe she may not be taking the effects o f socialisation seriously enough. The 
challenges posed by socialisation are not adequately portrayed by claiming there 
is a dichotomous choice to be made about autonomy: either saying that people 
are heavily socialised and thus we cannot take their choices to be true reflections 
o f their intentions, or claiming that socialisation is not that pervasive and thus we 
need to respect their choices. Thinking about socialisation requires the 
recognition that we affect social norms as well as being affected by them. Before 
state action takes place there must be careful consideration o f the ways 
individuals think about their lives, o f what they value. Autonomy matters 
because o f socialisation -  without these considerations it is possible that we 
might be too quick to assign particular meanings to practices without fully 
understanding the ways in which these are inhabited.
The first issue o f contention has to do with the possibilities o f existence. 
Practices and preferences are all possibilities o f action, themselves defined 
through social norms. Intangible social norms are illustrated, reflected and 
materialised in practice. Yet we can only imagine those things that already exist.
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For instance, it is possible to imagine human beings having blue skin, because 
we understand and know what blue looks like. Imagining human beings to be 
grue or bleen is more difficult because we do not know what these colours are: 
they are not notions we are familiar with or have knowledge -  material or 
abstract -  of. As Hans-Georg Gadamer claimed,
only the support of the familiar and common understanding makes 
possible the venture into the alien, the lifting up of something out of the 
alien, and thus the broadening and enrichment of our experience of the 
world.182
If  unequal gender norms are the only game in town, we cannot expect that a ban 
on female breast implants will alone make feminine socialisation any more 
egalitarian; it is likely that the unequal social norms that justify the practice will 
materialise in a different practice altogether. There needs to be real possibilities 
for changes to take place.
Secondly, I believe Chambers might be too optimistic about a government’s 
capacity to “focus on freeing individuals from unjust social influence: that which 
harms or disadvantages them”.183 There seems to be a tension in Chambers’ 
belief that it is almost impossible to “be completely free from social influence” 
and her thought that some, and not others, will be able to see where these 
harmful social norms operate.184 Surely there is a possibility that the state will 
also follow social norms?
The third area o f contention has to do with the importance o f contextual 
understanding. Socialisation does indeed problematise the issue o f choice, but 
attention to autonomy can help us to understand the plural meanings that single 
practices might have in different settings. As we saw in chapter I, a practice like 
wearing the hijab can have a variety of contextual meanings. We need to take 
seriously the meanings o f embodied practices, and analyse their normative
182 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Universality o f  the Hermeneutical Problem”, in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, California: University o f  California Press, 2008), p. 
15. See also Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and  M ystics (London: Penguin Books, 1997).
183 Chambers, Sex, Culture an d  Justice, p .l 13.
184 Ibid.
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content in plural ways.185 What might appear in the first instance to be an 
example o f inequality or oppression might also be considered an instance of 
emancipation -  a change in the normative significance o f practice, achieved via 
the reinterpretation o f the mechanisms that exist in lived realities. If the objective 
o f state action is to ensure that unequal choices are disallowed, we must be sure 
that those choices are experienced as unequal and damaging.
Ultimately, Chambers is not wrong in thinking that state intervention might be 
necessary. However, considering the possibilities o f autonomy could be a prior 
and complimentary step to policy changes that seek to eradicate inequality and 
oppression. Taking contextual significance into account brings up the issue of 
plural meanings and attachments. This is a crucial step in deciding what practices 
cannot be tolerated. Through autonomy considerations it is also possible to be 
clear about what the possibilities o f action are. Before a law takes effect that law 
must already be present, in some way, in people’s minds. It cannot emerge from 
nothing -  if a law is to work it must be understood by those who have to live 
with it. After all, social norms are not merely transmitted through society in an 
abstract sense -  they are transmitted by the very individuals who live in those 
societies. It must be the individuals themselves who come to realise the potential 
problems in a given practice. Considering autonomy can open up new 
possibilities for action, leading the way for the discussion o f more imaginative 
policies that could work in contexts o f deep unequal socialisation. Autonomy can 
be a tool for working against inequality too.
4. Socialisation and Identity
So far we have seen some o f the ways in which socialisation works, and its deep 
effect on individuals. We have also seen that although accepting the reality of 
socialisation need not mean that autonomy is de facto denied, there is still a 
problem caused by unequal forms o f socialisation. Through a discussion o f 
Chambers, autonomy has emerged as a useful consideration when working
185 See Mahmood, The Politics o f  P iety for a complete elaboration o f  how this might be the case.
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towards equality. However, before we look at how autonomy can be 
conceptualised we must consider how the social affects individual identities.
Individual identities are, in part, socially constituted. However, identities are not 
simply mere reproductions o f socially learnt norms and behaviours. As Anthony 
Appiah points out, explaining identity formation through its constitution in the 
social world does not diminish, in any way, individuality. For him,
to value individuality properly just is to acknowledge the dependence of 
the good for each of us on relationships with others. Without these 
bonds, as I say, we could not come to be free selves, not least because 
we could not come to be selves at all.186
In this account, the social is considered to be neither uniform nor single. 
Thinking about individual identity destabilises notions o f homogeneity in favour 
o f an idea o f the social that is plural and constantly challenged.187 But how do the 
social and the individual interact? In order to answer this it is useful to 
distinguish between two different types o f identity: collective and personal.
Collective identities are a form o f differentiation; a definition o f a group o f 
people that implies certain characteristics (also referred to as ascribed 
characteristics). The individuals in the group might or might not follow or agree 
to these in their totality. For example, the collective identity o f a Muslim might 
include following certain practices. They might be expected to eat Hallal and not 
consume alcohol. Muslim individuals, however, might agree with these practices, 
or they might not, choosing to follow some or none o f these. For Appiah, a 
collective identity is typified by the following three features. Firstly, it should 
allow for identification of those to whom it should/could be applied to: there 
should be available terms in public discourse that refer particularly to that group 
or collectivity.188 Secondly, an “element o f a social identity is the internalisation 
o f those labels as parts of the individual identities o f at least some of those who
186 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
p. 21.
187 See Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 2007).
188 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 66-7.
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bear the label”.189 And lastly, a collective identity implies that there are particular 
patterns o f behaviour. These behaviours can be o f two types: there might be a 
certain pattern o f behaviour towards those associated with the social group one is 
deemed to belong to, i.e. one is treated as a member or as an x, y or z. And it 
could also be that the individual herself acts in a certain way because she is an x, 
y or z.
The notion o f collective identity could lead to ideas about authenticity, in the 
form o f ‘a true’ way o f being this or the other: there is a true way o f being a 
Muslim, a true way o f wearing the hijab. Claims o f authenticity might assume 
that cultures are unchanging entities that follow certain patterns. Such rigidity in 
the conceptualisation o f culture might preclude careful evaluations on how 
autonomy might work in each instance. In order to avoid claiming that certain 
cultural groups are a particular way, or are uniform for all their members, we 
must bring in ideas about multiple identities. Whereas socialisation seems to 
imply, or at least can logically imply, that agents will follow certain general 
behaviours because that is what they have been socialised into, consideration of 
personal identities points at how these social norms are individually interpreted 
by those who live within them. Let us not forget that my concern in this thesis is 
primarily with aspects o f  a collective identity that agents feel matter to them, that 
is, the collective identities that agents participate in, the summaries that will 
affect and give meaning to their own individual identities.
As Meyers points out, the process o f socialisation is not simply homogenising: 
accepting that social norms operate and form individuals need not mean that all 
individuals are the same. Taking socialisation seriously also means analysing 
how individuals react to these processes. Social norms are internalised, but they 
are also simultaneously individualised.190 Indeed, for Meyers, the socialisation 
process is also constitutive o f identity. She takes issue with Okin’s dichotomy 
whereby
189 Ibid., p. 68.
190 Meyers, Gender in the M irror, p. 4 -  5.
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“either social positioning is constitutive of individual identity and all 
similar positioned individuals share a common identity, or else social 
positioning is external to individual identity, and no woman’s identity is 
gendered unless she decides to let gender in”.191
The dichotomy that Meyers eschews is that o f socialisation creating a form of 
authenticity and homogeneity that all individuals identified by a social identity 
(be it religious, cultural or political) must share, or the notion that social norms 
do not influence our identity unless we specifically choose to let them, i.e. unless 
an individual specifically chooses to be something rather than something else. 
For Meyers, the reality is a combination o f these two ideas, which is the 
possibility o f individuals being gendered, but living differentially through that 
identification. In the words of Iris Young:
No woman will escape the markings of gender, but how gender marks 
her life is her own.192
After all, if we accept that it is individuals who transmit and create social norms, 
it follows that cultures too are created from within. Thus speaking of cultural 
authenticity becomes oxymoronic: there might be commonalities in cultural 
identifications, but there can be no single and true way these exist. How agents 
individualise and live through their identities is the concern o f literature on 
multiple identities.
Taking socialisation seriously means taking contextual variations seriously. This 
chapter has argued that social norms are all pervasive and affect all individuals, 
but their effect need not mean that autonomy is impossible. The experience of 
socialisation is crucial to enable the formation o f collective identities, which are 
central to the development o f individual identities. The social, in a way, enables 
individuals to understand the world in which they live. However, it is crucial to 
note that individuals will have very different experiences o f the same social 
norms. They might also have more than one defining identity framework. How
191 Ibid. p. 7.
192 Iris M. Young, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective”, Signs, 
Vol. 19(1994), p. 734.
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they react and negotiate between these different attachments can enlightening for 
a theory o f autonomy. As Benson points out,
Even under social, economic, and psychological oppression, women 
have realized considerable power as free agents in relation to normative 
standpoints which were accorded little social visibility.193
Careful attention to the process o f socialisation requires that individuals are not 
forgotten. As such, a conception o f autonomy needs to be sensitive about how 
individuals view and interpret the significance and effects o f social norms. 
However, because o f the potential effects of oppressive forms o f socialisation, a 
conception o f autonomy must also carefully consider when choices are 
autonomous and when they are not.
Taking context seriously is crucial for a conception o f autonomy. Understanding 
plural responses to the same social norms shows the difficulties o f having a priori 
interpretations o f what equality looks like. As Hirschmann points out, “women 
are important constructors o f culture, and they constantly struggle to engage in 
this construction on their own terms”.194 Paying attention to how individuals 
reinterpret social norms and practices can be a fruitful and imaginative way of 
thinking about how equality can be achieved in practical terms. The potential of 
these individualised negotiation strategies will be the object of study in the next 
chapter.
193 Benson, “Feminist Second Thoughts about Free Agency”, p. 60.
194 Hirschmann, “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question o f  A gency”, p. 349.
III. The Plural Self; Me. Mvself, and I
1. What is meant by ‘Multiple Identities’?
In this chapter I set out the case for the importance of the literature on multiple 
identities for political theorists, especially for those working on theories of 
autonomy and multiculturalism. Theories of multicultural ism have been accused 
o f using notions of cultures or groups too rigidly.195 Besides the question o f 
whether this characterisation is actually correct, it is worth noting that literature 
on the paradox o f multicultural vulnerability does indeed focus on the position of 
individuals in order to understand the problems that might arise from essentialist 
views o f group or cultural rights.196 In this chapter I argue that personal identity 
is a crucial aspect o f thinking about cultural rights: it is one o f the bases on which 
groups are formed.
Autonomy and identity are not unrelated ideas. Indeed, the notion of being ‘one’s 
own person’ implies that one is, and that, to some extent, there is a procedure (let 
us call it autonomy) through which one reaffirms one’s choices, choices that 
potentially reflect who one is. So why is using an intersectional approach to 
identity important? What can be gained? And what kind of attitudes will it 
preclude?
I will use the terms multiple identities and intersectional identities 
interchangeably. These concepts refer to “an array of diverse and sometimes 
contradictory identities that were formed in and through various and often
195 See Barry’s claim that Tully and Young essentialise the notion o f  group belonging. Culture 
and Equality, p. 11. Okin makes a similar point when she says that multiculturalists “tend to treat 
cultural groups as monoliths -  to pay more attention to differences between and among groups 
than to differences within them”. Okin, Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, p. 12. See also 
Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture; Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
196 See Squires’ claim that Barry is indeed misrepresenting most multiculturalists. Judith Squires, 
“Culture, Equality and Diversity” in Multiculturalism Reconsidered, ed. Paul Kelly (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002).
82
intersecting social dynamics”.197 As such, the name o f the body of literature and 
the phenomenon it tries to describe is the same. The literature originally springs 
from work by black and mestiza feminists, that is, women who are mixed race 
(Indian/white), or have emigrated to or live between the US and Latin 
America.198 Intersectionality focuses on the effects o f plurality on identity. 
Although originating within a localised body o f literature, none o f the 
characteristics or subjects it deals with are exclusive to mestizaje or race politics. 
Most o f the authors who have dealt with the notion o f multiple identities are 
concerned to maintain a philosophical anti-essentialism that clearly has wider 
implications.199 Multiple identities as a fact can be said to be true for most 
individuals, since most, if not all, human beings will have a variety o f societal 
influences permeating their individual identities.
The central theme in the literature on iritersectional identities is that individuals 
are not formed within single monolithic models o f society. Within each social 
milieu there is a variety o f cultures, broadly defined, that intersect and form 
priorities in different ways. These generate a multiplicity o f life options that may 
not sit easily together, but might nonetheless coexist within the experiences o f a 
single individual: we can call these the various identifications an agent might 
hold. For example, under the logic o f multiple identities one could hold that 
being Spanish, British or French is neither a sufficient nor a correct portrayal of 
identity. A person might indeed be British, but might simultaneously be Hindu, a 
sceptical Labour voter, a feminist and bisexual. Identities are formed through a 
variety o f life worlds, amongst which are class, ethnicity, gender, race, sexuality, 
nationality, region, religion, language communities, and subcultures formed 
around such matters as political beliefs, fashion and life choices.
197 Edwina Barvosa Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy: Ambivalence and the 
Social Character o f  Free W ill”, The Journal o f  P olitical Philosophy, Vol. 15, N o. 1 (2007), p. 6.
198 See See Jennifer Nash, “Re-thinking Intersectionality”, Feminist Review , Vol. 89, No. 1 
(2008); Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margings: intersectionality, identity politics and 
violence against women o f  color”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, N o. 6. (1991); Barvosa Carter, 
“Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”; Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera; Maria 
Lugones, Pilgrim ages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against M ultiple Oppressions, 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
199 This is something Nash has emphasised in her work on intersectionality. Multiple identities, as 
a theorising strategy, must be careful to not reproduce the errors it seeks to criticise.
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This much is relatively uncontentious, but apart from indicating the presence o f a 
variety o f societal models that have bearing on an individual’s identity and 
choices, the notion o f intersectionality highlights another issue central to the 
study o f autonomy and multiculturalism. According to Maria Lugones, the 
experience o f multiplicity also reflects a possible contradiction in the individual’s 
experience o f events: the possibility o f being oppressed and, at the same time, 
resisting that oppression. Literature on intersectional identities allows for 
something to be experienced as both enriching, and constraining and limiting. As 
Meyers points out,
The notion of intersectional identity is paradoxical. Ties to groups are 
commonly experienced as emotionally gripping and integral to one’s 
sense of self, yet these ties may be experienced as imposed and 
confining, even wounding. Likewise, the divergent demands entailed by 
ties to different groups can lead to estrangement from oneself and from 
others, yet they endow individuals with opportunities for agency, both 
for self-definition and for affiliation with others.200
It emerges that theories o f intersectionality highlight the tensions that are created 
through identity. They reflect social processes not as static and homogenous, but 
portray reality in a more accurate way: lives are shown as constantly in flux, and 
identity forging relationships are shown as following a variety of axes. 
Individuals emerge as both creators and victims o f  their identities, portraying the 
creative potential o f individuality and adding depth to identity politics.
According to Jennifer Nash, studies o f intersectionality aim to challenge the 
following assumptions -  all o f which have important political consequences. 
Firstly, they “subvert race/gender binaries in the service of theorising identity in 
a more complex fashion”.201 This enables the study o f culture to be more 
nuanced, avoiding often harmful stereotypes and generalisations. Secondly, 
intersectionality challenges identity politics in its widest sense by highlighting
200 Diana T. Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!” in 
Relational Autonomy, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 155-6.
201 Nash, “Re-thinking Intersectionality”; Crenshaw, K. (1991), “Mapping the Margins”, pp. 2-3.
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the importance o f intra-group difference. Finally, intersectionality as an 
analytical strategy provides an alternative language to essentialism. According to 
Nash, this is due to the particular epistemological grounding o f intersectional 
subjects. In contrast, I argue that since most, if not all, subjects are intersectional, 
intersectionality provides the normative framework from which to deal with 
essentialism. The epistemology o f intersectionality is true for most human 
beings, but what matters in a normative sense is the realisation o f its existence.
In this chapter I set out to see how intersectionality operates. In the first section I 
look at where identities spring from, and consider the importance o f collective 
identities operational in social realms. I make a distinction between collective 
and personal identities in order to demonstrate that while the social is o f great 
importance in the creation o f identity, it is not the only operating variable. I also 
touch upon some o f the essentialism that is potentially problematic in collective 
identities.
In the next section I consider identity from a personal point of view: the identity 
o f the individual. I show that there are different levels to the constitution of 
identity: there are identifications, based on the collective identities agents feel 
apply to them, that is the life-worlds that are important to them, as well as the 
way individuals themselves think about these identities. These two are distinct: 
one relates to ascriptive group characteristics, and the other has to do with the 
individual’s own consideration o f her identity. I then go on to explain some of 
the ways in which these plural individual identifications can coexist, and how 
these are related to the different constituent parts o f identity.
Finally, I argue that intersectionality is a useful analytical strategy for political 
theorists concerned with questions o f equality, multiculturalism and autonomy. I 
demonstrate that by adopting intersectionality as an analytical tool, the analysis 
o f multiculturalism can avoid some of its potential pitfalls, as well as showing 
how the constitution o f identity has important implications for scholars of 
autonomy.
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2. Multiple Identities and the Social
As we have seen in the previous chapter, identity is partly socially formed. 
Collective identities are central in enabling individuals to form their own 
personal sense o f  self, containing a variety o f attachments and preferences. 
Appiah regards collective identities as similar to what Ian Hacking calls “kinds 
o f persons” -  an idea also akin to Max Weber’s ideal types.202 A kind o f person 
or an ideal type o f collectivity could be considered as a sort of summary o f what 
we expect the members o f that collectivity to be like. For example, Weber 
defines the ideal type o f German capitalistic entrepreneurs as follows:
He avoids ostentation and unnecessary expenditure, as well as conscious 
enjoyment of his power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the 
social recognition he receives. His manner of life is, in other words, 
often ...distinguished by a certain ascetic tendency. ...He gets nothing 
out of his wealth for himself, except the irrational sense of having done 
his job well.203
Analogously one could say that an ideal type could be, for example, that of a 
British Modem Orthodox Jew. We will have certain expectations o f what she 
might be and behave like. If she is a woman from London, we expect that she 
might be highly educated, live around the Hendon/Golders Green area (and not 
Stamford Hill), wear fashionable clothes but not buy into particularly revealing 
fashions or styles. We expect she will eat kosher, and if not available, prefer 
vegetarian alternatives, she will keep the Mitzvot, keep shomer Shabbat but not 
necessarily frown upon after-work drinks and so forth.
It is worth noting that the content and level o f detail o f a collective identity 
‘summary’ is variable. Individuals have different levels o f knowledge about 
other collectivities. Some they might know well, either through personal 
experience or professional interest. In these cases they might be able to provide a
202 Ian Hacking, “Making up People”, in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality 
and the S e lf  in Western Thought, eds. Thomas Heller, Morton Sosna and David E. Wellbery 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
203 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism  (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 
33.
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fairly specific (albeit not necessarily ‘true’) summary. The example above is a 
case o f an informed summary. Individuals might know less about other cultures 
or groups, making the characterisation less specific. For example, someone with 
limited knowledge o f Jews or Judaism might think that they can be defined by 
their ‘tight’ attitude to money, or their ability to perform well academically.
It should also be noted that the ascribed characteristics are not necessarily true 
and, that in both specific and more general cases, collective identities can be at 
risk o f essentialism. As Phillips notes, essentialism can have various meanings, 
all o f which can be applied to the use o f collective identities.204 In the first case, 
it overstates the similarities between members of the group. This is problematic 
since the way individuals experience the same collective identity varies. 
Collective cultural identities are not static -  they too are constantly challenged by 
the many sub-groups that constitute any collectivity: age, gender, education and 
socio-economic status all being examples o f the many differences found in any 
collectivity.205 This is particularly important to remember when thinking about 
the paradox o f multicultural vulnerability.206 As Shachar rightly points out, too 
much focus on identity politics can be a problem
when pro-identity group policies aimed at levelling the playing field 
between minority communities and the wider society unwittingly allow 
systematic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated
207group.
The paradox o f multicultural vulnerability emphasises the power differentials that 
cross cut any social group. These are precisely the issues that collective identities, 
through their abstraction and ‘summarisation’ o f what is to be expected, tend to 
ignore.
204 Anne Phillips, “What’s Wrong with Essentialism”, in Gender and Culture (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2010), Chapter V, pp. 69-82.
205 Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, p. 28.
206 See Shachar’s claim that this is part o f  the problem with Kukathas’ (or for that matter, any 
form o f  strong multiculturalism) take on minority rights. Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p. 
70.
207 Ibid, p. 2.
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Another way in which collective identities might be essentialist, despite their 
importance in forging individual identities, is in their potential to create reified 
categories o f identity and cultural groups.208 What is meant by this is the fact that 
sometimes these ascribed characteristics are taken as natural, as the essence o f 
what defines an individual. For example, it is because you are a Jew that you are a 
good student, not because your parents encouraged you to do well (for social, 
political, historical or religious reasons), or because you are personally interested 
in studying. The danger with this, as Phillips notes, is that it can imply biological 
determinism.
Related to the second understanding o f essentialism is a third interpretation. 
Again, it is one that can be perpetrated by the misuse o f collective identity 
summaries. According to Phillips, “the treatment of certain characteristics as the 
defining ones for anyone in the category, as characteristics that cannot be 
questioned or modified without thereby undermining one’s claim to belong to the 
group” is the most normative use o f essentialist terms.209 This kind o f essentialism 
can take the following form: you are not really a Jew if  you criticise Israel; you 
are not really Zionist if  you believe in a one state solution to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. It is used by others to judge an individual’s belonging. As 
mentioned above, this thesis focuses on individuals’ own evaluations o f their 
belongings and, as such, this type o f essentialism, albeit problematic, is not one 
that will be dealt with in detail.
The precise make up o f social groups or social identities is not what is 
particularly relevant for questions of autonomy. What matters is the way 
individuals deal with those identifications in personal ways. This is exactly the 
point at which the notion o f multiple identities differs from ideas on socialisation 
and group identities. Personal identities are commonly forged through the 
collective ones: the collective terminology enables individuals to articulate those 
aspects o f cultures with most meaning to them. Values only make sense when 
they resonate with others, making the social crucial in enabling the language, the
208 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture. See also Phillips, “What’s Wrong with Essentialism”, in 
Gender and Culture, Chapter V, pp. 69 -  82.
209 Phillips, “What’s Wrong with Essentialism”, p. 80.
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discourse within which individuals can construct or explain their own personal 
story. As Appiah points out,
once labels are applied to people, ideas about people who fit the label 
come to have social and psychological effects. In particular, these ideas 
shape the ways people conceive of themselves and their projects. So the 
labels operate to mould what we may call identification, the process 
through which individuals shape their projects -  including their plans 
for their own lives and their conceptions of the good life -  by reference 
to available labels, available identities.210
But these individual stories, these identities, are not circumscribed to follow only 
one aspect: there is no need, nor is it common practice, for an individual to 
define herself only as an x or a y, only as a woman or as a Jew. Collective 
identities enable agents to find their own identifications: those specific references 
that together constitute her identity. In other words, collective identities provide 
the language and knowledge necessary for the constitution o f the individual self, 
o f the person’s identity.
Literature on intersectionality highlights the cross-cutting plurality o f experience: 
“subjectivity or the person is shaped and decentred by multiple and cross-cutting 
forms o f socialisation, including relations of group conflict and 
subordination.”211 Collective identities are indeed ideal types, but the experience 
o f the individual is not ideal, perfect, unified. It need not conform to all that is 
expected o f a certain group, especially when we bear in mind that many o f the 
social attachments that agents hold might conflict with others. The experience of 
black feminists is a good example o f these conflicting attachments. As bell hooks 
pointed out whilst writing about suffrage,
Black women were placed in a double bind; to support women’s suffrage 
would imply that they were allying themselves with white women 
activists who had publicly revealed their racism, but to support only
210 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 66.
211 Barvosa Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p.2. Benhabib makes a similar 
point in The Claims o f  Culture, p. 103.
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black male suffrage was to endorse a patriarchal social order that would 
grant them no political voice.212
This concern is echoed in Kimberle Crenshaw’s call for the consideration of 
intersectionality as a crucial aspect o f thinking about inequality. According to 
Crenshaw,
the experiences of women of color are frequently the product of 
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and how these experiences 
tend not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or 
anti-racism. Because of their intersectional identity as both women and 
of color within discourses that are shaped to respond to one or the other, 
women of color are marginalized within both.213
Only through an intersectional approach would the theorising o f identity become 
truer to the lived experience, and only through such conceptualisations would 
identity politics come to fruition in its emancipatory egalitarian aims.
Literature on intersectionality reinforces notions about the particularity o f each 
agent’s response to socialisation. Each individual might respond in a unique way; 
it is through these responses that autonomy is developed, and cultural (as well as 
other) identifications are reproduced, maintained and challenged. Indeed, what 
multiple identities explores is the frequent gap between the ascribed preferences 
o f a group (for example, the Catholic faith is opposed to the use o f contraception) 
and an individual’s personal and private endorsements (a Catholic need not 
necessarily be opposed to the use o f contraception, regardless o f her religious 
beliefs).
Intersectionality also emerges as a way o f looking at the problems caused by 
plural and cross-cutting forms o f inequality and discrimination. As Meyers points 
out:
212 bell hooks, A in't I  a  Woman: Black Women and Feminism  (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 3.
2,3 Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”, pp. 1243-4.
The idea of intersectional identity is premised on the general 
philosophical thesis that who one is depends on one’s social experience. 
However, the intersectional conception is specific to societies that 
exhibit certain kinds of social stratification, for it derives from a social- 
psychological view about how individuals internalise gender, sexual 
orientation, race, class and ethnicity in sexist, homophobic, racist, 
classist and xenophobic societies.214
Its focus on the individual eschews the idea of homogenous groups, showing the 
plurality o f experience that defines lives, emphasising the individual. This does 
not mean that intersectionality is only present, or only becomes apparent, when 
there are inequalities operating. I take it that intersectionality operates for all 
human beings: it is a fact o f human life. Indeed, all individuals have a variety o f 
identifications that might or might not conflict. The point is, however, that the 
study o f intersectionality or consideration o f the literature o f multiple identities 
can help shed light on the many ways different inequalities can operate for 
different individuals. Because o f the weight placed upon the unique experience 
of agents, these inequalities, and their varying and cross-cutting forms, become 
more apparent as opposed to being subsumed under a general rubric of 
discrimination.
As such, group uniformity is challenged; the individual comes to the forefront as 
the unit o f analysis. Intersectionality stresses the individual’s response to 
inequalities: the uniqueness that arises as a result of externalist classifications and 
the possibilities of negotiating one’s identity in terms of what matters to one’s 
self.
3. How does Intersectionality Operate?
So far we have dealt with the origins o f the notion of multiple identities and 
some o f the assumptions it is meant to dispute, but in order to fully understand 
how the idea challenges traditional theories o f autonomy, it is necessary to sketch
214 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!”, p. 153.
out how it functions and some o f strategies people pursue when negotiating 
between conflicting demands. This section deals with intersectionality as 
experienced by individuals. It also looks at the different methods the literature on 
intersectionality identifies as typical in multiple identity negotiation.
The idea o f personal individual identity employed here draws on Appiah’s notion 
that our selves and identities are formed through discourse, and that collective 
identities provide the terms for identification. But these terms o f identification 
are not accepted wholesale, and collective identities can conjure many challenges 
for personal identities. In particular, an individual might not agree with all the 
ascribed identity characteristics of a group, but nonetheless feel she belongs. On 
what level can this be the case? And what happens when different identifications, 
that is, different collective identities, conflict?
In terms o f personal identity, it is useful to distinguish between the different 
constituent parts. I follow Appiah in thinking that social discourse provides the 
language for personal identity, but this is only part of the story. Kathleen Wallace 
points out two levels to identification, two constituent components that together 
form the individual identity o f an agent.215 The social works through each of 
these elements in different ways.
One element of individual identity is the ‘me’: “the self as the generalised other, 
that is, the self as a reflection o f the whole community.”216 The ‘me’ refers to the 
way individuals, as single agents, respond to the demands placed on them 
through their various identifications and belongings. The ‘m e’ is often not chosen 
in an autonomous way, although it could be. It refers to those groups the agent 
feels she belongs to: whether she has chosen to belong to them is a different 
matter. So, for example, a ‘me’ could refer to an agent’s individual identification 
as a woman, a daughter, a wife, a Muslim, a left wing political activist, a feminist 
and a British national. Some o f these identifications she might have not chosen -
215 W allace’s analysis is heavily reliant on George Herbert M ead’s work on the difference 
between the ‘I’ and the ‘m e’. See George H. Mead, Mind, S elf and Society  (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 1934).
216 Kathleen Wallace, “Autonomous ‘I’ o f  an Intersectional S e lf ’, The Journal o f  Speculative 
Philosophy , Vol. 17, N o. 3 (2003), p. 177.
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she has, for example, been bom in Britain. Others, she might have chosen herself 
-  such as being a feminist. Her ‘me’s’ are thus her various identifications. Based 
on Wallace’s ideal schema, we can see how these different identifications (the 
different ‘me’s’) operate.217 The following diagram is based on an imaginary 
individual -  an educated young female British Muslim. The identifications 
portrayed are by no means exhaustive: many other categories could also be 
included.218 For the purposes o f clarity, in order to shed some light on the 
examples that follow, I have chosen to use only six different identifications.
Left
Wing
Political
Beliefs
Daughter Muslim
British
Wife Feminist
Figure 1 - Intersectional Model of Identification (me's)
These identifications need not conflict, but the connecting lines between them 
signify identifications that could potentially conflict due to an incompatibility in 
ascriptive characteristics. Whether they actually conflict or not cannot be 
established a priori; this will depend on the particular situation, time and agent.
The other level that comprises individual identity is the ‘I’, defined as “the 
response of the individual (organism) to the attitudes of others”.219 The T  is in a 
sense deeper than the ‘me’. It employs the same identifications as the ‘me’, but
217 Ibid., p. 185, figure 3. The diagram (and its contents) has been changed slightly, but the way it 
operates is very similar to W allace’s model.
218 Examples o f  other identifications that could plausibly be included are identification with her 
family’s country o f  origin, with her occupation, with a particular political party and so forth.
219 Wallace, “Autonomous ‘I’ o f  an Intersectional S e lf ’, p. 178.
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analyses these in a different way: the focus is on how the agent sees them 
operating for her. T  involves a deeper level o f consciousness than ‘me’, in so far 
as it involves considering the characteristics an agent chooses to endorse, or not 
endorse or remain ambivalent about. The T  refers to her particular and 
singularly unique way o f being. It might not be possible to actively choose all the 
identifications that could constitute the ‘me’, for many are a matter of accident, 
dependent on place o f birth, parents, socio-economic status and biology. But this 
is not to say there is no consciousness operating in personal identities. Agents 
typically consider some aspects o f their identifications with more care than 
others, and do not necessarily accept the ascriptive characteristics bestowed on 
them without some degree o f consideration o f whether they are happy with these 
characterisations. The T  refers to that part o f our identity wherein we consider 
our own positioning towards our ‘me’, where we evaluate those aspects we agree 
with, and those ones we do not.
The distinction proposed here is somewhat analogous to the one Seyla Benhabib 
makes between the “concrete other” and the “generalized other” . For Benhabib, 
the universalism of liberal theory is severely weakened through its over-reliance 
on the notion o f the generalised other. According to her, the notion o f the 
generalised other requires us “to view each and every individual as a rational 
being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to 
ourselves. In assuming the standpoint, we abstract from the individuality and 
concrete identity of the other.”220 My argument for the ‘me’, that is, the self as 
the generalised other, does not require such level o f abstraction. It is merely a 
way o f describing how individuals feel about certain attachments that are 
developed socially.
Even if my description o f the ‘me’ could be said to be reminiscent of Benhabib’s 
depiction, it is the ‘I’ that provides the standpoint of the concrete self. Through 
the I, the self becomes situated, allowing us to “view each and every rational 
being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional 
constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our
220 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the S e lf  (Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press 1992), pp. 158-9.
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commonality and focus on individuality.”221 The combination of the ‘I’ and the 
‘me’ together make up the self -  a more concrete and situated conception which, 
as Benhabib argues, is a better way from which to develop theory.
The following diagram illustrates a relationship between the T ,  ‘me’ and 
‘m yself.
I M e
(Identifications)
M yself 
(Personal Identity)
Muslim (eating Hallal, 
not wearing the hijab) —
Muslim (Praying 5 times
--------- ► day, eating Hallal, dressings.
modestly) S ^
n/a
(biological fact)
Daughter (must honour your 
parents, there are certain duties _  
towards one’s own family,
^ Agent X  
/
Left wing (equal rights —  
for all citizens, National 
Health Service, privatised 
transport)
---------► Left wing politics (National /
Health Service, minimum wage, 
strong public sector)
/
Figure 2 - 1 ,  M e, M yself
The identifications above are clearly not exhaustive -  indeed, this is only a 
simplified snapshot of the way identities might operate. What is crucial to note 
here is that not all personal identifications (‘me’) need have an associated T .  As 
mentioned earlier, some identifications (‘me’s’) might be chosen, others are an 
accident. Some might be deemed more important by the agent, making her 
evaluate more deeply what it means to be identified as a or b. In the above case, 
for example, the agent does not have a strong ‘I* in terms o f being a daughter. 
The identification is sufficient and she has not felt it necessary to think deeply 
about what it means for her to be a daughter. This is different for her 
identification with having left wing political beliefs. Here, the ‘me’ might 
associate left wing views with support for a strong public sector, and her ‘I*
221 Ibid., p. 159.
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might agree with the need for a National Health Service, but not think the state 
should regulate all industries. She might believe that privatised transport systems 
are best, even if this does not agree with the typically ascribed characteristics o f a 
left wing voter. The collection of her T s ’ and ‘me’s’ are what together constitute 
her unique and singular personal identity.
What is clear from this is that different identifications might or might not conflict 
with each other, and that whether they do depends on the particular situation of 
the agent. But what happens when they do? What strategies do individuals use to 
negotiate between what can be potentially conflicting ascribed characteristics? A 
number o f negotiating strategies have been noted in the literature on multiple 
identities -  they exemplify how intersectionality considers the self as being made 
up o f experiences which are not uniform or homogeneous. In describing these 
mechanisms I seek to point out which elements o f the self (the ‘I’ or the ‘me’) 
the alleged conflict is based on. In so doing it is easier to see whether agents need 
to resolve the alleged contradictions in order to be true to themselves.
The first thing to consider is whether the agent accepts the identifications as hers. 
As mentioned above, for collective identities there must be some degree o f 
identification with the categorisation. But agents may not feel very strongly and 
one way in which intersectional identities can coexist is when the ‘me’s’ do not 
have an associated ‘I’: when the self as a generalised other does not feel the need 
to adopt an explicit position. In some cases, agents will care deeply about aspects 
o f their personal identities, in other cases they will not. In Figure 2, it could be 
said that the agent is ambivalent about being a daughter. This means that she is 
not particularly concerned about what it means, for her, to be one. She is a 
daughter, and she accepts her identification as one, but she remains ambivalent 
about what this identification might entail.222 Her acceptance is not deeply 
considered, there are no deep levels o f consciousness attached to her position as a 
daughter. At this point her identification, her ‘me’, will not come into conflict 
with her other identities.
222 For example, she might be ambivalent about what daughters “ought” to do. Does being a 
daughter mean you have to respect your parents? Or is it a mere biological fact?
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But tension between identities can indeed occur. One way o f negotiating plural 
identifications is then through what Barvosa-Carter, following Anzaldua’s 
characterisation, calls “syncretising” . This refers to:
The process of choosing and syncretically creating one’s own set of 
outlooks from the variety of elements within one’s array of social 
relations and identities. The result of these creative acts is a hybrid set 
of outlooks that include an array of elements adopted whole from 
socially given materials and others created syncretically by the subject 
from elements created from different social sources.223
The young woman in the above example might, for instance, consider herself a 
pious Muslim. However, there might be some customs she does not agree with at 
all as a consequence o f being a feminist. She might think that raising your 
children to be good Muslims is a requirement for women in Islam.224 But as a 
feminist, she might not think this duty should be exclusive to her: she might 
believe that she and her husband share the responsibility to raise their children to 
be good Muslims. Her ‘me’ might accept the duty as one that pertains to her, but 
her ‘I’ does not accept it as something that she would choose to do by herself. 
She picks, or even creates, her own endorsements from among her various 
identifications. She need not agree with all the presumed characteristics o f a 
collective identity, but will endorse those she agrees with, and that allow her to 
live with the plurality o f her identifications. Her multiple identities “are not
995fragmented, but an interconnected multiplicity” that make sense to her. They 
need to mirror the collective identities that operate in the social world but in 
ways compatible with her personal identity.
The idea o f syncretising can involve another form of negotiation, where the agent 
questions the particular characterisation o f the ‘me’ through her T .  Here, she 
might think that a particular feature of the collective identity is nothing more 
than a stereotype. She repudiates the particular characteristic on the level o f the 
the ‘I’, for example, when a young Muslim woman believes the Qu’ran does
223 Barvosa Carter, “M estiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 7.
224 Mahmood, Politics o f  P iety, pp. 181 -  184.
225 Barvosa Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 8.
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indeed call for women (and men) to behave modestly, but does not think that the 
interpretation o f modesty requires wearing the hijab. She is aware that other 
Muslims might disagree with her, but her T  disagrees with a particular 
interpretation of her ‘me’.
This idea o f forming one’s own endorsements also shows the creative potential in 
multiple identities. The notion o f creation is not a meta-philosophical one. It does 
not involve deep levels o f self-consciousness in interrogating every aspect of 
one’s life, for sometimes endorsements are produced by accident. A young 
woman, daughter to a Catholic and a Jew, might choose her endorsements (those 
things she takes from both faiths) almost by accident: she might maintain those 
things that she has seen throughout her childhood and eschew those her parents 
did not consider particularly important. Her theistic faith becomes a hybrid, a 
combination o f various belief systems she knows and, to an extent, practices. But 
this has not been achieved through a process o f deep reflection. It is more that 
her social background provided the reference points that she then considers 
important. The endorsement o f certain characteristics and creation o f hybrid 
identity implies a certain level o f self-consciousness. This is self-consciousness 
at the level of the ‘I’, where the agent considers her own position in terms of 
those collective identities she either identifies with or is identified (by others) 
with. But agents might not be aware o f “choosing” to be Muslim, British or 
feminists. But the way they then think about these identities is indeed a conscious 
process: it is perhaps at this level of identity where autonomy becomes most 
important.
Literature on multiple identities highlights identity change over time and not just 
depending on social circumstances. It recognises the fluidity o f social relations 
and attachments that characterises lives. The young woman in my example might 
find that at different points in her life different identifications come into tension. 
For a long time, perhaps, being a feminist and being a daughter do not conflict. 
Her parents, although not necessarily espousing her beliefs, are happy to respect 
her decisions. But imagine that a few years later her parents tell her that it is no 
longer appropriate, now that she has young children, for her to pursue her career 
on a full time basis, that this is not the appropriate manner o f behaviour. She
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might find that then her two identifications, feminist and daughter, come into 
conflict: she wants to please her parents, but does not believe that staying at 
home caring for the children is what will give her most fulfilment. Intersectional 
identities can generate conflict at different times: they need not always be in 
opposition, but they can potentially be.
An alternative way o f living through plural identities is through what Lugones 
terms “world travelling”, whereby “the agent shifts among her different 
identifications from one social setting to another. This method of negotiating the 
plurality o f one’s identities involves different identity-related meanings, values 
and practices being utilized in different contexts”.226 For example, the woman in 
the example might find her commitments to Islam and feminism run into 
conflict, but on a changing context basis. Perhaps, when surrounded by Muslim 
friends and loved ones, she defends feminism, including some principles she is 
not fully convinced by. In the presence o f feminist friends, she defends Islam 
against charges that it does not respect women. The alleged conflict between her 
Muslim and feminist identifications takes place at the level o f her ‘me’, the 
identification as a member of these two groups, but based on their ascriptive 
characteristics. In this case, the contradiction is vis k vis others: it is not 
necessarily the way she herself thinks about these attachments. She is able to 
move between her different identifications, prioritising them in different ways at 
different times.
World travelling can be seen as an instance o f ambivalence. Indeed, the case 
above seems to fit the standard definition: “the coexistence in one person of 
contradictory emotions or attitudes (as love and hatred) towards a person or 
thing.”227 Ambivalence can be taken as just a fact, a characteristic of certain 
moments where agents are tom by conflicting feelings. But does this mean the 
individual lacks autonomy at those moments? Intersectional theory would deny 
this. Indeed, as has been pointed out above, ambivalence in the world travelling 
sense can be a way o f making sense o f a variety o f attachments in a variety of
226 Barvosa-Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 7.
227 Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed on the 19/08/2010. 
http://dictionarv.oed.com/cgi/entrv/50006963?single=:l&querv tvpe=word&quervword=ambival 
ence&first=l& max to show=10.
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social situations, one that operates at the level o f ascriptive characteristics, not 
the agent’s own interpretation o f them. In this sense, ambivalence allows agents 
to portray their identities in a more plural fashion than strict conformity to 
ascriptive characteristics would allow.
World travelling allows agents to display the richness of attachments in a way 
that is crucial not just for the individuals themselves, but also as a form o f 
questioning and challenging the ascriptive expectations of the collective 
identities. The above example is a good one: defending both Islam and feminism 
might raise awareness o f the existence o f Islamic feminisms, or at the very least 
dispel some myths about the alleged misogyny o f Islam, while pointing to the 
possibility o f interpreting scriptures in a variety o f ways.228 World travelling 
helps raise consciousness and can dispel the static notions that can sometimes 
permeate identity politics.
But ambivalence can be said to have two further meanings: one is normative, the 
other not. The non-normative form o f ambivalence relates to the idea o f 
contradiction within the self, that is, uncertainty regarding the way an agent sees 
some o f her identifications. She might, for example, be ambivalent, unsure, as to 
whether or not to consider herself a left wing voter. Some o f her beliefs might fit 
well with with the ascribed characteristics o f a left wing voter, while others do 
not. She remains ambivalent about whether to term herself left wing at all -  she 
is tom between some of her ‘I* identifications and how to describe these vis h vis 
the ‘me’. The conflict here is the opposite o f the earlier example: there, the ‘me’ 
did not have a correlated ‘I’; here, the ‘I’ does not fit a ‘me’ that the agent can 
see as representing her.
The final way ambivalence operates has to do with the way the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ 
are related, otherwise known as ambivalence as an enabling strategy. As already 
argued, literature on multiple identities challenges the idea that wholehearted 
espousal is a necessary characteristic of autonomy. Ambivalence enables agents 
to move between different identifications depending on the particularities of the
228 See Nash, “Re-thinking Intersectionality”; Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”.
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social situations they find themselves in. Ambivalence as an enabling strategy 
also assumes that “an agent need not endorse all aspects o f her internalised 
identity frames”.229 There might be things she completely disagrees with but not 
espousing these does not mean rejecting the identification. In terms o f world 
travelling, ambivalence works at the ‘me’ level, or the agent as part participant in 
a collective identity. Where there is opposition, it is between allegedly competing 
‘me’s’ or identifications -  external ascriptive characteristics.
Ambivalence as an enabling strategy becomes particularly important when 
dealing with negative stereotypes. Collective identities can have both positive 
and negative characteristics, and these often permeate through personal 
identifications. Amos Oz, in A Tale o f  Love and Darkness, speaks of his 
bewilderment at the ability o f (Sabra) Jews to play sport: “ ...there were great 
sportsmen in Tel Aviv. And there was the sea, full o f bronzed Jews who could 
swim. Who in Jerusalem could swim? Who had heard o f swimming Jews? These 
were different genes. A mutation.”230
Meyers points out that ambivalence towards some o f these (negative) 
characteristics might have a positive effect. Subordination can mean that 
individuals in a marginalised group are victimised by their very identities. But as 
well as harming them, these identities also provide an important resource. Thus, 
for Meyers,
only if individuals can disavow harmful group-linked attributes, while 
identifying with their position as members of a wrongfully subordinated
229 Barvosa-Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 11
230 Amos Oz, A Tale o f  Love and Darkness (London: Vintage Books, 2005), p.6. Indeed, at the 
time the book is based (1940s and 1950s), Jewish immigrants to Palestine (later Israel) 
throughout and after the Shoah were often portrayed as weak, frail and helpless -  it was thought 
that the shtetl and ghetto experiences had deprived them o f  their ability to defend themselves in 
the face o f  unspeakable cruelty -  something the nation-building school led by Eisenstadt was 
keen to avoid, rekindling the Jewish story o f  Masada and turning military figures like Moshe 
Dayan into the new exemplary figures o f  the nation. See Nurith Gertz, Myths in Israeli Culture 
(London: Vallentine Press, 2000); Robert Wistrich and David Ohana, The Shaping o f  Israeli 
Identity: Myth, M emory and Trauma (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1995); Joseph A. Massad, 
“Zionism’s Internal Others: Israel and the Oriental Jews”, Journal o f  Palestine Studies, Vol. 
XXV, No. 4 (1996); Michael Jansen, Dissonance in Zion (London: Zed Books, 1987). The first 
few  pages o f  Chaim Potok’s The Chosen also have a similar theme -  d isbelief that a Hassidic boy 
would be able to play a very skilled (and almost violent) baseball game. See Chaim Potok, The 
Chosen  (London: Penguin, 1981).
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group and retaining their compassion for group members who have not 
succeeded in ridding themselves of disabling and disfiguring group- 
linked attributes, is the strategy of disidentification feasible for 
autonomous intersectional subjects. But since it is doubtful that one can 
decisively or wholeheartedly identity with being a victim without 
succumbing to self-pity or self-annihilation, it is doubtful that such 
identification could be integrated into an empowering and coherent 
hierarchy of desires and values. Indeed, ambivalence toward one’s 
victimisation seems a better attitude to strike.231
Ambivalence then emerges as a coping strategy, particularly useful in the case of 
subordination and victimisation. Identifications themselves are not the problem -  
the problem is not being an Ashkenazi Jew, Latino, or Black. The problem lies 
with some o f the characteristics associated with the identities -  for example, in 
the Ashkenazi case, as being weak, a klutz or a push-over. It is these 
characteristics which are harmful, and adopting an ambivalence strategy can be 
an effective way o f preserving what is an important identification for an 
individual, without allowing the negative external ascriptive criteria to dominate. 
In cases o f victimisation and subordination some o f the specifics o f ‘me’s’ are 
best ignored.
Ambivalence as an enabling strategy can even be seen as a truer description of 
the way collective identifications work. As Crenshaw reminds us, the relation 
between the oppressive and the oppressed is more complicated than a mere 
dichotomy, since “subordinated people can and do participate, sometimes even 
subverting the naming process in empowering ways. One need only think about 
the historical subversion o f the category ‘Black’ or the current transformation of 
‘queer’ to understand that categorisation is not a one-way street.”232 
Categorisations, if reconstructed, can have the potential to be empowering. It 
could even be said that ambivalence as a strategy can challenge misleading 
summaries o f collective identities, thus helping dissipate the effects of 
essentialist understandings o f culture and belonging.
231 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self: Opposites Attract!”, p. 170.
232 Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”, p. 1297.
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Ambivalence also enables agents to hold onto their various identifications, 
without hurting the people they care about. As Barvosa Carter points out, if the
rejection of unwanted cultural principles is done in a manner that 
‘outlaws’ -  i.e. fully rejects -  her social group’s views, (she) risks 
denying or alienating the social relationships she cares most about. ...By 
maintaining ambivalence toward some disavowed principles in this way 
she can clear social space for acting autonomously upon her own 
syncretic endorsements without simultaneously devaluing ‘abandoned’ 
ways of life that are still meaningful and socially important to others 
with whom she is closely socially related.233
Take the woman who considers herself a pious Muslim, but does not think the 
demands o f modesty mean the wearing of a chador. For her, head coverings are 
not necessitated by the demands o f modesty. She might occasionally wear a hijab 
in order not to upset her parents (for example, when attending Mosque or visiting 
her parents’ house), but she remains ambivalent about the necessity o f  this 
custom to her belief. But does this ambivalence mean that she is not truly her 
own person, that she is compromising or becoming inauthentic? Alternatively, 
does refusing to endorse the entire content o f one’s collective identities mean that 
one is not a member of these collectivities?
According to Barvosa Carter, this is not the case, since the social construction of 
membership in a community or in a collectivity requires two things: “ 1) To 
accept at least some o f the meanings, values and practices that are used to define 
that particular social group and 2) to be willing to be judged by the prevailing 
moral values o f the social group.”234 This means that ambivalence “is toward 
aspects o f her social identity group and is not the same as, and does not require, 
ambivalence toward her own self chosen endorsements”.235 The ambivalence is, 
ultimately, towards certain aspects of her ‘me’, rather than her carefully 
considered ‘I* preferences.
233 Barvosa-Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 14.
234 Ibid., p. 17.
235 Ibid., p. 18.
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Intersectional identities thus emerge as challenging the presumed homogeneity of 
lived experience. It is part o f my argument in this thesis that theories of 
autonomy do not sufficiently take into consideration the idea that the self is not 
stable, easily defined or easy to correlate with particular social groups. Multiple 
identities stress the particularities o f the dynamics experienced when living 
amongst a variety of attachments. It is thus a particularly fruitful way o f shedding 
light on the situation o f women within minorities, and the dynamics these 
relations give rise to.
4. The Implications of Multiple/Intersectional Identities
The implications for autonomy should already be becoming clear. One of the 
first issues to emerge from the intersectional literature is that, despite its 
rootedness in theories o f difference, it makes a clear move away from the 
traditional multiculturalist stance. For many multiculturalists, group rights are 
deemed necessary in order to allow individuals to value their social attachments. 
For Margalit and Raz, for example, “ ...people’s sense of their own identity is 
bound up with their sense o f belonging to encompassing groups and that their
236self-respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are held”. From 
this perspective, it is argued that cultural groups should have special rights. 
Making sure that certain groups are not disadvantaged is said to be crucial in 
fashioning individuals with a strong sense o f self; negative group stereotypes can 
be very damaging.
Intersectionality does not challenge this. Group or collective rights might indeed 
be necessary but while collective identities, as a sort o f ideal type, may be useful 
and necessary, they should not become the defining feature o f egalitarian 
politics. Appiah warns in The Ethics o f  Identity:
The politics of recognition, if pursued with excessive zeal, can seem to 
require that one’s skin color, one’s sexual body, should be politically
236 Margalit and Raz (2004), “National Self-Determination” in The Rights o f  M inority Cultures, 
ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 87.
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acknowledged in ways that make it hard for those who want to treat 
their skin and their sexual body as personal dimensions of the self. And 
personal, here, does not mean secret or ...wholly unscripted or innocent 
of social meanings; it means, rather, something that is not too tightly 
scripted, not too resistant to our individual vagaries.237
As pointed out earlier, collective identities can essentialise identity. Here, 
intersectionality as an analytical strategy can clearly help. Essentialism defined 
as the attribution o f particular characteristics to all those identified by the 
collective identity, can be helped by studies o f intersectionality through their 
insistence on highlighting the position o f individuals. Although agents might 
accept some o f the ascribed characteristics associated to a collective identity, the 
way they experience their identifications is highly variable. Not everyone will 
agree with all o f the ascribed characteristics, nor will they feel the same about 
them. The “summaries” o f collective identities, the categories, might indeed be 
useful, but they cannot be taken to be true for all people who feel identified by 
them.
Intersectionality as an analytical strategy can also help avoid the reification of the 
categories themselves. As pointed out in Chapter I, Susan Moller Okin was 
heavily criticised for her essay Is Multiculturalism B adfor Women? 238 The claim 
was that her understanding o f culture lends itself to static stereotypes, and her 
analysis failed to see the wealth of meaning inherent in various practices. Critics 
claimed that feminists must be sensitive to local contingencies and not assume 
that there are simple “truths” that can be done away with 239 As Yael Tamir 
warned, static representations o f culture can result in
agents of social and cultural change ... portrayed as feeble-minded 
individuals who are tempted by the material affluence of the 
surrounding society. .. .A great deal of paternalism is embedded in the 
assumption that while ‘we’ can survive change and innovation and
237 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 110.
238 Okin, Is Multiculturalism B adfor Women?, pp. 7 -24.
239 See especially Azizah Al-Hibri, “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third 
World/Minority Women?”, in Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, ed. Susan M. Okin 
(Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).
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endure the tensions created by modernity, ‘they’ cannot; that ‘we’ can 
repeatedly reinvent ourselves, our culture, our tradition, while ‘they’ 
must adhere to known cultural patterns. ...If however, culture and 
tradition are seen in a less static light, then reformers could be seen as 
contributing to the preservation of the communal identity no less than 
conservatives.240
Multiple identities reinforce all these ideas: agents are not portrayed simply as 
vessels o f culture but as active carriers and challengers o f the very ideas they 
hold. Culture and tradition are always matters o f interpretation. Intersectionality, 
through its concern with the way individuals interpret and endorse their own 
identifications, reinforces the notion that cultures, groups and identities cannot be 
taken as static. Those who participate in them cannot be defined solely by 
reference to the ascribed characteristics that their collective identities might hold. 
This is not to say that the ascribed characteristics have no force. As Crenshaw 
points out, “categories have meaning and consequences”.241 Intersectionality as 
an analytical tool does not dismiss the importance o f social categories. Instead it 
looks at what the effects o f categories might be and the many ways in which 
individuals might deal with them.
Intersectionality also emphasises what is known as non-ethnocentric feminism, 
i.e. the idea that it must be women themselves who challenge those aspects they 
consider harmful or patriarchal from within their own cultures.242 As Leti Volpp 
has pointed out, we must be wary o f “the presumption [that] Western women’s 
liberation depends upon the notion that immigrant and Third World communities 
are sites o f aberrant violence”.243 Inequality is more pervasive than this, present 
in developed and developing, rich and poor countries. The problem is that by 
creating stereotyped images of the Other, and thinking that some cultures, 
countries or religions simply are worse when it comes to treating women, we risk
240 Yael Tamir, “Siding with the Underdogs”, in Is Multiculturalism B ad fo r  Women?, ed. Susan 
M. Okin (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 48 -  51.
241 Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”, p. 1297.
242 Non-ethnocentric feminism does not claim that it must be only women, or women from 
minority cultures that challenge patriarchal practices. It could be men and women from a variety 
o f  backgrounds, however, the point is that it must be those who live within unequal norms that 
should be given a voice to express their own attitudes towards these practices.
243 Volpp, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism”, p. 1186.
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losing the ability to see the many ways in which inequality and patriarchy 
assume its forms:
We identify sexual violence in immigrants of color and Third World 
communities as cultural, while failing to recognise the cultural aspects 
of sexual violence affecting mainstream white women. This is related to 
the general failure to look at the behaviour of white persons as cultural, 
while always ascribing the label of culture of the behaviour of minority
244groups.
What multiple identities stress is the need for more nuanced understandings, not 
only o f the way collective identities or ascriptive criteria operate at an individual 
level, but also that the manner in which individuals respond to these is varied and 
plural. There might be acceptance o f externalist criteria, or there might not be: 
we must not forget that groups, cultures, religions -  any form o f association -  
tend to exist because o f their internal dynamics and that these often operate by 
being contested from within. Multiple identities stress the commonality o f 
experience: as individuals we all have to negotiate in our daily lives, whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging the many ways in which practices are maintained 
or challenged -  a likely way o f guaranteeing change and reflection from within.
My argument here is that a better understanding o f multiple identities has 
implications for autonomy. As we have seen, multiple identities challenge ideas 
about the homogeneity o f individuals, especially when considering individuals as 
members o f a variety o f groups. In the first instance, intersectionality brings into 
question issues o f authenticity. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
authenticity can refer to “being in accordance with fact, as being true in 
substance”.245 This would correspond with ideas o f cultural or group authenticity. 
But the term can also refer to “being what it professes in origin or authorship, as
244 Ibid., p. 1189.
245 Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed 19/08/2010. 
http://dictionarv.oed.com.eate2.librarv.lse.ac.uk/cgi/entrv/50015045?single=l&Querv tvpe-word  
&quervword=AUTHENTICITY&first=l &max to show=10 .
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being genuine; genuineness”246 i.e. autonomous. It emerges that authenticity can 
be o f two different types: individual or cultural. But does having more than one 
identity framework mean that there is no personal authenticity? This need not be 
the case, since multiple identities stress that the self, if authentic, will be 
constantly evolving, relentlessly challenged:
If ignorance of one’s intersectional identity impairs autonomy, 
intersectional identity and hence the internalised norms of the groups 
to which one is assigned are attributes of the authentic self. But since 
intersectional identity is constituted in part through a process of self- 
definition, the authentic self is an evolving self that is not chained to 
conventional group norms.247
This, in turn, might indeed affect conceptions o f autonomy: autonomy accounts 
will need to be sensitive to these variations. For example, it might mean that the 
idea o f autonomy as an all or nothing matter is precluded, but it also might mean 
that individuals could be more autonomous in certain aspects o f their life than in 
others.
The idea o f differentiating between the ‘me’ and the T  emphasises the notion 
that autonomy will apply differently in different areas o f the self. As has been 
mentioned, the idea o f the ‘me’ does not necessarily assume a deep level o f 
consciousness. It is a form of identification that is important to the agent, but not 
one that she need have considered in depth. The ‘I’, however, seems to imply a 
deeper level o f reflection. Surely this means that autonomy might be 
differentially exercised in certain aspects, but it also might be o f different kinds. 
The ‘me’ is o f no less importance than the ‘I’ -  especially when bearing in mind 
that the ‘me’, the definition of the self in terms of others and categories, is central 
to multicultural politics.
Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed 10/08/2010. 
http://dictionarv.oed.com.gate2.1ibrarv.lse.ac.uk/cgi/entrv/50015045?single=::l&Querv tvpe=word 
&quervword=AUTHENTICITY&first=l&max to show=10.
247 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self: Opposites Attract!”, p. 153.
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Through multiple identities we can perhaps avoid some o f the pitfalls that have 
characterised the literature on multiculturalism: it may be possible to uphold 
multicultural policies without forgoing equality, and without essentialising 
cultural practices. The social retains its central position without being elevated 
into a static, unchangeable fact. This is turn can have important consequences for 
emancipatory politics. A feminist project is characterised by “a political and 
philosophical devotion to ending the oppression o f people on the basis of gender 
and sex”.248 As Mahmood makes clear, there is always an emancipatory subtext 
in feminist analysis.249 Literature on multiple identities is not prescriptive: it is 
rather a descriptive methodology that will enable the studying o f oppression to 
become more nuanced. Within that, it becomes clear that taking the 
intersectionality o f identity seriously means that it will not be possible to 
condemn practices a priori: it is crucial that we analyse how an agent comes to 
view her particular attachments and how the negotiation o f these will result in 
certain practices.
As we have seen, the consideration of intersectionality as intrinsic part o f the 
lived experience will have important consequences for political theorists. It will 
help in the understanding o f autonomy, the tool often used by political theorists 
to help elucidate the limits o f liberal toleration. Not just in the case of minorities, 
intersectionality as an analytical strategy shows the limitations o f the more 
formalistic versions o f autonomy (often procedural and substantive), whilst 
retaining the centrality of the individual that is at the heart o f the investigation. 
Only through seeing how individuals form their identities, and the different ways 
in which they negotiate these, will it be possible to have a successful setting for 
the study o f minorities within minorities and equality at large.
248 Hirschmann, “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question o f  Free Agency”, p. 348.
249 Mahmood, Politics o f  P iety, pp. 9 -1 0 .
IV. Procedural Theories of Autonomy
Autonomy has long been considered an important factor when evaluating the 
permissibility o f certain cultural practices. However, what is meant by 
autonomy? Conceptions o f autonomy are varied and highly distinctive. Some 
theorists regard autonomy as a process of decision-making, whereas others seem 
to imply that autonomy is something deeper than an internal process. For some, 
autonomy is a preference that requires no voicing, yet for others it is defined by 
action. Unless the particularities are spelled out, there is a danger o f talking at 
cross-purposes. It follows that it is necessary to distinguish between the different 
kinds of autonomy that are most commonly used in the literature on 
multiculturalism.
This is the starting chapter o f a theoretical bloc. There will be three chapters 
wherein three different theories o f autonomy shall be examined. This first 
chapter will deal with procedural theories o f autonomy, the second with 
explicitly relational accounts o f autonomy, and the third chapter in the bloc will 
focus on autonomy as a substantive ideal. Each one will evaluate the different 
theories in order to understand how well they are able to accommodate the two 
concerns posed by socialisation and multiple identities.
How well do the different theories accommodate and explain autonomy in the 
presence of oppressive or unequal forms of socialisation? And how well do they 
reflect the identity dynamics that individuals with more than one identification 
might experience? Do the various theories o f autonomy even allow for this 
multiplicity to exist?
1. Introduction
Autonomy considerations have been shown to be an important concern when 
deciding whether or not liberal states ought to tolerate certain minority practices.
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However, as Chapter I argued, there is a danger that cultural defence might 
portray members o f minority groups as less autonomous than those o f majority 
groups. This is particularly true o f minority women, where non-comformity to 
cultural stereotypes can mean that culture is no longer deemed relevant in
250defence cases. The case o f Kiranjit Ahluwalia is o f particular interest here. 
Ahluwalia was tried for the murder of her abusive husband. In the first instance 
she was convicted, and the fact she had a university degree was cited as evidence 
that she was aware o f and responsible for the consequences of her actions.251 The 
possible defence claim, that she came from an Asian community that holds 
women responsible for the family honour, seems to have been mitigated by her 
education 252 As Phillips notes when discussing cultural defence, ‘“ cultural 
defence’ becomes available to female defendants only when they conform to 
prevailing images o f the sub-servient non-Westem wife. ...Cultural evidence only 
‘works’ when it enables judges and juries to fit the defendant’s actions into a 
pattern already familiar through mainstream culture.”253
When women’s views comply with traditional values, no thought is given to their 
positions and thoughts on their preferences. Women are silenced; their actions 
hold no normative weight. Their actions are read as something devoid o f intrinsic 
value and women themselves are seen as passive agents that require protection. 
Private decisions are not considered private; instead the private symbolises the 
public. Women themselves seem not to choose -  their actions merely reflect 
elements o f public patriarchy. Indeed, it seems that unless practices conform to 
pre-established normative beliefs, women are not considered autonomous. The 
private is private so long as it follows a certain pattern. This is problematic for 
two reasons. Firstly, this ignores how individuals themselves think about their 
preferences and commitments, which is crucial so as not to deny women as moral 
agents and decision makers:
250 R. v. Kiranjit Ahluwalia, unreported case, Lewes Crown Court, 6 and 7 December 1989 
(transcript: Hibbit and Sanders) and R. v. Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889.
251 The judgment was subsequently overturned on additional evidence that Ahluwalia was 
suffering from depression.
252 Phillips, Gender and Culture, p. 96.
253 Ibid, pp. 9 7 -103 .
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A complete disregard for women’s perspectives is demeaning and 
deeply disrespectful to women. On this view, either the woman would 
be regarded as somehow incapable of making generally worthwhile 
choices or the women would be regarded as irrelevant to moral 
community, as beings whose perspectives made no normative 
difference.254
The normative significance o f the action is not what ought to matter in this case. 
The very preference itself ought to be respected as an axiom of agency. Agency 
ought not to have an a priori normative content: agency is rather the ability to 
make decisions and form preferences, and thus an instance o f moral existence. 
Recognising the presence o f agency, and its importance, is crucial in progressive 
politics. As Drucilla Cornell shows, respecting the constitution o f the self, its 
valuations and preference formation, are crucial steps in overcoming what it 
means to be the degraded other. Cornell maintains her claims through the 
advocacy o f a private domain where we can constitute ourselves as sexuate 
beings. Her point stands, however, when considering the importance o f this space 
in constituting oneself more generally and making oneself the source of 
valuations:
because sex and intimate life are so important to us, we need to be 
recognised as the source of our own evaluations and representations of 
how we are to live out our sexuality.255
As we have seen, respecting an agent’s self-understanding is crucial in analysing 
autonomy. How individuals live through their attachments will vary greatly, and 
an analysis o f autonomy should allow the space for this individuality. Doing so 
ensures that the individual is respected as a moral agent. Furthermore, respecting 
individuals also necessitates allowing for a variety o f options as possibilities of 
autonomous decision-making. As we saw in Chapter III, how individuals 
experience their attachments varies greatly, and thus a theory o f autonomy must
254 Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
199.
255 Drucilla Cornell, At the Heart o f  Freedom: Feminism, Sex and Equality (Princeton: New  
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 19.
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ensure that these varied preferences can be understood as, at least in part, 
autonomously chosen.
Procedural theories seem to respect these two insights. They respect the 
individual by making her the source o f valuations: it is up to the agent herself to 
judge whether or not she is autonomous. They respect plurality o f choice by 
arguing that the content of a decision is o f no relevance to the concept of 
autonomy. What matters is how a decision was arrived at. Key to such 
definitions is that “the state ...protects individual liberty without dictating the 
goals and purposes espoused by free people”.256 The object o f procedural 
theories is partly that o f respecting what it means to be a free and self-governing 
person: if  I am free, then the aim of the state should be to protect me in my 
decision-making. Central to this conception is the structure o f decisions, and the 
critical capacities used in order to reach them.
Procedural theories mainly vary according to the structure deemed necessary in 
order to consider a decision autonomous. This chapter will deal specifically with 
two: structural procedural theories and historical procedural theories. Structural 
procedural theories point at the need to look at agents’ motivational structure. 
What matters is the hierarchy o f desires: certain desires will matter more than 
others, and a decision will be termed autonomous if the agent’s preferences 
conform to the hierarchy of principles that are considered more valuable by the 
agent herself. It is the ordering o f desires that is the most characteristic feature of 
this account.
Historical procedural models o f autonomy focus on the processes o f reflection, 
which should be themselves procedurally independent. In this way, historical 
models are able to take into consideration some o f the effects of socialisation, 
arguing that as long as the agent endorses these herself, the decision must be 
termed autonomous. The two types will be dealt with in turn since, to an extent, 
it is concerns about the former that give birth to the latter.
256 John Christman, “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2 
(1991), p. 343.
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2. Structural Procedural Theories of Autonomy
a. What the Theory Maintains
The main proponent o f structural procedural theories o f autonomy is thought to 
be Harry G. Frankfurt.257 According to Frankfurt, what we ought to study is the 
structure o f an agent’s will. It is this that distinguishes us from other animals. All 
animals have desires: dogs might desire to eat or sleep, puppies might desire to 
play. However, what distinguishes humans from animals is the fact that we can 
differentiate between these desires: a human might have a first desire o f eating, 
but because she wants to lose weight (her second order desire) she might not 
pursue her first order desire. Indeed, this is the crux o f the relationship between 
different desires:
I
someone has a first order desire when he wants to do or not to do such 
and such, and ...he has a second order desire when he wants to have or 
not to have a certain desire of the first order.258
The relationship between these two types o f desires is hierarchical: second order 
desires are the ones that ought to direct or guide first order desires. There is a 
further level to the structure desires should take. It is not sufficient to have 
second order desires guiding or informing first order desires. We must also have 
another type o f desires, which Frankfurt calls second order volitions or volitions 
o f the second order.259 These are the desires that constitute the will, or desires we 
wished were our will. Second order volitions are thus a further level that guides 
second order desires, that in turn guide first order desires. To use the example 
above: an agent who desires to lose weight (and is not fulfilling her first order 
desire o f eating) will have further reasons (second order volitions) that inform 
her second order desires, such as ideals o f beauty that do not include being over-
257 See Harry G. Frankfiirt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person”, The Journal o f  
Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1. (1971); The Importance o f  What We Care About: Philosophical 
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Necessity, Volition and Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
258 Frankfiirt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person”, p. 7.
259 Ibid., p. 10.
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weight, or desires to be healthy, whereby being over-weight is clearly a problem 
for health reasons.
Frankfurt’s hierarchy is conditional on reflexivity, that is, the agent’s own 
consideration o f her options:
The notion of reflexivity seems to me much more fundamental and 
indispensable, ...than that of a hierarchy. On the other hand, it is not 
clear to me that adequate provision can be made for reflexivity without 
resorting to the notion of a hierarchical ordering.260
The structure o f the preferences is indeed important, but it is important in so far 
as these preferences are wholeheartedly espoused. This matters, according to 
Frankfurt, because human beings care about what they are. In order to espouse 
one’s preferences wholeheartedly Frankfurt maintains that conflicts between 
desires need to be resolved.
There are two ways o f resolving preference conflicts. Firstly, a conflict can occur 
when “desires compete for a priority or position in a preferential order; the issue 
is which desire to satisfy first”.261 Resolution of this type o f conflict will take the 
shape o f integrating preferences into a single ordering, in which each one has a 
specific place according to its importance. Secondly, conflicts can occur when a 
decision needs to be made, on whether a desire should be there at all. In this 
instance, the conflict will be resolved through “a radical separation o f the 
competing desires, one o f which is not merely assigned a relatively less favoured 
position but extruded entirely as an outlaw”.262 Resolving these conflicts will 
result in a wholehearted espousal o f preferences; not resolving them (for 
whatever reason) means that the preference is not really the agent’s own.
It seems to follow, then, that second order volitions, if  wholeheartedly espoused, 
will have more than one first order preference. For example, an important ethical 
second order volition will have ramifications into more than one area o f conduct.
260 Frankfurt, The Importance o f  What We Care About, p. 165, footnote 7.
261 Ibid., p. 170.
262 Ibid.
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Given that in order to be a person in command of her own will Frankfurt 
maintains that there should be a hierarchical ordering o f preferences, it seems to 
be that this type ordering will lead to a well ordered life in which the will dictates 
the choices that the agent makes.
b. How the Theory Works in Practice: Examples
According to Frankfurt, what matters is the structure o f the desires we hold dear. 
We must identify strongly with them in order to make these desires ours. Thus, 
for example, a woman who chooses to wear the hijab can be considered 
autonomous if  she is doing it for what she considers the right reasons. Take the 
following preferences and volitions:
1st order desire: wearing the hijab
2nd order desire: wearing the hijab as a requirement o f Islam
2nd order volition: the agent deems that Islam (religion) is important to
her.
In this case the agent will be considered autonomous: her second order volition is 
wholeheartedly espoused by the agent, and thus her 1st and 2nd order desires are 
explained and indeed autonomously endorsed. It is plausible to assume that her 
2nd order volition will also lead her to further 1st order desires that also reflect her 
commitment to Islam: she might pray five times a day, she might follow 
Ramadan, she might eat Hallal. Her volitions, that is, what she considers to be o f 
utmost importance to her self, will indeed reflect themselves in a variety of 
different choices she might make.
It is apparent that although the structure o f the desires is correctly ordered, and 
even wholeheartedly espoused, Frankfurt’s schema will not go beyond structure. 
He does not question how those preferences came to be formed. It might be that 
the agent does not have any knowledge o f alternative ways o f practising Islam. It 
might be that her 2nd order desire (and the particular shape it takes) has been 
conditioned by the social entourage she has grown up in. She might have grown
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up in a family that did not allow her to question the significance of religion. 
Although useful in restating the importance of the individual vis a vis societal 
pressures, and showing how the act of deciding is itself o f much weight, 
Frankfurt’s categorisation does not question either the normative content o f the 
choices that surround agents, or the availability o f different choices. Are 
volitions not socially conditioned too?
The plausibility o f the schema is also called into question when considering the 
way he proposes agents resolve preference conflicts. According to Frankfurt, 
there are two possible ways of resolving a conflict: either the preferences are 
hierarchically ordered, or one of the preferences must be rejected. Setting aside 
for the moment considerations o f socialisation, consider the following case, 
mirroring the hierarchical organisation of preferences. An agent believes that 
honouring your parents is a constitutive part o f being a Muslim (her second order 
volition). Her parents demand that she goes through an arranged marriage. 
Simultaneously, the agent also believes her freedom (defined here as the 
possibility o f making choices) to be important. Her ideal o f freedom contradicts 
her own understanding o f the requirements of Islam. In this case, the agent will 
have to make a choice and give lexical priority to one o f her two volitions: she 
either puts her freedom to choose her partner first, putting the requirements of 
Islam in a secondary position, or she places the requirements o f Islam as primary, 
granting her parents’ wish for her to have an arranged marriage but perhaps 
exercising her freedom to choose in other aspects (education, choice o f career, 
education o f her future children, etc.). One o f the two volitions will have priority 
when deciding how to act.
Consider a different case, where the conflicting volitions cannot be hierarchically 
ordered, and one needs to be rejected. Take the above agent again. She 
wholeheartedly espouses the importance o f religion in her life. She deems this to 
be o f importance to herself and a defining feature o f her as a person. 
Simultaneously, she believes education to be of utmost importance. If she is a 
schoolgirl in France, however, she may not be permitted to wear the hijab in the
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classroom.263 We find here a conflict o f volitions that are not compatible, and the 
agent has to decide which is more important to her. If she chooses education as 
her most important volition, she will have to remove the hijab in the classroom. 
If  she chooses religion as more important, she will be unable to continue her 
education in the same public school.
c. Evaluation o f the Theory
Frankfurt’s theory has been criticised on various grounds. In the first case, Gary 
Watson maintains that Frankfurt’s theory is insufficient to explain autonomy and, 
in particular, why certain desires or preferences matter more than others. 
According to Watson,
Why does one necessarily care about one’s higher order volitions? Since 
second order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add them to the 
context of conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not 
to give a special place to any of those in contention. The agent may not 
care which of the second order desires wins out. The same possibly 
arises at each higher order.264
The problem is that o f infinite regress. According to Watson, Frankfurt does not 
sufficiently explain why those higher order volitions are more important and will 
be decisive when resolving conflicts between preferences. For Watson, the 
difference is one that rests in distinguishing between desires, which are neutral 
and have no content, and values. Desires will have a valuational content through 
which humans can subsequently order their life and make their desires theirs. 
Merely arbitrarily identifying one type o f desire as more important in the creation 
o f the self is not sufficient.
263 This is true o f  all public schools and centres in France. Private schools (such as faith schools) 
will allow the wearing o f  the hijab or any other conspicuous symbol o f  religion.
264 Gary Watson, “Free Agency” in The Inner Citadel, ed. John Christman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 118-119.
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Frankfurt’s response to Watson is that the latter’s own theory is no less artificial, 
and indeed seems to require a hierarchy in order to distinguish between desires 
and values. Frankfurt maintains that commitment to certain volitions will be 
enough to stop the infinite regress:
The fact that a commitment resounds endlessly is simply the fact that 
the commitment is decisive. For a commitment is decisive if and only if 
it is made without reservation, and making a commitment without 
reservation means that the person who makes it does so in the belief that 
no further accurate enquiry would require him to change his mind. It is 
therefore pointless to pursue the inquiry any further.265
Again, it is identification and complete and wholehearted espousal o f one’s 
volitions that seems to characterise the differences in Frankfurt’s hierarchy of 
desires. But how are these different volitions to be distinguished? What makes a 
desire higher or lower? Is there some sort o f normative differentiation that makes 
something more decisive than something else?
Aside from the question about how to normatively differentiate between higher 
and lower desires, Irving Thalberg raises further questions about why agents 
should properly identify with their higher order desires above their second order 
ones.266 In his critique o f procedural theories, he notes that there seems to be an 
implicit ordering o f desires, through which some are accorded ontological 
priority over others. This can point at a potential division between higher and 
lower selves, in which it is only the higher selves that reflect who the agent truly 
is. Such a division and ordering, he states, deeply contradicts Freudian 
psychological accounts o f the self and the conflicting desires that permeate 
existence:
265 Frankfurt, The Importance o f  What We Care About, p. 169.
266 Which as Watson has pointed out, could be done by differentiating higher desires or volitions 
as something valuational, and distinguishing these from mere desires or preferences, which 
merely concern choosing one course o f  action over another. Frankfurt has subsequently mirrored 
this approach in his division between choosing and deciding: “This difference between deciding 
and choosing accounts for the fact that deciding to make a certain choice is not the same as 
actually making it (after all, the time or occasion for doing that may not yet have arrived), 
whereas deciding to make a particular decision (that is deciding to decide things a certain way) 
cannot be distinguished from making the decision itself.” Frankfiirt, The Importance o f  What We 
Care About, p. 172.
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Watson arbitrarily narrows us down to a rationally valuing self. Like 
Dworkin, Frankfurt and Neely, he begs the question against Freudian 
and kindred personality theories, which depict us as conflict-prone 
systems of libidinal, destructive, morbid, self-preserving, sociable, 
conscientious, guilt-ridden, and other ‘forces’, ‘principles’ or mini­
agencies. Perhaps we value our disposition toward ‘cool and non-self- 
deceptive’ moral thinking and like-planning more than we value our 
primitive urges and fantasies. But that is too circular to prove that the 
real self is the valuing self, that we ‘most want’ things we value. Even if 
our valuing self were our most priceless asset, nothing would follow 
about its ontological superiority, nor about the comparative reality of 
our values over workaday desires.267
Even if  we were able to differentiate between a higher and a lower self, how can 
we know that it would be the higher self that we would identify with? And even 
if  we did value the higher rational self more than the impulses or desires, why 
should they be given priority in ontological consideration? As we saw in Chapter 
III, identifications are not stable over time. It might be possible to identify with 
one area o f the self more strongly at certain times rather than others. Selves are 
characterised by conflicting identifications and attachments, and expecting an 
agent to always value the higher self seems unduly demanding in a conception of 
autonomy.
A third criticism o f Frankfurt’s theory also stems from the literature on multiple 
identities. As already stated, ambivalence can potentially be considered both a 
characteristic of those that hold multiple identities, as well as a way o f enabling 
identity conference in situations of conflicting desires or expectations. According 
to Meyers, Frankfurt’s theory simultaneously accommodates some o f these 
concerns, whilst negating the potential o f ambivalence for fostering autonomy in 
certain cases.
In terms o f the accommodation o f intersectional identity concerns, Frankfurt’s 
notion o f integration can be useful. Meyers claims that “theories o f intersectional
267 Irving Thalberg, “Hierarchical Analyses o f  Unfree Action”, in The Inner Citadel: Essays on 
Individual Autonomy, ed. John Christman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 135.
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identity implicitly endorse one form o f integration, for they stress the urgency of 
opening lines o f communication between differently situated group members to 
prevent one segment o f the group from undertaking political initiatives that 
would be detrimental to the other”.268 Frankfurt stresses the importance of 
negotiation between desires. This negotiation is also a feature of multiple 
identities. The second way in which Frankfurt’s theory is compatible with 
multiple identities is in the idea that identification with desires will allow agents 
who have been subordinated to disidentify with the harmful attributes that 
victimisation and subordination might carry.
This, however, leads to a potential problem. Returning to the idea about the 
usefulness o f ambivalence (which Frankfurt can be said to reject through his 
commitment to the thorough and wholehearted identification an agent must 
undergo if her desires are to be considered truly her own), it seems that 
identification would not be so useful in the case o f victimisation. As Meyers 
points out,
To disidentify wholeheartedly with one’s victimisation when one is in 
fact a victim of systemic injustice is to deny social reality and to 
foreclose resistance. Such disidentification may redouble the 
individual’s vulnerability to injustice, or it may draw individuals into 
complicity in their own subordination or the subordination of other 
group members.269
Ambivalence, in this case, is a more productive strategy. Barvosa Carter takes 
Meyers’ criticism further, pointing out that ambivalence might be useful in more 
situations than just those of victimisation. She points at the need to consider 
intersectional identity as something that is different in each agent’s case. 
Intersectional reasoning means that individuals negotiate and connect different 
identities. This leads to a personal and individual reasoning system through 
which attachments and their value make sense to the agent herself and only to 
herself by virtue o f her own valuations and identity schemas.
268 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic S e lf ’, p. 169.
269 Ibid., p. 170.
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Barvosa Carter criticises Frankfurt’s insistence on hierarchy and coherence of 
desires. Having a number of conflicting attachments or. endorsements does not 
necessarily mean the agent is not autonomous, since she will be able to create a 
hybrid set o f endorsements that make sense and are coherent to her. The 
hybridity o f these different endorsements might indeed complicate their falling 
into an orderly hierarchical pattern, and might even preclude their 
hierarchisation, but they will still make sense to the agent herself. This is because
those with more highly diverse identities may sometimes forge syncretic 
endorsements that depart significantly from the norms and practices that 
prevail in some or all of the social groups in which they are strongly 
related and identified.270
Thus, what matters is how the agent feels about the endorsements vis a vis 
herself, and not necessarily how well they fit with the ascriptive characteristics o f 
the particular identity-conferring group. According to Barvosa Carter,
the ambivalence and flexibility ruled out in Frankfurt’s procedural 
autonomy could become useful assets for agents, assets that can help 
them observe their syncretic endorsements consistently in contexts of 
social or interpersonal conflict.271
For example, take the earlier case o f a girl who is Muslim and believes in the 
importance o f education. Say that a few years later this girl, now a young 
woman, is married to a Muslim man who supports her in her decision to pursue 
further education.272 Her parents-in-law do not approve o f this decision, which 
they see as conflicting with her marital duties. This girl might choose to pursue 
further education whilst remaining ambivalent about the way this might conflict 
with her role as a Muslim wife. As was argued in Chapter III, by being 
ambivalent about certain group ascriptive endorsements, the agent will be able to 
maintain herself as a member o f a social group, without necessarily giving
272 This example is based on Barvosa Carter’s (2007) similar one about a Catholic Chicana 
college student.
122
priority to one o f her endorsements over another. She might pursue further 
education but, in other aspects, her belief in Islam will lead her to espouse other 
commitments (such as food and prayer customs).
Not only does the possible use o f ambivalence as a strategy mean that 
wholeheartedness might preclude the attaining o f coherent autonomy, but it also 
can mean that a hierarchy o f  preferences might not be necessary or significant for 
autonomy. Frankfurt seems to demand a fair amount o f coherence between the 
first and second order desires and the corresponding volition. However, as 
Barvosa Carter points out, attachments might not always be coherent with one 
another. This is especially the case when considering how agents decide to act on 
their self-chosen endorsements in different situations: there might be times when 
one preference will take priority over others, in a different situation another 
endorsement might be chosen to be acted on. This is the case when two 
endorsements might contradict each other strongly. Say that an agent is both a 
Catholic and a lesbian. One ascriptive characteristic o f Catholicism is that it is 
usually considered to frown upon homosexuality. Some Catholics, however, are 
gay, lesbian or bisexual. Thus, it could be that a homosexual agent will choose to 
privilege different endorsements in different social contexts: she might defend 
the Catholic faith when in an homosexual social environment, and she might 
choose to defend homosexuality when surrounded by Catholics who think the 
two identifications are inconsistent.
Barvosa Carter does indeed admit that this latter case is problematic insofar as it 
might give the impression o f inconsistency. However, as was shown in chapter 
III, this need not mean the agent is inconsistent in her identifications. What 
matters for autonomy is not so much whether ascriptive group preferences are in 
order and do not conflict, but whether the agent is able to negotiate between 
these in order to give sense and meaning to her life. The agent may choose 
different endorsements from within a value conferring identity schema, but need 
not endorse all o f the given ascriptive characteristics. Thus,
It is possible to balance morally conflicting social identities though a
consistent set of syncretic endorsements. This is possible, however, only
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if the order of those endorsements is flexible enough to accommodate 
prioritizing endorsements contextually in response to varying demands 
or different social settings and relationships.273
The final criticism of Frankfurt’s theory hinges on its ability to accommodate 
socialisation, in particular unequal or oppressive socialisation. As Marilyn 
Friedman notes,
Frankfurt’s varying and widely influential accounts of autonomy, 
spanning more than three decades of work, ...are devoid of any 
reference to social dimensions or conditions of autonomy.274
Frankfurt does not stipulate that volitions or preferences must come only from 
the inside o f the agent, but he does not comment on how socialisation influences 
or affects the critical processes or structures deemed necessary in order to 
consider a particular preference autonomous. By omitting to explore this area he 
can be seen to be perpetuating ideas about the self-made man and, more 
importantly, as failing to grasp the prominent influence social relationships have 
on the structure o f autonomous agency.275
There even seems to be some sort o f internal logical mechanism through which 
higher order volitions are considered to be outside o f the agent; they are that 
which the agent arrives at after critical deliberation on her motives and, as such, 
are able to transcend socialisation or socially influenced preferences. This begs 
the question o f where higher order volitions come from: is value not socially 
constructed and socially dependent too? Is it possible to evaluate and 
wholeheartedly espouse one preference over another individually, and without 
any influence from those identity conferring groups we belong to and value?
An agent raised in a practising Muslim family might indeed believe her second 
order volition to be that religion is important to her. The problem is that 
Frankfurt’s account maintains that so long as she is happy with this preference,
273 Ibid., p. 18.
274 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, P olitics, p. 91.
275 Ibid., p. 103.
124
there is no need to consider how it came to be formed, nor whether there were 
other options available. Perhaps the agent did not have knowledge o f any other 
belief system; perhaps the agent was surrounded by a social environment where 
religion was important to all and thus could not conceive of the world as 
anything but ordered by religion.
This is problematic because, as Stoljar points out, it fails to satisfy the feminist 
intuition, that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms o f femininity cannot 
be autonomous”.276 Stoljar claims that given the reality o f oppressive forms of 
socialisation, a conception o f autonomy must have “restrictions on the contents 
o f agents’ preferences”.277 Even when positing a less strong claim about how 
much substantivity is required, it seems that Frankfurt’s account gravely fails to 
question his autonomous agents as to the origin o f their preferences. Thus, take 
the feminist intuition that female genital cutting is wrong and cannot be 
considered an autonomous choice -  it is one deeply influenced by (harmful) 
societal norms regarding the regulation of women’s bodies and sexuality. 
Frankfurt’s case would allow us to consider adult women who had genital cutting 
as a first order desire, followed by a higher order volition that holds that cultural 
and regional practices are important for the life o f that particular individual (with 
all the associated practices they might entail) to be deemed autonomous. The 
structure o f the desire at any one time is what matters -  yet it is hard to accept 
certain cases as truly autonomous.
From the socialisation point of view, there are two separate issues with 
Frankfurt’s work. The first is that he does not consider how volitions come to be 
formed. The process by which they are arrived at does not matter; what counts is 
the structure they take at any one time. The second issue is that the content of 
those volitions does not seem to matter at all. Content neutrality is foremost in 
Frankfurt’s account, yet this does not fare well in accommodating intuitions 
about what it would be autonomous to choose. Perhaps this latter question, 
involving the feminist intuition, hinges on the idea that autonomy is, or should
276 Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, in Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie 
Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 95.
277 Ibid.
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be, laden with normative content -  autonomy is often considered to be 
synonymous with choosing the good, being good. As I explore later, how much 
or what kind o f substantivity is required in a conception o f autonomy is a central 
question that determines its ability to accommodate the insights from 
socialisation.
3. Historic Procedural Theories of Autonomy
a. What the Theories Maintain
As we have seen, part o f Frankfurt’s failure to show how autonomy is achieved 
lies with his inability to successfully show how we come to form preferences, 
that is, the internal process that is required in order to deem a desire or preference 
autonomous. This is exactly what historic procedural models o f autonomy try to 
achieve. By considering the structure o f preference over a longer period, 
philosophers Gerald Dworkin and John Christman have tried to include, or at 
least give more consideration to, the phenomenon of socialisation and its impact 
on autonomy.278 They have devised a compatibilist theory that posits that 
socialisation is omnipresent and that autonomy itself is dependent on the critical 
reflection process that occurs over time.
Dworkin directly engages with the challenges socialisation might pose to a 
concept o f autonomy. According to him,
Our dispositions, attitudes, values, wants are affected by the economic 
institutions, by the mass media, by the force of public opinion, by social 
class, and so forth. To a large extent these institutions are not chosen by 
us: we simply find ourselves faced with them.279
278 Frankfurt’s account could be seen to apply in a particular moment in time -  it is a static, time 
slice approach that hinges on the particular structure found in an instant.
279 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice o f  Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 11.
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The question is how we can consider autonomy and accommodate social 
construction as a fact o f human life. Identification with preferences, on a second 
or first order, is not a sufficient condition. Identification itself is conditioned by
forces that might not be the agent’s own, and thus do not satisfactorily reflect
what it means to be autonomous, to be one’s own person.280 What matters then, 
“is the capacity to raise the question o f whether I will identify with or reject the 
reasons for which I now act”.281 It is the rational capacity (defined as a second 
order capacity) to evaluate preferences that characterises autonomy. Thus,
Autonomy is conceived of as a second order capacity of persons to 
reflect critically upon their first order preferences, desires, wishes and
so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of 
higher order preferences and values.282
John Christman holds a similar account, but claims that we must go beyond 
Dworkin’s analysis. An account of autonomy ought not to focus on the structure 
o f preference at all, which Dworkin could be said to have maintained by claiming 
that the evaluation o f preferences is itself the higher order tier o f autonomy. 
Instead it ought to focus on the formation of preferences. Autonomy, for 
Christman, is defined as follows:
Whatever forces or factors explain the generation of changes in a 
person’s preference set, these factors must be ones that the agent was in 
a position to reflect upon and resist for the changes to have manifested 
the agent’s autonomy. In addition, this reflection and possible resistance 
cannot have been the result of other factors which -  as a matter of 
psychological fact -  constrain self-reflection.283
In this account there is a definite link between autonomy and rationality. 
However, in order to maintain the content neutrality that characterises procedural 
theories, Christman differentiates two types o f rationality. The first is externalist
280 Ibid., p. 18.
281 Ibid., p. 15.
282 Ibid., p. 20.
283 Christman, “ Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom”, p. 346.
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rationality, a substantive account that maintains that rationality should be o f a 
particular kind, abiding by particular values and ideas. Christman’s own account, 
in contrast, is regulated by an internalist rationality whereby “the property by 
which an action is considered rational for an agent bears only on those beliefs 
and desires actually ‘internal’ to the agent, not on the relation between those 
beliefs and the world”.284 What matters is whether the agent’s preferences are 
rational for the agent herself, and not for any other agents that may be tempted to 
judge her decisions. She must be considered autonomous if  in choosing her 
preferences and being made aware o f the way she came to choose these, she 
would not decide differently. Thus, for historical accounts what matters is the 
way we come to choose. Identification matters not; it is rather a question of 
whether an agent is aware of why she has chosen certain preferences and the way 
these preferences came to be formed, and whether, on consideration o f such 
knowledge, she would make the same choices. In such a way, her life comes to 
be hers; she has chosen to act, value, be and prefer the kind o f human being she 
is.
b. How the Theories Work in Practice: Examples
In Dworkin’s account, an agent is autonomous if  she is able to reflect critically 
on her preferences. Her critical reflection is the higher preference, or what is 
characteristic about autonomy. It is the procedure o f deciding on a preference 
that matters. According to this schema it follows that an agent who chooses to 
wear the hijab will do so autonomously if she has rationally chosen to do so. The 
agent, very much like the agent in Frankfurt’s case, will reflect on what matters 
to her and why these preferences matter. If  the agent decides that wearing the 
hijab matters because she believes religion to be important to her, the decision 
cannot be considered in and o f itself a sufficient condition to consider it 
autonomous. She must also evaluate how she came to believe religion to be 
important to her. If  she decides that religion is important to her because that is 
the way she has been raised, but would not choose any other way had she had the
284 Ibid., p. 349.
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choice, then her decision would be termed autonomous. If, however, when 
critically assessing the place o f religion in her life she realises that she would not 
have chosen this had she experienced a different upbringing, then the decision 
will be termed non-autonomous.
Christman’s theory leads to a slightly different scenario. Again, what matters is 
the formation o f the preference. Rationality is not a higher order element, but 
rather that which is characteristic o f an autonomous act. The agent must be able 
to assess critically how she came to form her preferences and through a rational 
framework that applies only to her. She should then assess whether she wants to 
continue to endorse her preference or, having been made aware o f how she came 
to support such a thing, choose something else. What this means in practice is 
that the agent needs to be aware of all the processes throughout her life that have 
led her to endorse a particular decision. She must be self-transparent, and content 
with the objects o f such transparency. Were the agent to be unhappy, she would 
be able to change her preferences in order to truly be a free agent. Thus, a woman 
who chooses to have genital surgery performed will be considered autonomous if 
she internally agrees with not only the procedure but also the reasons for having 
it done. Reasons might include that having genital surgery at a particular time in 
life, such as during the menopause or after her last child is bom, signifies her end 
as a sexual woman, someone now worthy o f respect according to her particular 
group’s customs. The agent might be made aware that female genital cutting (in 
her case) is based on differential gender expectations and sexual regulation. As 
long as she knows and agrees with this, and would not choose for any other 
valuational scale to apply, her preference will be autonomous.
Society’s norms and values are thus integrated into Frankfurt and Dworkin’s 
accounts o f autonomy. As long as the agent would not want to change the way 
she came to have certain preferences, she will be considered autonomous. Take 
the agent who decides to quit her career to have children. She does this because 
she thinks her value as a woman stems from her ability to be a mother. When 
rationally analysing her decision to quit full time paid employment, she realises 
that her decision hinges on a certain upbringing. Say her family was very 
religiously Catholic and believed (and told their daughters) that a woman’s place
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is to support her husband and raise his children in Christ. Say, also, that the agent 
is no longer a firm Catholic believer, but that her notion that her value stems 
from her role as a mother originates from her education. If, on rational revision, 
she wishes her upbringing had not been so influenced by certain religious, ethical 
and societal beliefs, her decision to quit her job can be deemed non-autonomous.
What we must now look at is whether this treatment o f socialisation is 
satisfactory. Is there a possibility that, although logically consistent, historic 
procedural theories fall short o f tackling the difficulties posed by socialisation 
and multiple identities? Can an agent ever be so self-transparent as to evaluate 
and rationally assess how she came to her preferences? To these questions we 
now turn.
c. Evaluation o f the Theories
For the evaluation we shall focus on Christman’s non hierarchical account. 
Christman’s account has been considered by many to be the logical step from 
Dworkin’s theory, and in the literature they are often evaluated as if they were 
substantially similar.
The first issue that is raised when analysing historic procedural theories is that of 
self-transparency. Christman’s theory calls for a degree o f self-transparency that 
can be said to be rather stringent. The more an agent considers how she came to 
espouse her preferences, and how these were formed, the more autonomous she 
will be considered to be. This in itself is a circular argument, made more dubious 
by Thalberg’s question o f why rationality ought to be considered the highest and 
most characteristic element o f autonomy. As he points out,
Why can’t I be, by my own admission in my rare moments of 
rationality, a generally irrational person? Why should it never be the 
case that when I am unamenable to reasoning, my desires still express
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what I really want? This identification of rationality with authenticity 
seems to rule this out a priori.285
Not only is the argument circular, it also seems to imply a certain dualism: the 
true self is the rational, higher self and the rest is merely impulsive desire. This 
assumption is particularly problematic when we consider the second objection 
that has been posited against Christman’s theory. Historic procedural theories of 
autonomy embrace socialisation as a necessary fact o f life. However, as 
Christman himself notes, these theories might not be well suited to deal with 
cases o f oppressive socialisation:
I am assuming here that this model of autonomy applies to adults whose 
childhoods have not been manipulative and autonomy-inhibiting. 
Admittedly, this is a highly artificial assumption.286
As pointed out earlier, the more self-transparent we are, the more autonomous we 
shall be considered. However, this self-transparency is something that agents can 
achieve only when they have the necessary tools to do so. There will be certain 
people who have grown up in oppressive atmospheres who will be unable to 
reach such levels o f self-reflection. Exactly how problematic is this?
As Benson points out,
A woman who oppressively conceives of her identity in terms of the 
male interests she seeks to gratify may not revise her identification with 
her desire to look femininely attractive upon becoming aware that this 
identification is primarily the product of social training which implicitly 
functions to enhance men’s power over women. She has become 
accustomed to thinking of herself from an internalized male point of 
view, so she may be unaffected by the knowledge that her endorsement 
of her desire to have a feminine appearance was the product of 
socialisation in a male-dominated society.287
285 Thalberg, “Hierarchical Analyses o f  Unfree Action”, p. 133.
286 Christman “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom”, p. 348.
287 Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation”, p. 394.
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The agent is able to critically assess her endorsements but, when arriving at the 
knowledge o f her preferences and their formation, might be so thoroughly 
socialised into them that she will be unable to disidentify with them or even 
conceive o f a situation where she did not have them. It is possible that the agent 
does not have information of other valuational scales, or that her only 
experiences lead her to think she ought not to revise her preferences. 
Alternatively, she might disagree with some o f these preferences, but her 
belonging to a cultural group still leads her to espouse them in order to remain a 
member.
It seems that Christman’s theory is unable to accommodate successfully cases of 
oppressive socialisation. Because the theory is wholly dependent on subjective 
(or internalist) evaluations of preference, the material realities and inequalities 
that persist do not affect or challenge the so called autonomy o f the agent. This is 
particularly troubling because it implies that most agents are bom into autonomy 
enhancing backgrounds. Christman’s theory ignores the material and social 
inequalities that persist in everyday life: it is difficult to imagine that all women 
have been socialised into equal positions and roles. The inequalities that 
currently exist affect not only minority cases but all sectors o f society, ranging 
from different expectations and arrangements concerning childcare and 
household duties through to unequal employment practices.
What does this mean in terms of intersectional or multiple identities? Albeit more 
accommodating than Frankfurt’s theory, it seems that Christman’s account might 
be problematic when thinking about the reasons agents might choose different 
preferences. Christman maintains that as long as the process through which 
preferences are chosen is itself procedurally independent it then follows that we 
are autonomous. If  the agent disagrees with the way she came to form her 
preference, then the autonomous act would be to reject that preference. However, 
this obscures the reasons why agents with multiple or intersectional identities 
might abide by certain practices, or choose to do one thing over another. An 
agent might disagree with the unequal gender roles that permeate her nomos 
group. Although realising that she has come to acquire these through the 
socialisation process, and that they cannot be considered to be truly her own
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(because she does not espouse them), she might decide to maintain them in an 
attempt to maintain her membership o f the group. She might not approve o f a 
preference, she might object both to its content and to the way she came to 
acquire it, but she nonetheless will not reject it because doing so will call into 
question other relationships that are important to her. As mentioned earlier, the 
ambivalence that might characterise her reaction could be a way o f negotiating 
this without rejecting her different identities. Again, there is a question about 
whether we can ever truly reject those things we have been socialised into, those 
things that we hold dear and on which social relationships that matter have been 
formed, even when we might (rationally) disagree with their normative 
implications.
4. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Procedural Model
Philosophers have long had an expression to label the realm of 
inviolable sanctuary most of us sense in our own beings. That term is 
personal autonomy. The word ‘autonomy’ is obviously derived from the 
Greek stems for ‘self and ‘law’ or ‘rule’, and means literally ‘the 
having or making of one’s own laws’. Its sense therefore can be 
rendered at least approximately by such terms as ‘self-rule’, ‘self- 
determination’, ‘self-government’, and ‘independence.’288
On an intuitive level, autonomy means to be one’s own person. Procedural 
accounts seem to honour this intuition by espousing content neutrality in regard 
to the “metaphysical status of the processes that constitute autonomy”.289 Content 
neutrality is useful because it allows us to understand the subject from her own 
perspective, or, as Mahmood puts it, locate the meanings o f actions in particular 
contingencies. It is necessary that we
288 Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy”, in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John 
Christman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 27.
289 John Christman, “Introduction”, in The Inner Citadel, ed. John Christman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 14.
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think about the variety of ways in which norms are lived and inhabited, 
aspired to, reached for, and consummated. ...This in turn requires that 
we explore the relationship between the immanent form a normative act 
takes, the model of subjectivity it presupposes (specific articulations of 
volition, emotion, reason, and bodily expression), and the kinds of 
authority upon which such an act relies.290
There is a great deal to be said in favour o f agency being content neutral. Firstly, 
it allows for many options to be considered as possible autonomous choices. This 
is particularly important in multicultural societies, where the definition and 
embodiment o f “the good” will take many different forms, many o f which might 
be unfamiliar to the majority. Content neutrality does not privilege one 
understanding o f the good over any other: so long as the procedure o f decision­
making follows a certain structure, the preference will be considered 
autonomous. In turn, this allows us to better understand the meanings and values 
o f the particular preferences that agents might hold. This is particularly necessary 
when thinking about minorities within minorities, where inequalities might be 
experienced in different ways by individuals.
Procedural theories also do well in respecting the individual, private character of 
autonomy. Content neutrality can allow for a variety o f different preferences to 
be considered autonomous, as long as the individual herself is aware of how she 
came to have them. The judgement is an internal one: what matters is how the 
agent feels about herself and her attachments. What others think does not matter. 
In procedural theories the individual is a moral agent by virtue of her ability to 
see what her preferences are and how she came to have them.
The importance o f considering agency as a distinct but related part o f autonomy 
becomes clear when we examine a preference such as attending the mikveh 
(Jewish ritual bath or immersion). According to scripture, both Jewish men and 
women need to enter the mikveh if  they are impure. Impurity can be o f two 
types: ritual and bodily. During menstruation, women are considered to suffer 
from both. During the seven days o f menstruation and the seven after, women
290 Mahmood, The Politics o f  Piety, p. 23.
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cannot touch or have sexual relations with their husbands. The laws o f family 
purity have been thought to be unequal towards women, in so far as they rest on 
the notion of women as impure and liable to pass on the impurity to the “pure 
male”.291 Varda Polak-Sahm cites the case of two very different women who 
attended an orthodox mikveh in Israel. One young Ultra-Orthodox married 
woman attended the mikveh because it was a commandment: it was law that she 
should attend the mikveh in order to preserve the laws o f family purity. Whether 
or not she actually wanted to attend was, for her, irrelevant. It was law, and as 
such, she would not question it. A different woman is cited as attending the same 
establishment. From the description o f the clothes this woman was wearing it is 
evident that, albeit perhaps observant, she was not Ultra-Orthodox. Her reason 
for attending the mikveh had little to do with religious observance. For her, it 
was a way o f creating and maintaining sexual tension with her husband. Her 
husband did not agree with her keeping the laws o f niddah, and from the 
description it is not clear that religion had anything to do with it all: it was a 
personal decision that she had arrived at.292
Polak-Sahms’ investigation shows how the same ritual can have extremely 
different meanings for different individuals. This in turn shows how autonomy 
needs to be carefully considered from an individual’s point o f view, and cannot 
simply be judged a priori, dependent exclusively on the alleged normative 
content o f a decision.
Autonomy cannot be considered something that has to be by definition 
emancipatory. The laws o f family purity are misogynistic and unequal towards 
women (the burden o f abstinence is carried by the woman, not the man). 
However, as Sahm-Polak’s example shows, this does not mean that the reasons 
for choosing to follow these laws are themselves non-autonomous. If indeed 
personal and private life is so important for human beings, then surely these will 
reflect themselves in preferences advocated. The young Ultra-Orthodox woman 
could potentially be considered as less autonomous, since her own desires were 
irrelevant to her. However, according to procedural accounts, so long as she
291 Varda Polak-Sahm, The House o f  Secrets (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), pp. 68-71.
292 Polak-Sahm, The House o f  Secrets, pp. 4-16.
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understood and agreed with how she came to value orthodoxy, she is to be 
considered autonomous.
Agency, as Mahmood points out, need not be progressive or emancipatory. 
Agency can also be seen as regressive, but not for that it is non-agency. Choices 
can simultaneously be “both a marker o f autonomy, individuality and identity 
and a marker o f inequality and sexist oppression”.293 Choosing to attend or not 
attend the mikveh could both be considered to be instances o f agency -  however, 
not for that will they necessarily be deemed egalitarian. Agency need not be 
equated with equality -  indeed, it may not have an emancipatory subtext at all, 
regardless o f what we may wish to read into it:
The normative political subject of post-structuralist feminist theory 
often remains a liberatory one, whose agency is conceptualised on the 
binary model of subordination and subversion. In doing so, this 
scholarship elides dimensions of human action whose ethical and 
political status does not map onto the logic of repression and 
resistance.294
Indeed, looking at agency in a binary way will preclude us from understanding 
the significance o f the practices espoused. We must remember that agency is a 
modality o f action and it need not embody a norm. Without understanding its 
contextual significance, we will never comprehend how and in which ways it 
operates. Agency is plural. It is not in itself a sign o f political emancipation, but 
something required for action. The way preferences are then normatively 
interpreted is a different matter. The various interpretations o f mikveh attendance 
show that there is no single unified understanding that will deem the act of 
attending an autonomous one or not. Respecting the autonomous character o f an 
act is crucial in so far as it makes the person “the morally and legally recognised 
source o f narration and resymbolisation o f what the meaning o f sexual difference 
is”.295 It is the person herself who should evaluate the normative meaning of her 
preferences; it is this process of reflection that will enable women to overcome
293 Hirschmann, “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling and the Question o f  Free Agency”, p. 352.
294 Mahmood, The P olitics o f  Piety, p. 14.
295 Cornell, At the H eart o f  Freedom, p. 10.
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injustice by considering their own position towards practices and norms that 
might, or might not, be deemed disadvantageous. Indeed, the very notion of 
considering a practice as a prima facie non-autonomous choice is reminiscent of 
old attitudes whereby “elite men have long been given the right to self­
representation ...as essential to the recognition o f who they are. ...Women, on 
the other hand, have for too long been judged capable only o f passive 
imagination and the ability to mimic the persona deemed proper for women.”296
An appropriate understanding o f autonomy needs to recognise agency, and thus 
requires some o f the content neutrality that characterises procedural accounts. 
However, the conception remains problematic in other aspects, such as its 
inability to account for the effects o f oppressive socialisation. As has been 
mentioned previously, these procedural accounts o f autonomy are accounts of 
preference formation. Most certainly in Frankfurt’s case, but also in Christman’s, 
what matters are preferences at a particular time; it is the structure o f a particular 
desire at a particular moment which is analysed. These accounts fall short of 
explaining how this rationality or critical faculties are achieved, or where the 
preferences actually come from. Thus, in their account, autonomy becomes a 
feature o f a moment, an instance where the desires are the agents’ own.
Though this correctly captures some characteristics o f autonomy, it is not 
sufficient to be the whole picture. The time slice approach and content neutrality 
seem more a feature o f agency than autonomy per se. Agency refers to the 
moment o f acting, which in this case would mean making a decision, deciding. 
Autonomy, intuitively, seems like something more than just a feature o f a 
moment, dependent exclusively on the structure o f the preferences held. 
Autonomy must also deal with the capacities it requires, as well as longer- 
standing attitudes to the self.
This is where procedural accounts fall short. We must not forget that practices, 
like the agency that leads to them, do not arise naturally. Practices, like beliefs, 
are not static. They evolve constantly and are partly determined by the material
296 Ibid., p. 11.
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and structural conditions that define their embodiment. Thus, and for that reason, 
it is crucial that we consider the ways in which material conditions might interact 
and affect the exercise o f agency. This might mean that although a certain 
practice could be considered an instance of agency, it could also simultaneously 
be considered a reflection of underlying inequalities.
We have seen that socialisation can have pernicious effects. Procedural accounts 
of autonomy do not pay any attention to the effects that socialisation can have on 
the formation of agents’ preferences. This is problematic since as we have seen 
in Chapter II, socialisation can deeply affect agents’ own self-conception and the 
esteem in which they hold their own selves. An account o f autonomy must be 
sensitive to these affects without being prescriptive about the content of choices.
We have also seen that the procedural insistence on carefully ordered structure 
and resonance o f desires is unable to fully account for the autonomy of 
individuals who have more than one identity framework. Intersectional identities 
show how individuals’ experiences o f practices and attachments is highly 
variable and changing. Procedural accounts might be able to explain autonomous 
preference formation at any one time, but they fail adequately to portray how 
multiple attachments can affect autonomy on a longer-term basis.
If we are to understand the importance and meaning o f practices, the procedural 
formation of the desire will not be sufficient in order to have a full idea of 
autonomy. Agency and content neutrality emerge as crucial, but not sufficient, 
elements o f what it means to be an autonomous person. The next chapter will 
deal with some of these issues. What kind o f capacities do we need in order to 
exercise autonomy? How are these capacities developed? Are these capability 
theories sufficient in order to explain what autonomy is? And are they able to 
accommodate the insights provided by socialisation and intersectional identities?
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V. Relational Theories of Autonomy
The previous chapter looked at strict procedural theories o f autonomy. I showed 
that these theories are useful in portraying one o f the possible meanings of 
autonomy: agency. Agency matters because it respects the individual and, the 
content neutrality o f procedural theories allows for a vast range o f options to be 
chosen as part o f an autonomous decision, as long as this decision is taken in the 
appropriate procedural way. However, the chapter also showed that agency alone 
is not sufficient to describe what it means to be free. Indeed, the strict logical 
methodology used to judge who is considered to be autonomous poses problems 
for those interested in issues o f socialisation and multiple identities. Procedural 
theories emerge as too rigid to be able to satisfactorily accommodate the cases o f 
those who hold more than one identity framework within which they make 
decisions. They also appeared unable to explain satisfactorily the relation 
between the social and autonomous being.
This chapter deals with theories that can be considered an answer to procedural 
accounts o f autonomy. Indeed, an important part o f their concerns is to show that 
a purely procedural account cannot be a complete account o f  autonomy: there are 
other necessary factors that need to be brought in. In exploring these alternative 
theories, I show in which particular ways they are useful. One o f these is their 
concern with the social, and an approach to autonomy as something which is 
socially developed. In relational theory it simply does not make sense to speak o f 
autonomy as a skill without taking into consideration the way this skill comes to 
be developed. As such, these theories refuse to consider autonomy and 
socialisation as two opposed processes: the social becomes an intrinsic and 
necessary part o f the development of autonomy.
Linked to this idea is the development of autonomy as something beyond a zero 
sum game. Autonomy becomes a matter o f degree, a skill that can be more or 
less developed at different times and in different contexts. This in turn means that 
relational theorists o f autonomy are able to deal more effectively with some o f
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the challenges posed by multiple identities. The self no longer appears as a static, 
homogenous entity that exists in a vacuum. It is possible to hold more than one 
identity framework through which to take decisions, and preferences might vary 
depending on the context or moment the agent finds herself in.
Relational theorists also address the issue o f content neutrality. Both Marilyn 
Friedman and Diane Meyers strive to achieve theories that are neither as neutral 
as the previous accounts nor too rigidly substantive. As already argued, a 
complete onus on content neutrality proves inadequate when dealing with cases 
o f unequal or oppressive socialisation. Friedman offers a form o f proceduralism 
that contains the possibility o f evaluating the social causes and effects of choices, 
while Meyers introduces a mild substantivism, intrinsic to the development o f 
autonomous capacities. They position themselves some way between pure 
content neutrality and strong substantivism. Their accounts are broadly 
procedural but I argue that there are latent substantive concerns that permeate 
them.
In addressing these issues, I continue further with the questioning o f the 
relationship between autonomy and emancipatory politics. I take emancipatory 
politics to mean a politics that aims to redress inequalities between persons. Here 
I pursue a line o f thought introduced by Saba Mahmood: the idea that in feminist 
writings there is a worrying tendency to attach an emancipatory subtext to 
autonomy. Friedman and Meyers are both feminist theorists dealing with 
questions o f autonomy and women, especially women within minority group, 
and both suggest that autonomy has emancipatory effects, that autonomy is a tool 
o f change.
The question here is whether this suggested relation between autonomy and 
emancipatory politics forces Friedman and Meyers in a more substantive 
direction than they officially wish to go. I argue that the stances they adopt on 
respect for difference, and their commitment to revised proceduralist accounts 
combine to generate latent substantive commitments, which then signal a 
departure from strict content neutrality. How problematic is this? To what extent
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can a descriptive term like autonomy be linked to a particular world view? In 
what ways might this be helpful and in what ways might it be harmful?
1. What do Theories of Relational Autonomy Try to Achieve?
The two theories dealt with in this chapter are generally considered procedural 
accounts o f autonomy.297 However, they differ from other procedural accounts in 
so far as they fall under the theoretical umbrella o f relational autonomy.298 
Relational autonomy is a broad body o f literature, containing a variety of 
approaches, but characterised by a number o f shared assumptions. Generally 
speaking, the term refers to that body o f theory that depends on
the conviction that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ 
identities are formed within the context of social relationships and 
shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, 
class, gender, and ethnicity. Thus the focus of relational approaches is to 
analyse the implications of inter-subjective and social dimensions of 
selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual autonomy and moral 
and political agency.299
Jennifer Nedelsky, probably the first proponent o f relational autonomy, argues 
for a reconceptualisation o f the notion o f autonomy. Autonomy, in its theoretical 
incarnation, needs to respect the experiences o f women -  which in Nedelsky’s 
view, involves the rejection o f the social atomism that characterises much liberal 
theory. Autonomy needs to
297 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Introduction”, pp. 1 4 - 1 8 .
298 See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”; 
“Law, Boundaries and the Bounded S e lf ’, R epresentations, Vol. 30 (1990); “Meditations on
Embodied Autonomy”, Graven Images, V ol, 2 (1995); Marina Oshana, “Personal Autonomy and 
Society”, Journal o f  Social Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1998). See also Mackenzie and Stoljar, 
Relational Autonomy, for a number o f  different perspectives o f  relational autonomy. 
2".M ackenzie and Stoljar, “Introduction”, p. 4.
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incorporate our experience of embeddedness in relations, both the 
inherent, underlying reality of such embeddedness and the 
oppressiveness of its current social forms.300
In Nedelsky’s argument, the social matters in two distinct ways. One, because it 
is through social relationships we develop the capacity to be autonomous, and 
two, because the content o f autonomy depends on the social structures around us. 
The process o f autonomy is rendered intelligible; its content is valuable because 
it is valued socially. Autonomy appears as a process and as dependent on human 
relations.
Relational theory also tends to be characterised by a distrust o f binary 
classifications in ways that resonate with my earlier argument about autonomy 
not being in opposition to socialisation. For Nedelsky,
the dichotomies of state-individual, public-private, politics-market, 
legislation-common law were always illusory. The central part of the 
illusion was the association of freedom with the second term of each 
dichotomy and coercion with the first. It is not simply that things have 
changed so much that the categories no longer make sense. Rather, the 
dichotomies from the beginning served to mask the role of state power 
in the second set of terms.301
The binary oppositions that characterise traditional accounts of autonomy are 
mistaken: they misconceive the individual by representing autonomy as contrary 
to social influences, and misconstrue how the private and the public are, in fact, 
intrinsically linked.302 Nedelsky makes a point reminiscent o f Okin here, arguing 
that these distinctions help conceal the extent to which current structures are 
oppressive. Relational autonomy seeks to do exactly the opposite: by decentring 
and calling into question these very structures, and interrogating the processes 
that depend on them, it becomes possible to arrive at a better understanding of
300 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, p. 10.
301 Ibid., p. 18.
302 For a discussion on how the private is in fact created by the public in its limits and 
manifestations, and the way the private works to maintain the public see Okin, Justice, Gender 
and the Family, pp. 124-133.
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what it means to be autonomous. What is necessary is “to combine the claim of 
the constitutiveness o f social relations with the value o f self-determination”.303
Beyond these (rather general) shared assumptions, relational autonomy is a 
varied field, as evidenced by the plurality o f approaches in the collection edited 
by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy. Some 
theorists, like Friedman, believe in the compatibility of procedural content- 
neutral accounts with relational accounts o f autonomy. Others, like Stoljar, argue 
that only a substantive conception o f autonomy can deal effectively with 
oppressive or unequal socialisation. The central shared concern is the emphasis 
on the relationship o f the social to the self, how this is formed, and the idea that 
autonomy is best characterised as a process.
2. Friedman’s Integration Model
a. What the Theory Maintains
Friedman’s account o f autonomy is a revised structural account. Like other 
procedural theorists, Friedman also abides by the ‘time slice’ approach. For her,
according to our everyday usage, the conditions which matter most for 
the realisation of autonomy are conditions involved in the immediate 
situation in which a choice is being made.304
She argues that the historical constitution of preferences is not crucial: it is not a 
matter o f revising the way we come to form preferences over time. Her account 
does not call for a hierarchical structure of desires. Instead, Friedman argues that 
we must be aware o f  the social conditions in which choices are made. For her, as 
is the case with historical proceduralists, it is crucial to interrogate “what is 
behind the choices [the agent] makes”.305
303 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, p. 9.
304Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and the Split Level S e lf ’, Southern Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 
24, N o. 1 (1986), p. 20.
305 Ibid., p. 20 [emphasis mine].
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Friedman’s original proposal emerges from a concern with the ‘split-level se lf. 
According to Friedman, both historico-procedural and structural procedural 
theories o f autonomy emphasise the role o f critical reflection as autonomy 
conferring. Frankfurt identifies second order volitions as those that are necessary 
in making a decision autonomous. The highest part o f the self is represented by 
these generalised volitions. The lower self is characterised by the first and second 
order desires, which seem to be of less importance. Central to this is the agent’s 
ability to critically distinguish between the different kinds o f desires, being able 
to explain the lower ones by reference to higher, more general ones. Christman 
takes critical evaluation o f preferences to be central to autonomy. Without 
critical evaluation, preferences cannot be considered autonomous. Thus, it seems 
that it is this critical ability that is most characteristic of autonomy and of “higher 
selves”. This is problematic because these theorists do not provide sufficient 
justification for according critical reflection this special ontological status. Why 
is critical reflection thought to reveal the only true or real self? Furthermore, does 
not critical reflection itself develop from the very social relationships in which 
the agent finds herself? For Friedman,
the self must become autonomous in respect to her critical assessment in 
some way other than that of critical assessment in accord with a higher 
principle -  at least this must be true for one’s highest principles.306
Why is critical reflection autonomous? The problem lies in that
...split-level self theorists are challenged to defend the notion that 
critical assessment in accord with higher principles is uniquely 
privileged to constitute the basis of autonomy and is the manifestation 
of self more ‘true’ than the lowest of a person’s motivations.307
How does critical reflection become autonomy conferring, especially when 
bearing in mind that the ability to reason critically is also socially acquired? For 
Friedman this question could be avoided if
306 Ibid., p. 26.
307 Ibid., p. 32.
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critical assessment did not require principles at a higher level than that 
which was being assessed. Only if critical reflection must be exclusively 
a ‘top-down’ affair is there no room at the top for autonomy.308
Friedman rejects the idea of critical reflection as synonymous with autonomy -  
indeed it is this she seems to consider the main issue distinguishing her approach 
from traditional procedural accounts.309 Her integration model calls instead for a 
bottom-up approach, closer to Freudian personality theories. According to Freud, 
higher principles are those that are not truly our own: they are the ones acquired 
through habituation and living in society. It is the libidinal self that is most truly 
characteristic o f humans: the impulses that are biologically driven are those that 
are truly constitutive o f our selves. Friedman claims to be respecting the insights 
from psychological theories by maintaining that
autonomy is achieved in virtue of a two-way process of integration 
within a person’s hierarchy of motivations, immediate standards and 
values and highest principles. Only if a person’s highest principles have 
been subjected to assessment in accord with her intermediate standards 
and her motivations, would it be appropriate to consider them her ‘own’ 
principles. Thus, her highest principles are ‘highest’ in a logical, not an 
ontological way.310
All the principles the agent holds must be integrated. Those that are higher 
principles are not so randomly: they are merely broader or more general 
principles through which agents can justify their choices. But not for that are they 
o f more importance than those mid or low level preferences. Indeed, for 
Friedman, it is important to note that higher principles are often socially created 
and maintained. As such these principles cannot logically represent who the 
agent truly is since they
308 Ibid., p. 30.
309 Friedman’s account differs from procedural theories in more ways than just a focus on 
integration. Array and competency development are also crucial parts o f  her account. She 
however points at integration as being the most salient difference, and names her theory after that 
condition.
310 Friedman, “Autonomy and the Split Level S e lf ’, p. 32.
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might well manifest culturally prevalent ideals of personhood which she 
has unreflectively absorbed. For a self-concept to become a person’s 
own self-concept, it must have been assessed by her for fitness with 
whatever else already motivates and guides her.311
Friedman’s 1986 model was revised and expanded in her Autonomy, Gender, and 
Politics.312 This later work addresses different questions to those posed in her 
earlier article. The aim is not simply to provide a critique o f existing structural 
procedural theories, but moves on to offer a positive defence o f the concept of 
autonomy. Autonomy, Gender, and Politics provides us with a more developed 
account, where she supports autonomy by appealing to the importance of 
individuality and content neutrality. As we saw in Chapter IV, content neutrality 
is useful in the analysis o f cross cultural issues o f autonomy -  something 
Friedman was increasingly concerned with. For Friedman, content neutrality 
matters because it is that which will allow the necessary importance to the 
individual as an agent. Content neutrality respects what she calls ‘perspectival 
identity’, an intrinsic part of what characterises autonomy, defined as “the 
particular person she can be constituted by her perspective, her deeper beliefs, 
desires, values”.313 This is contrasted with ‘trait-based identity’ which is defined 
as the “human categories used to describe” agents.314 Perspectival identity is 
important to Friedman because of the significance o f the first person position. 
According to her,
an ideal of personal autonomy is based on the presumption that there is 
value in a life lived in accord with the perspective of one who lives it.
The way to appreciate that value is to start with a first-person 
perspective.315
Indeed, for Friedman, the value in respecting one’s own preferences should lead 
on to ideals of reciprocity, whereby everyone should respect other people’s
311 Ibid., p. 32.
312 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, and Politics.
313 Ibid., p. 10.
314 Ibid.
3,5 Ibid., p. 56.
146
preferences in respect to their lives. First person perspectives will emphasise the 
notion of mutual respect, something she takes to be a central liberal concern.
The first person perspective is also important because o f its ability to encourage 
critical reflection on oppressive socialisation or coercive norms. Autonomy as 
personal, individual and content neutral will encourage (or indeed supposes that) 
agents will exercise their critical capacities, and, in so doing, be able to realise 
their own positions towards these practices and their effects:
Women benefit from autonomous, critical reflection on social norms 
and practices both as potential subjects or victims of those practices and 
as potential agents engaged in perpetrating or sustaining those practices.
As victims or subjects of customary wrongs, women would be more 
likely, if autonomous, to recognise the injustices perpetrated against 
them by wrongful norms.316
For Friedman, it is this critical capacity which can lead to freedom from 
domination; it is autonomy that will enable us to fight against oppression and 
injustice. The key to equality lies in being able to be an individual, to be one’s 
own person and, from that, able to assess the legitimacy of those norms from 
within which we are formed.
Friedman’s account is explicitly relational in so far as she takes the social to be a 
causal factor for the emergence o f autonomy:
persons are fundamentally social beings who develop the competency 
for autonomy through social interaction with other persons. These 
developments take place in a context of values, meanings, and modes of 
self-reflection that cannot exist except as constituted by social
• 317practices.
The social matters and it can either hinder autonomy or enable it. Autonomy, in 
Friedman’s conceptualisation, is a tool for change; by valuing individuality,
316 Ibid., p. 62.
3,7 Ibid., p. 104.
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independence can be achieved, leading eventually to the overcoming of 
subordination. It is a revolutionary value but one that might not develop where 
certain conditions are not met. Autonomy “requires both certain personal 
competencies and certain ‘external’ conditions among which those competencies 
can develop and manifest themselves”.318
If autonomy competency requires the development o f certain tools like 
independent thought and capacity to evaluate options, then some forms of 
socialisation might be less favourable to this development than others. In those 
cases, Friedman maintains, liberal societies have no duty to respect the choice of 
women. Content neutral autonomy must fulfil two characteristics if  it is to be 
considered a reliable indicator o f whether to accept choices or not:
First, women’s choices would have to be made under conditions that 
promoted the general reliability of their choices. This would require that 
women be able to choose among a significant and morally acceptable 
array o f alternatives and that they be able to make their choices 
relatively free of coercion, manipulation and deception. Secondly, 
women must have been able to develop, earlier in life, the capacities 
needed to reflect on their situations and make decisions about them. The 
right sorts o f opportunities and guidance must have occurred in order 
for women to have developed these general skills of practical 
reflection.319
According to Friedman, the conditions for content neutral autonomy can be met 
more easily than those o f substantive versions o f autonomy. However, the above 
specifications are quite substantively laden. Importantly, she gives no indication 
o f how exactly societies are to encourage the development o f these critical skills, 
who decides exactly how these are to be identified, or when the “right sorts of 
opportunities and guidance” have been achieved. To this point we shall return.
One o f  Friedman’s interesting arguments is that autonomy can, sometimes, be a 
problem for it is potentially disruptive o f social relationships:
318 Ibid., p. 189.
319 Ibid., p. 188 [emphasis mine],
148
although autonomy is not inherently anti-ethical to social relationships, 
nevertheless in practice, autonomy may contingently disrupt particular 
social bonds. ...I link [this] tendency to a potential for promoting social 
nonconformity and, thereby, resistance to possibly oppressive social 
norms and practices.320
The importance o f this rests in conceding to (certain critical) feminists that 
autonomy can, at least in the short term, be harmful for women and what matters 
to them. However, she is careful to point out that
it is not autonomy (as a dispositional capacity) that disrupts social 
relationships; it is people who disrupt social relationships.321
The primacy o f the individual is again restated: individuals can disrupt social 
relationships and their reasons for doing so might well be justified. As should be 
clear from this, there is a strong normative characterisation o f autonomy 
underlying Friedman’s account. Autonomy emerges as a double sword: 
potentially useful for women, but also and sometimes simultaneously, dangerous 
for those things or people they care about.
b. How the Theory Works in Practice: Examples
What makes someone autonomous according to Friedman? Autonomy is based 
on the integration o f preferences. There are no ontologically higher and lower 
levels: the only reference to gradations is merely for explanatory or justificatory 
purposes. Thus, ‘higher’ preferences have no priority over ‘lower’ ones. Take the 
preferences mentioned in the previous chapter:
1st order desire: wearing the hijab
2nd order desire: wearing the hijab as a requirement o f Islam
320 Ibid., p. 105.
321 Ibid., p. 106.
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2nd order volition: the agent deems that Islam (religion) is important to 
her.
The second order volition is important to the agent because it is a way of 
explaining her behaviour. However, it is not for that more important than 
wearing the hijab per se. What stands out in Friedman’s account is the fact that 
these preferences need to be integrated. As long as the above preferences make 
sense together, as long as they have coherence, the agent will be deemed 
autonomous. This means that preferences need to be consistent with each other: 
wearing the veil might also lead to other preferences, such as eating Hallal, 
praying five times a day and following any other customs that the agent believes 
to be coherent with her other endorsements. Rationality is not awarded a more 
important place than those things that actually matter to agents; those things she 
has chosen herself.
Apart from the fact that preferences need to fit in with one another, Friedman 
argues that they will only be considered autonomous if the agent has had enough 
choices (significant and morally acceptable) and has been allowed (and 
encouraged) to develop her capacity for autonomy. It is here that the examples 
become more complicated. What do morally acceptable and significant options 
mean?
Take a young woman who has been given the choice to wear the hijab, the niqab 
or the burqa.322 Are these sufficient and morally acceptable choices? Do they 
need to be acceptable to the agent herself, or to those who evaluate whether or 
not she is autonomous? As already noted, bans on religious headwear often 
follow judgements about whether the persons wearing them are autonomous or 
not. Who judges is therefore important, since the answer may influence the 
outcomes o f legislation that directly affect the individuals themselves. Who 
evaluates what is considered an acceptable choice is also important because
322 Whether there is a normative significance between the hijab, niqab and burqa was part o f  the 
debate in the 1993-4 conversation between Anna Galeotti and Norma Moruzzi. See Galeotti, 
“Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration” and “A Problem with Theory: A Rejoinder 
to Moruzzi”; Moruzzi, “A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities o f  Political 
and Social Identity”, and “A Response to Galeotti”.
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Friedman’s discussion takes place against a background o f what to do when 
women choose apparently illiberal practices, and what to do from the standpoint 
o f a liberal state. It seems that if the agent considers the choices of different 
headwear to be morally significant (which they can easily be, given that each of 
those garments signifies a different commitment level and different interpretation 
of the demands o f piety and modesty, as well as cultural and local differences) 
her choice to wear any o f them will be deemed autonomous.
Women must have choices, Friedman states. The available options must, 
moreover, be o f the ‘right sort’ in order to be able to develop the capacity for 
autonomy. Once again, what is the right sort o f choice? Perhaps that an agent is 
given the choice to wear any form o f covering she pleases, though not the choice 
to wear none. Perhaps that she be allowed to interpret the requirements o f the 
Qu’ran by herself and decide individually how to apply these to her life. In these 
cases, we might say that her critical capacities are developed; she is made to 
consider what she wants to do and why she wants to do it.
But would this be sufficient for Friedman? As noted, Friedman believes strongly 
in the revolutionary power of the capacity for autonomy. By questioning and 
interrogating practices, we become able to challenge oppression. So perhaps the 
kind o f options that Friedman is considering are rather different: instead o f a 
choice between different forms o f covering, she is perhaps referring to the 
opportunity to interrogate her attachments from more than one point o f view. She 
may have been given the option to wear a niqab, a hijab or a burqa, but this is not 
sufficient. In order to develop her critical capacities, and make her choices really 
her own, perhaps she needs to have been exposed to radically different world 
views that do not award the same importance to modesty and piety. Perhaps she 
should have been exposed to egalitarian theories on the equality o f women and 
men, or to ideas about the importance of women’s emancipation. Moreover, as 
well as being exposed to radically different choices, she must have been guided, 
throughout her early years, whilst making her choices.323
323 See Friedman’s comments on the matter. Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, P olitics , p. 188.
151
Friedman does not say to whom the choices should seem worthwhile, although 
one can infer she means to the individual agent. But this is potentially circular, 
given that what she tries to do is show why we should consider choices 
themselves to be important. As long as all the desires are integrated, there are no 
divisions between higher and lower selves, and these selves are created out o f an 
array o f options, it would seem that Friedman’s individuals are always 
autonomous in a content neutral way. But is this really the case? Do her 
conditions for acceptance of content neutrality not provide a stronger substantive 
basis that circumscribes her neutrality?
c. Issues To Consider
Benson argues that Friedman’s account o f integration, albeit avoiding some of 
the problems created by hierarchical accounts, is unable to provide a satisfactory 
response to how oppressive socialisation works. For him, “an integration view 
detects threats to autonomy only when the total internalisation o f autonomy- 
inhibiting socialisation fails to take hold or begins to break down”.324 This is 
particularly problematic because of the way autonomy-inhibiting socialisation is 
likely to work. It influences not only lower order desires, but also higher ones. 
So, if the socialisation process has been effective, the agent will indeed have 
integrated desires, but she will be unable to see why she has such desires. The 
only time she will be able to notice the hold her identifications and socialisation 
patterns have on her, that is, the only time she will be able to be effectively 
critical about her desires and her reasons for holding them, is if the oppressive 
socialisation process has, in some way, failed to take complete hold.325
Linked to this is the fact that Friedman, like other structural procedural theorists, 
takes a time slice approach. Again, what matters is that the desires are in
324 Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation”, p. 395.
325 Benson’s criticism must be considered with the follow ing proviso: Benson is considered to be 
a proponent o f  a substantive conception o f  autonomy, both in its weak and strong incarnations. If 
Friedman was to acknowledge the pervasiveness o f  oppressive socialisation and its omni­
presence if  successful, she would have to forgo her attachment to content neutrality, which for 
her is pivotal in acknowledging the moral agency o f  individuals (and her associated belief in the 
emancipatory consequences o f  individual critical capacities).
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agreement at any one moment in time. The time slice approach matters for 
Friedman for the same reasons it is important to thinkers like Frankfurt and 
Dworkin. It is the instance o f decision-making, the act o f deciding, that is 
characteristic of moral agency, which in turn is linked to political agency as a 
force o f change. However, this approach can be problematic when considering 
that identity building and socialisation are both processes that occur over the 
course o f time. If we ignore how an agent comes to acquire certain preferences, 
or the way these might have been introduced into her psyche, it becomes more 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which an agent can truly be said to be choosing 
them.
The time slice view therefore further problematises the integration approach, for 
it need not take into account that some preferences might have been coercively 
learned. Time slice approaches seem to preclude the possibility o f seeing how 
autonomy operates. No importance is given to the way preferences might change: 
they might sometimes be integrated, sometimes not. The way preferences 
change, and why, does not seem to be o f importance for Friedman.
In her assessment o f Friedman, Catriona Mackenzie argues that there is a
tension within her approach between her minimal interpretation of the 
requirements for content neutral autonomy and her claim that autonomy 
is valuable in providing a normative standpoint from which to criticise 
oppressive social institutions, practices and relationships.326
The tension seems to be between content neutrality and what constitutes a 
choice. At first glance, it seems that Friedman allows for oppressive socialisation 
to be the grounds for a preference. She maintains that liberals have a duty to 
respect these preferences:
A liberal culture should respect and tolerate the practices of cultural 
minorities in its midst even when those practices violate the rights of
326 Catriona Mackenzie, “Autonomy, Gender and Politics”, review o f  Autonom y Gender and  
Politics by Marilyn Friedman, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 12, 2003. Found at 
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm7idH295.
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females in those minority groups, but only so long as the females 
themselves choose to participate in those practices.327
This is because autonomous choices are “those that mirror wants or values that 
an acting person has reflectively reaffirmed and that are • important to her”.328 
This definition seems quite permissive. Indeed, it seems that most people will fall 
under the definition o f what it means to be autonomous and thus will be able to 
be the rational critics that Friedman ascribes autonomous agents to be.
However, let’s not forget a second thing. As previously mentioned, Friedman’s 
discussion also has some rather more restrictive qualifications to the definition of 
who is to be considered autonomous. An agent has to have a set o f preferences 
that are truly hers, desires that matter to her person. Despite Friedman’s claim to 
respect content neutrality, these preferences might not be as varied as their 
abstract enunciation might lead us to think. As mentioned before, Friedman says 
that these preferences need to come from a “significant and morally acceptable 
array o f alternatives ” and that these need to be o f the “right sort”.329 What does 
she mean by right sort? How does one distinguish between a significant and a 
non significant option? And, more importantly, is moral acceptability in itself not 
a product o f the social in which an agent lives? Are value and acceptability not 
socially constituted and maintained? The notion that some options are more 
valuable than others suggests that Friedman’s content neutrality is perhaps more 
limited than she believes it is; autonomy is not as easy to achieve for all as a first 
reading o f her thesis might suggest.
327 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, P olitics, p. 201.
328 This is a. summarised version o f  Friedman latest full definition o f  what it means to be 
autonomous. The full definition reads as such: “Choices and actions can be autonomous only if  
they are self-reflective in two senses and meet at least two other conditions. First, they must be 
self-reflective in being partly caused by the actors’ reflective consideration o f  her own wants and 
values, where reflective consideration may be cognitive in a narrow sense or also affective or 
volitional and cognitive in a broad sense. Second, they must be self-reflective in mirroring those 
o f  her wants and values that she has reflectively endorsed. Third, the underlying wants or values 
must be important to the actor. Fourth, her choice or behaviour must be relatively unimpeded by 
conditions, such as coercion, deception, and manipulation that can prevent self-re fleet ion from 
leading to behaviour that mirrors the values and commitments a person reaffirmed.” (Friedman, 
Autonomy, Gender and Politics, p. 14).
329 Ibid., p. 188 [emphasis mine].
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Furthermore, the conditions for choosing are also heavily limited. Choices must 
be made
under conditions that facilitate autonomy. These conditions must 
include the presence of genuine alternatives for the woman’s choosing, 
the absence of coercive and manipulative interferences with the 
women’s reflections on their cultural practices, and socialisation that is 
capable of developing in the women real autonomy competency.330
It seems that Friedman is aware of the potentially negative impact o f unequal 
socialisation. Her allegedly neutral account is limited, in so far as women’s 
choices must be respected only if  they are made in the right circumstances, and 
these are predefined in advance. Oppressive socialisation (and certain lifeworlds 
it appears) can hamper autonomy and, as such, should not be allowed. But how 
easy is it to find these autonomy enhancing backgrounds?
Friedman seems to think that autonomy will lead to certain consequences -  an 
increased willingness to criticise traditional practices, for instance. According to 
her,
autonomy promotes in individuals a greater degree of critical reflection 
on traditional norms and customary practices, and ...this reflection 
gives individuals greater opportunity to recognise norms that are 
harmful to them.331
Not only is the practice o f reflection given quite a substantive meaning, but there 
is also a certain dualism implied in the account. On first reading, it seems 
Friedman is saying that those who are autonomous will reject anything 
traditional and will live an emancipated life. Those who live by traditional or 
local customs, on the other hand will not, finding themselves unable to live a 
fulfilling life that is truly their own. This is troubling because, as Volpp points 
out, the characterisation o f minority cultures as sites o f violence and aberrant 
behaviour is often used in the discourse as a way o f neutralising and avoiding
330 Ibid., p. 201.
331 Ibid., p. 70.
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further thought on the situation o f those women in majority cultural groups.332 
There is an assumption that the west is free and the rest lives in chains:
those with power appear to have no culture; those without power are 
culturally endowed. Western subjects are defined by their abilities to 
make choices, in contrast to Third World subjects, who are defined by 
their group based determinism.333
Though Friedman explicitly argues that oppression pervades all realms -  
minority and majority -  autonomy and critical reflection still emerge as the 
liberators of those who live in particularly unequal realms. Autonomy is de facto 
emancipatory. Friedman attaches strong substantive values, despite her insistence 
on the neutrality o f the account. The notion that rational thinking is a tool for 
emancipatory politics, and that it will lead to the challenging o f oppression and 
inequality by those who are submitted to it, seems to imply that autonomy is a 
value that will lead to particular, pre-determined consequences. This becomes 
particularly clear if we remember the dualism present in her thinking of 
autonomy as something that will challenge the traditional and customary. 
Friedman claims to be finding a middle way between liberalism and cultural 
minorities, but it seems her answer prioritises a liberal understanding o f what 
matters, which in itself is a substantive, non-neutral evaluation o f what it means 
to be one’s own person.334
This point resonates with Mahmood’s claim that feminism (in general) works as 
a strategy that is diagnostic but also prescriptive.335 Resistance and autonomy are 
different, they do not necessarily reflect the same aim. Autonomy has to do with 
the constitution o f the self, whereas resistance means a struggle against 
oppression. They are conceptually different. It seems that despite her best efforts, 
Friedman returns to a version o f the split-level self she set out to differentiate 
herself from: critical capacities become the most important element in 
autonomous decision-making. In making a positive defence o f why it is
332 Volpp, “Feminism versus Multicultural ism”, p. 1186.
333 Ibid., p. 1192.
334 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, p. 195.
335 Mahmood, The Politics o f  Piety, pg. 10.
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important to be autonomous, Friedman forgoes some o f her initial premises in 
making autonomy a valuable tool for women.
Friedman’s approach seems promising in its consideration of multiple identities. 
As already argued, an agent attached to more than one normative framework may 
act in different ways depending on social context, and may deal with the 
potential conflicts through what Barvosa Carter describes as syncretisation.336 
This could be seen to resonate with Friedman’s notion o f integration. Friedman’s 
idea that desires should be consistent with one another and should reciprocally 
resonate in order to be somewhat coherent could be viewed as a recognition of 
the existence o f multiple identities. Moreover, the primacy o f the first person 
perspective highlights the undeniable particularity of the person with multiple 
identities, something that theorists who work on multiple identities are also keen 
to emphasise.
Friedman’s integration requirement works best in cases where the preferences 
can indeed be integrated. A woman who is both a Jain and an animal rights 
advocate has little difficulty, since Jainism mandates vegetarianism. However, 
not all cases are as straightforward. The idea o f consistency could be taken to 
mean that certain desires will give rise to other associated preferences. So, a 
young woman who deems Judaism to be important to her and who follows the 
laws of Kashrut (dietary laws) and Tzniut (modesty), will also be expected to 
follow other commandments o f Judaism, such as honouring your parents and 
following their wishes. Let’s imagine her parents do not wish her to be educated 
outside a Beis Yaakov institution.337 If she chooses to disobey them and opts to 
attend a secular educational centre, it could be taken as a sign that her conflicting 
preferences (being an observant Jew and valuing secular education) are not 
integrated. Indeed they are not being checked by other related preferences that 
would show the agent is an autonomous one.
336 Barvosa Carter, “Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 7.
337 B eis Yaakov educational centres are Ultra-Orthodox schools for girls. How much secular 
education is available varies between centres. Generally it can be said that in Israel they tend to 
de-prioritise secular education, whereas in Europe and North America secular studies are often 
included in the programme. This however varies between schools. Some Haredi schools in Ultra- 
Orthodox areas like Stamford Hill in London and Borough Park in Brooklyn, N ew  York de- 
emphasise secular education.
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Moreover, while integration is one method o f navigating a variety of 
endorsements and life worlds, it is not the only one. If  ambivalence is, as I have 
argued, an alternative mode, then this means precisely not integrating. 
Ambivalence as a strategy means choosing to remain equidistant between 
different choices whose conflicting and incommensurable natures make them 
impossible to merge.
It appears that Friedman’s account, although able to accommodate some o f the 
manifestations o f multiple identities, cannot deal with some of its more difficult 
characterisations. Furthermore, the stipulation that the choices available need to 
be morally acceptable is also contentious. This prompts questions about which 
options are to be considered conducive to autonomy and which ones are not. 
Ultimately, Friedman’s account does not differ substantially from other 
procedural theories, but introduces new complications in the form o f an 
underlying normative evaluation o f what is to be considered valuable. This 
trumps her own preference for a content-neutral form o f autonomy.
3. Meyers and Autonomy Competency
a. What the Theory Maintains
Diane Meyers, like Friedman, is widely considered a relational theorist. For her, 
social relationships are crucial in order to develop the capacities that make the 
exercise o f autonomy possible. She pays particular attention to the situation of 
women within minority groups. Indeed, one o f the driving forces of her position 
is the following:
the reality I propose to inject into my discussion of autonomy is the fact 
that enormous numbers of people are assigned to social groups that are 
systematically subordinated. The wonder is that despite this
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subordination, some of these individuals are exemplars of autonomy, 
and few of them altogether lack autonomy.338
The aim is to explain how, despite oppressive socialisation, autonomy might still 
be present and if so, in what ways. Her account is sensitive to the challenge not 
only o f socialisation but also to that o f multiple identities. Central to her theory is 
the idea is that autonomy is a competency,
a way of living in harmony with one’s true self. Conceived as the 
exercise of a competency comprising diverse self-reading and self- 
actualising skills, I shall urge, personal autonomy is not only compatible 
with the civilising influences of socialisation, but it depends on 
socialisation to cultivate the requisite skills.339
Autonomy competency is particularly relevant in the areas o f self-discovery, 
self-definition and self-direction. In order to achieve personal autonomy,
one must know what one is like, one must be able to establish one’s own 
standards and modify one’s qualities to meet them, and one must 
express one’s personality in action.340
Some o f these qualities are indeed socially created, or at least, socially 
developed. Simultaneously, these qualities will also allow agents to bypass the 
harmful effects o f oppressive socialisation so as to truly reflect, in their 
decisions, their authentic self. For Meyers, “the self of the person who exercises 
autonomy competency, then, is an authentic self -  a self-chosen identity rooted in 
the individual’s most abiding feelings and firmest convictions, yet subject to the 
critical perspective autonomy competency affords”.341 The authentic self is who 
the person truly is, when her desires are her own and not the product of tradition 
or oppressive socialisation: it is “a self that is shaped by social experience as well
338 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!”, p. 152.
339 Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 
1989), p. 20.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid., p. 61.
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as individual choice”.342 The authentic self need not be static, nor is it always 
reflected in decisions taken. However, for Meyers, it is the touchstone o f 
autonomy, that which allows agents to gain control over their selves despite the 
problems associated to oppressive socialisation.
The social thus emerges as central in Meyers’ account. It can harm as much as it 
can enable the development o f the capacities characteristic o f autonomy. As 
Mackenzie and Stoljar point out, in Meyers’ account social relations are 
important to autonomy in three different ways. Firstly, autonomy does not mean 
doing all the things an agent might be interested in doing; it is doing the things 
that most matter to the agent herself and her idea of who she is (her self­
conception). It follows that since “different social environments encourage or 
foster the development o f different potentialities in any individual, the agent’s 
social environment is crucial to the agent’s ability to recognise and develop her 
important potentialities”.343 Oppressive social environments might encourage 
agents to develop qualities that perhaps are not central to who the agent truly
•  344 
IS.
Secondly, and very much related to the first way in which socialisation affects 
the process o f autonomy development, is the fact that certain social environments 
might thwart the development o f the authentic self. Different values are often 
attached to certain preferences and choices in different social environments. 
Agents who are socialised into a particular environment will, more often than 
not, incorporate these preferences into their conceptions o f their own self, 
regardless o f whether these actually matter and are indeed present in the person’s 
own life plan. This idea echoes Benson’s notion that successful oppressive 
socialisation creates preferences at all levels, which problematises (in Friedman’s 
account) the possibility o f individuals critically assessing the values and 
preferences they are able to choose and are surrounded by.
342 Ibid., p. 96.
343 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Introduction”, p. 17.
344 This point is made very clearly in Diana T. Meyers, “Feminism and W om en’s Autonomy: the 
Challenge o f  Female Genital Cutting”, M etaphilosophy, Vol. 31, No. 5 (2000).
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The third way in which socialisation has an effect on autonomy competency 
hinges on the fact that competency is itself developed through social processes:
To understand autonomy as the exercise of a competency is to 
acknowledge that autonomy is impossible without socialisation. People 
are bom with the potential to become competent in various ways, but it 
is only through education that these potentialities are realised.345
This point is particularly important for Meyers because socialisation has often 
affected women and men in different ways:
socialisation does not foster the same capacity for autonomy in men and 
women alike, at least not in the dominant cultures of Western 
industrialised nations. Indeed, it is almost a platitude of the socialisation 
literature that men are encouraged to act more autonomously than 
women. Men are taught to be more independent and to exert greater 
control over situations.346
So the question becomes how to think o f autonomy when we consider that 
women might not undergo the same education, that expectations are different and 
that some social environments simply do not allow for autonomy competency to 
be developed.
Meyers’ way o f answering this plays on the idea of autonomy being a matter of 
degree. She distinguishes between two types o f autonomy: episodic and 
programmatic.
I shall argue that viewing personal autonomy as an all or nothing 
phenomenon is misguided in several respects. Specifically, I shall urge 
that the scope of programmatic autonomy compasses narrow as well as 
global issues, that episodic autonomy is intelligible without
345 Meyers, Self, Society and  P ersonal Choice, p. 135.
346 Ibid., p. 136.
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programmatic autonomy, and that a measure of personal autonomy can 
be gained through partial insight into one’s authentic self.347
Programmatic autonomy has to do with following one’s life plan. A life plan can 
be general or specific (narrowly programmatic). It deals with questions such as 
‘how do I want to live my life?’. More specifically, it will lead to agents’ 
consideration “of what qualities they want to have, what sorts o f interpersonal 
relationships they want to be involved in, what talents they want to develop, what 
interests they want to pursue, what goals they want to achieve and so forth”.348 
Life plans are constantly changing. As such, someone who exhibits 
programmatic autonomy will be able to ask herself questions on the ways in 
which her life desires are changing and the significance of these changes, as well 
as effecting alterations on the way the individual acts.
Narrowly programmatic autonomy is similar in so far as it is also a partial insight 
into the authentic self whereby similar questions are asked. However, what is 
different is that the scope o f the questions is limited to a particular area o f life, as 
distinct from other areas (e.g. education versus choice o f partner).
The last type of autonomy is that o f episodic autonomy. As the name indicates, 
episodic autonomy is limited to certain episodes, or moments, in an individual’s 
life and is not dependent on the presence o f programmatic autonomy. Meyers 
defines it as follows:
Autonomous episodic self-direction occurs when a person confronts a 
situation, asks what he or she can do with respect to it -  the options may 
include withdrawing from it, as well as participating in various ways -  
and what he or she really wants to do with respect to it, and then 
executes the decision this deliberation yields.349
Episodic autonomy is similar to the procedural accounts we saw earlier. For 
Meyers, they too constitute a form of autonomy, albeit one that is significantly
347 Meyers, “Personal Autonomy and the Paradox o f  Feminine Socialisation”, p. 624.
348 Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice, p. 48.
349 Ibid.
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different from programmatic types. Meyers’ differentiation o f three distinct types 
o f autonomy is a crucial and significant part o f her theory. It contains an 
assumption that seems intuitively true -  that being autonomous might affect 
individuals in different ways. Making a choice at a particular moment in time 
does indeed seem different to the idea o f making life plans and thinking o f how 
to enact these. It also seems plausible to think that autonomy is not a zero-sum 
game: it might be the case that certain individuals will be more able to act 
autonomously in certain areas than in others. Indeed, this would also be 
supported by thinking about the impact of socialisation, for an individual might 
have experienced particularly unequal social norms in one aspect (norms of 
feminine appearance, for instance), but not others (education).
A further issue arises in relation to Meyers’ account of autonomy. As has already 
been said, autonomy is achieved through a cluster o f skills, namely self- 
discovery, self-definition and self-direction. Desires are not always 
autonomously chosen -  they are only so if  the way an individual arrives at them 
is through the exercise of these particular skills. It is the exercise of these critical 
capacities that reflects the authentic self. It follows then that not all desires are to 
be given the same credence or weight -  not all will truly reflect the authentic self.
It is also important to note the idea o f self-direction. For Meyers, autonomy 
competency is not merely an intellectual exercise. Autonomy involves the 
changing of one’s responses, the alteration o f preferences to suit or better fit the 
revision o f life-plans. To an extent, autonomy is an ideal o f action. It is not 
merely the decision to do something but also the possibility o f being able to do it 
that counts. Not surprisingly, her recommendation for the improvement of 
autonomy developing skills takes the following form:
socialisation practices aimed at awakening and cultivating autonomy 
competency must be coupled with a social and economic climate that 
supports the exercise of this competency.350
350 Ibid., p. 188 [emphasis mine].
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The material and the social conditions matter because autonomy depends on its 
exercise. It is not sufficient, according to Meyers, to evaluate what autonomy is; 
there is also a duty to improve the social conditions so that these are geared to the 
development of these capabilities. The material then becomes an intrinsic part of 
Meyers’ analysis.351
b. How the Theory Works in Practice: Examples
Meyers gives examples throughout her work o f what it means to be autonomous, 
in its episodic, narrowly programmatic or programmatic forms. Before we go on 
to see how these forms o f autonomy fare in practice, let us see how, in her 
analysis, socialisation affects (or enables) autonomy.
Socialisation, Meyers thinks, can lead agents to develop potentialities that are not 
truly part of their authentic selves. The pressure of external societal values can 
lead individuals to appreciate those things that are valued in their society, those 
things that are conventional. Thus, a woman might face a number o f options in 
composing her life-plan. If she decides to live her life according to conventions, 
without questioning these through self-discovery, self-definition and self- 
direction, she cannot be considered autonomous. Take the example o f a young 
woman raised in a deeply religious Muslim family. She believes, because o f the 
way she has been educated and how she has seen her female family members 
behave, that she ought to value family over education, that she ought to put her 
husband’s and children’s needs first. If she arrives at this conclusion because she 
merely has accepted all that is around her, and has not questioned the meaning o f 
these preferences or whether they are truly her own, she cannot be considered 
autonomous in a programmatic way. She is merely responding to the social 
norms around her, rather than defining herself through a variety o f options.
351 This was particularly evident in her article on female genital cutting and her consideration o f  
education as a crucial element in the development o f  autonomous capacities. See Meyers, 
“Feminism and W omen’s Autonomy: The Challenge o f  Female Genital Cutting”. The point is 
also reminiscent o f  Nancy Fraser’s call for an integration o f  identity politics and redistributive 
justice. See Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas o f  Justice in a ‘Post- 
Socialist’ A ge”, New Left Review , N o. 1/212 (1995).
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On the other hand, take another young woman, raised in a secular environment, 
albeit originally o f Christian heritage. Over the course o f her studies she begins 
reading about the Qu’ran and finds that she agrees with a lot of what she takes to 
be its meaning. She starts revising her world-views, eating Hallal, praying, 
dressing according to the norms of modesty and begins to attend Islam 
conversion courses at her local Mosque. As long as she keeps reconsidering her 
own position vis k vis her life and the way she wants to live it, and then acts and 
changes according to these beliefs, the woman is to be considered autonomous.
Meyers’ stress on the importance of the procedural conditions o f autonomy 
becomes obvious in this case. What matters is how individuals come to the 
conclusion that this is the way they want to live their life, and that they act 
accordingly. This is not the full story regarding autonomy however, because o f 
the second way in which socialisation affects autonomy, through the learning o f 
those skills necessary to make autonomous decisions. Meyers draws on Simone 
de Beauvoir’s work to show how differing female and male socialisation 
processes mean that men and women, boys and girls, are differently equipped to 
develop the necessary capabilities for the exercise of autonomy. Women, she 
says, are better at self-discovery.352 This is because women are more 
introspective, more responsive to criticism, more insecure in their persons and 
thus more questioning about their persons.
However, girls’ socialisation fares badly in the other two qualities necessary for 
the development o f autonomy competencies. Self-definition favours men’s 
socialisation, since women are often thought o f (and expected to be) more 
altruistic than men, caring for others rather than acting in a self-regarding 
manner. Self-direction also involves pro-action and thus is not as well developed 
in women if they are taught that they should not be boisterous or rash, that they 
should ask for permission to speak or wait until they are asked before replying.
A programmatically autonomous person is someone who evaluates her life-plans 
as they change over the course o f time. The earlier convert to Islam can be
352 D e Beauvoir, The Second Sex.
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considered programmatically autonomous. She revises her life plans according to 
the changes she sees in herself and those things she values; she changes the way 
she defines herself vis h vis others and acts on her identifications in order to get 
closer to her ideal life plan.
A narrowly programmatic autonomous person might be someone raised under 
Jewish orthodox social norms. Judaism is important to her but she also thinks 
that education is vital to her development and to her person. She might not be as 
autonomous in certain areas. For example, she might allow her parents to arrange 
her marriage without evaluating other possible ways of reflecting her 
commitment to Judaism.353 She might not question why she eats kosher or why 
she fasts during Yom Kippur either. She might not be autonomous in those 
aspects; they are the consequences o f her socialisation as a young Jewish woman. 
On the other hand, she might think deeply about her decision to be educated. She 
might devote time to considering which career path to pursue or what degree 
would be most suitable and might devise different ways o f studying that will help 
her achieve better grades. She revises, defines and constantly questions those 
aspects o f education that are important to her. In this aspect, she is autonomous.
Finally, let us consider an example o f episodic autonomy. Take the above 
example o f a young orthodox Jewish woman. This woman is narrowly 
programmatically autonomous in certain aspects, such as her decision to pursue 
further education. She could also be episodically autonomous in others. Upon 
marrying, for example, she faces the choice of covering her hair with a snood, a 
tichel or a sheitel.354 She has considered why she is to cover -  it is a demand of 
Tzeniut, the norms o f modesty.355 She must cover her hair -  this she does not 
question. What she does question is the way she wishes to cover. All available 
forms o f covering will imply different things about her orthodoxy. If she chooses
353 Arranged marriages are by no means exclusive to Judaism. They are part o f  the cultural 
imaginary that surrounds belief, but not necessarily intrinsic to it. Most o f  the examples used here 
are by no means exclusive to the faith or belief mentioned in their depiction -  countless examples 
could be found in many other religions and cultures.
354 A snood is a close fitting net fitted over hair; a tichel is a headscarf, worn to cover all hair. The 
word comes from Yiddish, which means ‘kerchief; a sheitel is a wig.
355 See Talmud Tractate Yevamot 79a; Babylonian Talmud, Rabbi Elazar Bar Tzadok, Tractate 
Sukkah 49b.
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to wear a sheitel merely because that is what she has always seen, and does not 
consider the merits o f snoods or tichels, then she cannot be considered 
episodically autonomous. However, if  she evaluates all the available options and 
decides that she would prefer to wear a snood as a way o f keeping with the 
current ‘boho-chic’ fashions, this could be considered to be an episodically 
autonomous decision. Indeed, she might decide to wear a tichel or another form 
of covering at some other point.356 As has been seen, episodic, narrowly 
programmatic and broadly programmatic forms o f autonomy can coexist: the 
difference lies between the moment o f deciding (episodic) and longer ranging 
forms o f autonomy (long range plans, such as educational aims).
c. Issues to Consider
Although Meyers’ theory pays a lot of attention to the challenges o f socialisation 
and multiple identities, and her account o f autonomy could even be said to spring 
from the analysis o f  these, there are still a number o f problematic aspects to her 
work.
The first issue is her claim that it is important for desires to be developed until 
they are finished or, rather, until the desire has been satisfied:
when competing desires cannot be satisfied to an acceptable degree, the 
person who has them cannot ever do all that he or she really wants. 
...People who have them have authentic selves that can never be 
adequately expressed. As a result, these people cannot be 
autonomous.357
She later qualifies this, noting that it might be social circumstances that do not 
allow an individual to fully pursue her autonomously chosen desires, at which
356 This is an extremely simplified case: the choices upon marrying are not restricted to what sort 
o f  hair covering to wear: there is also the choice o f  shaving one’s head or not. This will depend 
on the agent’s interpretation o f  the norms o f  Tzeniut.
357 Meyers, Self, Society and  P ersonal Choice , p. 65.
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point only a partial satisfaction ensues.358 Although there is a clear link between 
the process o f autonomous reflection and subsequent action, I am unsure whether 
these two aspects ought to be considered the same process. If this were the case, 
it seems most human beings are only partly autonomous. Not all individuals are 
able to pursue their life-plans due to a variety o f constraints: economic, social, 
political, familial and even personal, To say that these people are not fully 
autonomous because of their inability to put in action all they desire might be a 
little far-fetched. Indeed, the very characterisation o f autonomy, previously 
described as a process of introspection and practiced as a cluster o f skills, as 
something that requires action-fulfilment seems to miss a logical step: there is a 
move from intemality to externality that is neither required nor implied by the 
very conditions the process necessitates.
An associated issue with Meyers’ competency theory is her claim that 
autonomous integration means
to be satisfied -  whether explicitly or implicitly -  with one’s traits and 
the ways these traits find satisfaction in action.359
Essentially, in Meyers’ characterisation, action and decision are closely related: 
action completion results in happiness, or at least, satisfaction. She also adds that
unhappiness with one’s self is incompatible with autonomy. For such 
unhappiness stems either from one’s failure to become the sort of person 
one wants to be (failure with respect to self-definition) or from one’s 
failure to act in accordance with one’s authentic self (failure with 
respect to self-direction).360
Although she maintains that is not necessary to be happy if  you are autonomous, 
Meyers still seems to hold that felicity is a common characteristic o f the optimal 
exercise o f the capabilities for autonomy. This characterisation seems rather 
gratuitous. As Friedman notes, autonomous thinking can potentially disrupt
358 Ibid., p. 111.
359 Ibid., p. 73.
360 Ibid., p. 74.
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social relations agents hold dear. Albeit autonomous, there is no reason to believe 
that such disruption should end in increased levels o f happiness. Furthermore, it 
is not clear that self-discovery ought to lead to increased happiness. As the 
Socratic paradox maintains, ‘the more you know, the more (you realise) you do 
not know’. If  self-discovery is indeed a part of autonomous thinking surely, even 
according to Meyers, it is never complete? The same applies to self-definition 
and self-direction: such processes are never finalised. As people go on with their 
autonomous lives, surely autonomy-completion based happiness is in itself an 
oxymoron?
A further problem could be seen to spring from Meyers’ characterisation o f the 
differential socialisation processes boys and girls undergo. As has been seen, 
Meyers seems to believe that female socialisation is itself non-conducive to 
autonomy competency. However, this view relies heavily on an evaluation of 
what is femininity and masculinity, and the associated traits developed through 
socialisation processes. As a lot o f feminist literature points out, the valuation of 
certain character traits as more or less valuable fails to recognise the intrinsic 
value, albeit perhaps differential, that female socialisation holds. Is this a return 
to male-focused forms o f autonomy?
Meyers’ interest in the “authentic se lf’ could be seen to be problematic. 
Although she does not stipulate what exactly the authenticity should consist of, 
she is clear that it requires that the agent exercise the competencies o f self- 
discovery, self-definition and self-direction in deciding what matters to her. The 
very language used is problematic in so far as it is reminiscent o f ideas about the 
split-level self. As Mackenzie and Stoljar question:
does the notion of autonomy competency implicitly rely on a more 
normative and substantive view of what is required for women to 
flourish or achieve full autonomy?362
361 See Nancy Chodrow, The Reproduction o f  M othering (Berkley: University o f  California Press 
1978); “Gender, Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective” in The Future o f  
Difference, eds. Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (N.J.; Rutgers University Press, 1985); 
Virginia Held, Feminist M orality  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1993).
362 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Introduction”, p. 19
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Though Meyers’ notion is content neutral in so far as the substance of the desires 
chosen is concerned, there is definitely a strong onus posed on the importance of 
self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction. In themselves, these capabilities 
are not neutral -  the system through which one deems an individual autonomous 
is not free from normative evaluations o f what it means to be one’s own person 
and pursue one’s own life. Meyers’ competencies seem to prioritise rational 
critical reflection over other factors that might also play a part in the evaluation 
o f choices. As was pointed out in Chapter II, critical reflection might well play a 
part in what it means to be autonomous, but it should not be thought to be the 
defining characteristic. Other factors, like emotion and attachment, might also 
have a role to play in agents’ evaluations o f their choices.
Meyers relies on the universability o f the criteria of self-definition, self- 
discovery and self-direction, assuming that any individual would abide by them. 
However, the notion that one chooses one’s own life might be not easily agreed 
to by religious people or indeed by anyone who believes there are other factors 
besides the self that influence decisions, such as a dedicated reader of astrology. 
Take, for instance, the narrowly programmatic idea o f choosing one’s own 
spouse. Orthodox Jews would deny that this is a choice at all -  it is Bashert. 
According to Jewish mythology, people are paired up (in couples who will 
complement each other) before they are bom, and even before they are 
conceived. It is God who chooses their spouse, which is essentially the same as 
their destiny.363 Thus the notion that people self-define and self-direct themselves 
according to their choices might be something that in itself already contains 
substantive content about what is to be privileged, which abilities or capacities 
are of more importance than others when defining if  one is indeed living the life 
one wants or not. As Kukathas has pointed out, the examined life might be 
worthwhile living, but neither is it as common as we might think nor is it 
necessarily a good one.364 Indeed, the very focus on examination is reminiscent 
of the difference between orthodoxy and orthopraxis in religion. Whereas
363 Bashert means destiny in Yiddish. References to this belief cannot be found in the Torah, but 
they can be traced, through the Talmud, to Rav Dovid Cohen, who says that 40 days before a 
male child is conceived, a voice from heaven announces whose daughter he will marry. (Sotah 
2a.) See Ronald Eisenberg, Jewish Traditions (Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society, 
2008), p. 46.
364 Chandran Kukathas, “Passing the Unexamined Life”, Quadrant M agazine (July 2001).
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orthodox religions prioritise belief, orthopraxis based faiths give precedence to 
action. According to Kukathas, living the examined life could take time away 
from action, thus possibly resulting in a failure to fulfil one’s religious duties -  
depending on what is prioritised in one’s world-view.
How does Meyers’ capability approach deal with the challenge of multiple 
identities? As we saw in Chapter III, Meyers deals with this explicitly. She seems 
to believe that having intersectional identities can be both productive and 
autonomy fostering at the same time as it can be harmful. According to her
In reconnecting people to all of their group-identity determinants, 
intersectional identity works as an antidote to shame, self-contempt, and 
self-limitation and therefore as a support for personal autonomy.365
Belonging to more than one group means that one will be forced to be more 
critical, bringing about the social analysis necessary to overthrow the unequal 
material and social structures that characterise modem societies. This might be 
true, but it somewhat resembles Friedman’s perception o f autonomy as a tool to 
overcome oppression; the idea that autonomy is a way of being critical about 
those things you are most immersed in. It is in this stronger claim the problem 
lies: intersectionality might indeed foster critical abilities but these abilities need 
not be determined to pursue certain normative goals.
Meyers also sees the strategy o f ambivalence as a useful one to hold -  
particularly in the case o f oppressed groups. Non-identification with oppressed 
groups when one is a member is harmful, in so far as it is an instance of 
“deny[ing] social reality and foreclose[ing] resistance”.366 Identification with the 
oppressed group is also suspect, however, since identifying as a victim can be 
harmful for autonomous development. Ambivalence becomes a way o f 
negotiating these identifications without internalising their more dangerous 
characteristics.
365 Meyers,“Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!”, p. 161.
366 Ibid., p. 170.
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Ambivalence emerges as a useful tool for political autonomy. However, it can 
also be harmful to agents, since it might mean that individuals need not react to 
certain things they care deeply about. Ambivalence means not acting. It can also 
mean that the agent is neither happy nor unhappy about her identification. It 
seems as if Meyers’ claims about the positive effects o f ambivalence are 
somewhat contradicted by her characterisation o f autonomy as requiring action 
and resulting in increased happiness.
Barvosa Carter has criticised Meyers’ analysis of the tensions that might exist 
when holding multiple identities. She claims, for instance, that
For African-American women, commitment to antiracist politics may 
entail tolerating sexism, and commitment to feminist politics may entail 
tolerating racism. As a result, intersectional identities often leave 
individuals tom by conflicting self-understandings and conflicting social 
and political loyalties.367
Meyers seems to be centring her analysis on ascriptive group characteristics, i.e. 
what others believe the group to be and act like. According to Barvosa Carter, 
Meyers does not differentiate sufficiently between internal and external group 
characteristics:
It is important to draw a distinction between perceptions of 
inconsistency that arise from the ascriptive elements of group identities 
and an agent’s active and demonstrable betrayal of her own 
endorsements.368
Conflicts might be true in terms of general characteristics but we must not forget 
that multiple identities focus on the reaction o f the individual to those things she 
cares about. Therefore, what might be a conflict in nominal terms might not be 
felt as one by the agent. There is nothing to say that a black feminist anti-racist 
politician cannot see the two allegiances to be parallel and even linked.
367 Ibid., pp. 157-8.
368 Barvosa Carter, “M estiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy”, p. 5.
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Even if there was to be a conflict, this might only appear when in the presence of 
distinct groups. Having an intersectional identity might mean that the individual 
privileges different aspects at different times: the woman might argue strongly 
for anti-racist policies when in the presence of conservative politicians, or might 
defend feminist policies in the presence o f chauvinist males. There is nothing in 
the idea o f multiple identities that means that an agent must act similarly at all 
times. Thus, the principle o f action can still be maintained in ambivalent or 
multiple identity scenarios. The principle o f happiness might be more difficult to 
justify -  perhaps the agent is happy acting in different ways at different times, or 
perhaps she might feel that it is not a true representation o f who she is and what 
she cares about. As mentioned above, the idea that happiness is intrinsic to 
autonomy seems rather gratuitous, and ultimately something that only the agent 
herself can decide.
Meyers’ account is sensitive to the challenges posed by socialisation and 
multiple identities. This is partly due to her ability to distinguish between 
different types o f autonomy that operate at different times and in different ways. 
Her claim that we ought to distinguish between different kinds o f decisions, that 
represent different levels o f importance and time-frames, seems intuitively 
plausible. However, Meyers seems to return to a certain conception of the split- 
level self in so far as she argues for the discovery of an “authentic se lf’. Despite 
the neutrality in the different options that might be espoused, it seems that the 
authentic self could be interpreted to be a rather substantive, particularistic 
understanding o f what autonomy is. This substantivity is particularly clear when 
considering the primacy of ideas o f self-realisation, self-knowledge and self- 
direction. These are what constitute a person’s autonomy competency, but in 
themselves are highly substantively laden in so far as they seem to prize critical 
evaluation over any other factor. The idea that intersectionality is something that 
can bring about progressive effects also demonstrates the thought that there must 
be a good out there, that there must be a way o f doing things that is better than 
the current one in existence. Does this mean that an idea o f autonomy perhaps 
needs, in order to effectively accommodate feminist intuitions, a stronger 
substantive content? Is the idea o f programmatic autonomy, with its focus on life 
plans, sufficient?
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4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have looked at two different relational theories o f autonomy. 
What issues do they bring to light? In the previous chapter I argued for the value 
o f respecting autonomy as a content neutral exemplifier of moral agency. It is 
necessary to respect agency because it signifies the ability of a woman to make a 
decision. It is her life and her choice. These choices need not be emancipatory 
though they could be considered signifiers o f the structural inequalities that 
permeate society. Friedman and Meyers do well in showing that some of these 
choices are indeed heavily socially conditioned: they are shaped by practices, 
laws and customs that are unequal towards women. It is here that Friedman and 
Meyers become most interesting. How is a relational theory o f autonomy, a 
socially sensitive take on what it means to have the skills necessary to be one’s 
own person, able to deal with these inequalities without necessarily bringing in a 
particularistic normative project?
The first key thing to emerge from their accounts is that autonomy can be a 
matter o f degree. Unlike the procedural theories seen earlier, Meyers and 
Friedman reject the overly rigid idea o f autonomy as something happening at a 
particular moment and following a particular structure. Their accounts are more 
flexible and thus more amenable to describing the realities, the material 
grounding where autonomy happens. They are also better able to accommodate 
the position of those who might find themselves within a variety o f identity- 
conferring frameworks, and might react differently to each o f these. As such, 
they are better suited to explain or characterise the position o f women within 
minorities.
Two different aspects emerge in relation to autonomy as a variable skill. On the 
one hand, autonomy can be a matter o f degree, in the sense that an individual 
might have developed more (or less) o f the capacities necessary to make an 
autonomous decision. A second way in which autonomy as a matter o f degree 
can emerge is particularly salient in Meyers’ account. She develops a conceptual 
distinction between the different timeframes of autonomy: episodic,
programmatic and narrowly programmatic decisions. Episodic autonomy is
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similar in its content to the forms o f agency we explored in chapter IV. It is short 
term, applies only to one moment and is defined by whether or not the individual 
has carefully considered the reasons for doing something. Programmatic 
autonomy is more long term. It is characterised by life plans, that which the 
individual wants to do, be, feel, try over the course o f her lifetime. In this sense, 
autonomy takes a deeper meaning. And finally, there is the narrow programmatic 
autonomy -  the idea that autonomy might apply differently in different areas. An 
agent might have programmatic autonomy in a particular aspect o f her life, such 
as political views, but be episodically autonomous in another, such as her 
education. It is the idea o f different areas o f  autonomy for which I am most 
indebted to Meyers.
These two points about autonomy as a matter o f degree are not mutually 
exclusive. There seems to be something intuitively true about the possibility of 
an individual being more autonomous in certain areas than others. Noting that we 
are not equally developed in all areas also seems to be true; most people would 
not argue against the idea that different individuals might be more or less 
developed in certain aspects. A person might be very intellectually mature, but 
that same person might not be very affectively mature. It seems natural that 
individuals might consider certain areas o f their lives more carefully than they 
think about others. They might have more available options, they might have 
been less affected by oppressive socialisation, or the social norms they have 
learnt regarding that particular aspect might be less rigid. For a variety of 
reasons, it is plausible to think that people consider various aspects of their life 
differently and, as such, might be more or less autonomous in these.
Relational theories do not dismiss the importance o f socialisation -  indeed they 
heavily rely on it. Socialisation is not taken to be an external influence that harms 
the individual’s “true se lf’. Rather it is conceived o f as a process through which 
all individuals develop a number o f important skills, amongst which are the 
capacities to be an autonomous person. Socialisation is ever present and a fact of 
human life; whether its effects are positive or negative is a different matter. 
Socialisation can help as well as harm.
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Both Meyers and Friedman claim to be able to provide a neutral conception of 
what it means to be free. They reject the total neutrality o f strict proceduralism in 
an attempt to investigate the effects o f oppressive socialisation. Both accounts 
require a certain degree o f substantivity if they are to make their claims. 
Friedman returns to the idea o f critical thinking, but also to the evaluation of 
options as morally acceptable and sufficient. The question remains: acceptable 
and sufficient to whom? There is certainly evaluation occurring in the account, 
and it seems that one cannot talk about both structural inequality in the form of 
differential socialisation and autonomy without having some notion o f what is 
good and what is not. What one considers to be a problem, what one considers to 
be unequal, and therefore harmful, also depends on normative evaluations. 
Meyers’ account also seems dependent on substantive claims. Allegedly 
procedural in its outset, her theory claims that there is an “authentic se lf’ that can 
be discovered through the exercise o f particular characteristics. If these are 
rightly exercised then autonomy can be deemed to be present. These capabilities 
could be considered to be universal but might easily not be. After all, the onus 
placed on self reflection and critical engagement with one’s own self seems to be 
the product o f a particular philosophical tradition.
Although both Meyers and Friedman explicitly address the relationship between 
autonomy and socialisation, it remains unclear whether their characterisation is 
enough. According to Benson, this is the problem with procedural theories: they 
are unable to see the extent to which oppressive socialisation affects all levels of 
an individual’s self-conception. In order to avoid this, he claims, a more 
substantive conception o f autonomy is necessary. Meyers maintains that 
“autonomy must dwell in the process o f deciding, not in the nature o f the action 
decided upon”.369 The substantive element is centred on the process o f decision­
making. But is even this enough? As Benson points out, and as was argued in 
Chapter II, oppressive socialisation will have deeper effects than merely 
affecting how individuals make decisions. Oppressive or harmful forms of 
socialisation will affect the agent’s self-conception, that is, her sense o f self. This 
is a deeper substantive concern than looking at how decisions are reached. But
369 Meyers, “Feminism and W omen’s Autonomy: The Challenge o f  Female Genital Cutting”, p. 
470.
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how can this necessary substantivity be part o f a conception of autonomy that is 
respectful o f cultural differences?
Meyers’ and Friedman’s theories seem to regard autonomy as inherently 
emancipatory. Friedman’s account, in particular, affirms this view. Meyers’ 
position is less clear: she thinks autonomy can lead to progressive consequences 
but does not seem to regard autonomy as the sole source of these.370 
Emancipation, or the fight against oppression, seems to be a pretty substantive 
aim. This is especially the case when we consider that Friedman and Meyers do 
not leave the content o f oppression open -  what counts as oppression and what 
emancipation should achieve is pre-determined according to a schema of 
evaluation that determines what the good life is. But is such a level o f specificity 
necessary when thinking about emancipatory politics?
As has been argued, the same processes of socialisation might affect individuals 
rather differently. This requires that emancipatory politics (and policies) that are 
not predefined in their outcomes. The particularities o f the local must be taken 
into account, and individuals’ attitudes and responses to these considered. This is 
what we must be wary o f when thinking o f autonomy as a necessarily 
emancipatory process. Indeed, autonomy might help with some kinds of 
oppressions but it cannot, by itself lead to particularised consequences.
But then how can autonomy be a normative, worthwhile project that does not 
lead to pre-determined social and material consequences? I have maintained in 
this chapter that relational approaches provide more sensitive and nuanced 
accounts o f how to lead an autonomous life. They are a significant improvement 
on mere proceduralism, but still do not manage to satisfy all intuitions about 
what it means to be free. The substantivity criteria in Meyers’ and Friedman’s 
positions remains too close to the rational actor tradition, prioritising rationality 
over other factors that might also be important when making decisions. Yet 
having a substantive underpinning in a conception o f autonomy seems a useful
370 According to Meyers, education is crucial in order to develop autonomy competency. It is 
through this that oppressive practices can be renegotiated. See ibid., p. 483, in particular footnote
6.
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way o f tackling some o f the problems posed by unequal socialisation. However, 
what kind o f substantivity is required? Can substantive versions o f autonomy 
provide a more intuitively plausible way o f understanding freedom without 
importing unacceptable normative prescriptions that fail to address cultural 
difference? To these questions we now turn.
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VI. Substantive Theories of Autonomy
Traditionally, substantive theories have linked autonomy with morality -  
autonomy depends on choosing the right things.371 This approach to autonomy 
has been strongly criticised by feminists for its failure to take into account the 
effects o f the social, and presuming the existence o f atomistic individuals whose 
inner self is prior to the material world they inhabit. This chapter focuses on 
theories that have emerged directly from feminist concerns about what autonomy 
means. For feminist substantive theorists, it is important to take into account the 
effects o f the social. As Susan Wolf, a strong substantivist says,
there is no ultrareal or superdeep self, independent of all external 
influences, arising from nothing; and even if there were, it is hard to see 
why a being with such a self would be any more responsible than a 
being without it.372
These substantivists do not focus on the idea of autonomy as something deeper 
than everyday existence. Their challenge is a different one: to show that 
proceduralism is not enough and explain what is missing from these accounts. 
According to them, abiding by content neutrality denies the possibility o f truly 
and deeply engaging with the effects o f oppressive or unequal forms of 
socialisation. Conceptions of autonomy, therefore, should always carry a 
substantive, normative echo. I have argued that relational theories, like those of 
Meyers and Friedman, are, despite their claim to respect content neutrality, 
dependent on rather substantive underpinnings. This substantivity focuses too 
much on the procedure o f decision-making and, as such, is not able to adequately 
capture how oppressive socialisation can harm agents’ own sense o f self.
371 Robert Young, “Autonomy and the Inner S e lf ’ in The Inner C itadel, ed. John Christman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
372 Susan Wolf, “Freedom Within Reason”, in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal 
Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary M oral Philosophy, ed. James Stacey Taylor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 269.
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So the question is, if agency and capability based forms o f autonomy are not able 
to portray folly what we mean by autonomy, what is missing? What else would 
be required in a foil conception o f autonomy to render the process and 
experience intelligible?
Substantive theorists can be split into two different categories. Strong substantive 
theories, such as those proposed by Paul Benson and Natalie Stoljar maintain a 
strong antipathy towards content neutrality. For them, the choices decided upon 
must correspond to certain values. Weak substantive theorists are no less strict in 
their rejection o f content neutrality. Instead o f positing what content preferences 
have, they maintain that the preferences must be chosen with further substantive 
conditions, such as self-trust.373
1. Strong Substantive Theories of Autonomy
Strong substantive theories o f autonomy emerge from concerns about procedural 
accounts. There are two separate and related ideas. Firstly, these theorists believe 
that a true account o f autonomy needs to make reference to something more than 
mere capabilities or the structures that choices must follow. Autonomy is 
something intuitive, something positive, and the ontological basis of 
proceduralism and capability approaches means they are unable to justify folly 
the value o f autonomy. For substantivists, autonomy is more than a characteristic 
o f particular actions; it is a value, a form o f good. Secondly, autonomy must be 
able to account for the intuition that some choices simply cannot be chosen 
autonomously, regardless o f individuals possessing the right capacities and 
having their preferences structured in the right order.
Perhaps the strongest claim comes from Natalie Stoljar, who holds that only 
strong substantive theories are able to make sense of the fem inist intuition. This 
is the idea that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms o f femininity cannot
373 The distinction between strong and weak substantive theories o f  autonomy was penned by 
Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Introduction”, p. 19.
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be autonomous”.374 For Stoljar, certain things cannot be chosen autonomously. 
The content o f preferences is crucial in order to establish whether choices are 
autonomous, because oppressive forms o f socialisation tend to privilege norms 
that are unequal towards women. The process o f internalising norms means that 
the agents who are submitted to them are unable to see, rationally, that these 
norms are false. “Women who accept the norm that pregnancy and motherhood 
increase their worthiness accept something false. And because o f the 
internalisation o f the norm, they do not have the capacity to perceive it as 
false.”375 According to Stoljar, inequalities in socialisation are indicators of 
oppression. The question inevitably arises: who decides what equality is? What 
equality are we talking about? And even if something (a choice) is normatively 
preferable, does this necessarily make it desirable for the agent?376
In criticism o f Stoljar, one might note that she reproduces binary classifications 
that have characterised much of the literature on multiculturalism. When talking 
about the incoherence in beliefs that might result from holding more than one 
identity framework, for example, she asserts a difference between oppressed and 
non oppressed individuals, characterising the latter as part o f the “outside” 
world.377 What does Stoljar mean by “outside world”? Is this another instance of 
minorities being characterised as backward and illiberal -  perhaps not even 
minorities, but all those groups and individuals she considers to be oppressed?
This concern is reinforced in the distinction she makes between “the pre liberated 
group, to whom the stereotypes o f female sexual agency are applicable, and the 
post liberated group o f active sexual agents in whom the difference between the 
sexes is not salient”.378 There seem to be strong echoes o f a traditional/modem 
dichotomy in this, o f the kind criticised by Leti Volpp. For Stoljar, those who 
live by unequal norms simply cannot be autonomous. What matters for autonomy 
is the very content o f the choices: their emancipatory characteristics. What is not
374 Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, p. 95.
375 Ibid., p. 109.
376 See Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985); Thomas 
E. Hill, “Servility and Self-Respect”, The M onist, Vol. 57, N o. 1, (1973); Marilyn Friedman, 
“Moral Integrity and the Deferential W ife”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 47, (1985).
377 Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, p. 104.
378 Ibid.
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clear is how particular choices take on their strong normative component. The 
fact that something is considered good, valuable and worth pursuing, must, to an 
extent, be a subjective judgement depending on the social conventions o f the 
time. Stoljar seems to attach no importance to the context within which a 
decision is taken: she assumes that all reasonable people who have not been 
subjected to oppressive norms will be able to see why certain emancipatory 
options are better than others. Is this really what emancipation is about? Is the 
content o f choices not socially laden? And if  this is the case, is it not true that the 
social is only slowly and rarely able to do away with long held prejudices?
For Stoljar, norms o f femininity are inherently oppressive because o f their 
unequal character, yet she seems to assume that there are people who are 
socialised into them and others who are not. But who decides who has been 
socialised into these norms? As Linda Duuits and Liesbet Van Zoonen point out, 
regulation in terms o f female dress is not a phenomenon exclusive to 
“minorities”.379 Women’s appearances are indeed regulated, sometimes because 
they show too much skin (the porno chic debate), and sometimes because they 
show too little (the hijab debate). Stoljar is too quick to point her finger at those 
she considers to be oppressed, without giving thought to whether the majority 
populations really live in this paragon o f freedom, autonomy and equality that 
she seems to champion, confident it exists.
Susan W olf provides a similar but more carefully argued account. Although 
primarily concerned with autonomy and responsibility, she also argues that the 
contents o f choices have a strong substantive grounding. W olf considers 
socialisation central to the analysis o f freedom, and her interest in autonomy and 
responsibility originates from questions about how to address “special cases”. 
For her
379 Linda Duits, and Lisbet van Zoonen, “Headscarves and Porno-Chic: Disciplining Girls’ 
Bodies in the European Multicultural Society”, European Journal o f  W om en’s Studies, Vol. 13, 
N o. 2, (2006). A similar point is made by Sheila Jeffreys, who argues that western beauty 
practices have not become more empowering or even gender neutral over time, but rather are 
increasingly serving to harm women, placing them in a subservient role. Sheila Jeffreys, Beauty 
and Misogyny: Harmful Cultural Practices in the W est (London: Routledge, 2005).
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it is undeniable that many of our actions are governed by our selves -  
that is, they result from our own decisions and choices. ...But neither do 
our choices or decisions or selves arise spontaneously out of nothing.
Though the factors that shape who we are and what we value, and 
consequently that shape how we respond to the circumstances that 
confront us, are rarely so easy to point to as they are in the examples of 
what I called ‘special circumstances’, it is plausible that such factors are 
always operative nonetheless, calling into doubt the assumption that 
even the strongest candidates for autonomous action really are as 
autonomous as they appear.380
The social affects special circumstances: oppressive or coercive socialisation 
being obvious examples. But, as W olf argues, the factors that shape us do not 
operate only in the most difficult cases. Social structures and norms are always 
part o f the picture, giving meaning to who we are and what we choose, and value 
to the things that matter most to us.
Wolf initially espoused what she called the “Sane Deep Self View”. In contrast 
to proceduralists, Wolf thought that autonomy required reference to something 
other than correct procedure or identification with a “Deep Self’. Autonomy 
required sanity, defined as “the ability to cognitively and normatively understand 
and appreciate the world for what it is”.381 In this understanding, sanity takes a 
normative meaning that goes beyond its specialised sense.382 W olf then moved 
on to call her position the “Reason View”. The key issues in W olfs newest 
account remain very similar to those proposed in the Sane Deep Self View, and it 
is only the term “sanity” that is dropped from nomenclature. This move away 
from the term sanity seems a logical one, given the strong implications of the 
term for medical and policy issues. In this chapter I will focus mostly on W olfs 
Reason View given that it is representative o f her latest position.
380 Wolf, “Freedom Within Reason”, p. 261.
381 Susan W olf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics o f  Responsibility”, in The Inner C itadel, ed. John 
Christman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 150.
382 For a full discussion o f  W o lf s view s on sanity as a necessary condition o f  autonomy see Iain 
Law, “Autonomy, Sanity and Moral Theory”, Res Publica, Vol. 9 (2003).
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According to the Reason View, what matters when making a decision is its 
“goodness factor”. It is choosing the ‘good’ things, for the right reasons, that 
makes us responsible agents.
What matters ...is that the agent’s embrace of these good values be an 
expression of her understanding that they are good, of her appreciation, 
that is, of the reasons that make these values preferable to others. It is by 
being rationally persuaded that these values are the good ones that the 
agent makes them her own in a way for which she is responsible.383
A few different issues are central to W olfs account. Firstly, the agent needs to be 
reasonable -  she needs to evaluate how her choices will fare with others. 
Choosing something good because one does not know any other way o f acting is 
not sufficient: one must be able to see why the choice is a good one. Secondly, 
how her options fare is a socialised process, dependent on public perceptions of 
value. Agents must be aware, rationally, o f the effects and values their beliefs 
carry:
our tendency to excuse those whom we think could not help but develop 
bad values or perverse ideals, then, is due to our seeing them as having 
been pushed blindly along a path that, through no fault of their own, 
they could not recognise as undesirable or wrong.384
For Wolf, it is crucial that we do not hold people responsible for determinants 
they have not chosen. She uses the example of Jojo, the son o f an evil and 
sadistic dictator. Jojo strives to imitate his father: he believes that torture and 
violence are the best way to guarantee his power over the citizens o f his 
(undeveloped) country. Jojo has not been shown that there are different ways of 
acting. His belief in cruelty has been developed over time, and his desire for 
sadism is truly representative o f what he thinks is the best way of ruling. It is a 
reasoned desire that coincides with what he thinks is True and Good. However, 
according to Wolf, “in light o f Jojo’s heritage and upbringing -  both o f which he 
was powerless to control -  it is dubious at best that he should be regarded as
383 Wolf, “Freedom Within Reason”, p. 269.
384 Ibid, p. 270.
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responsible for what he does”.385 Jojo’s socialisation is such that he is unable to 
see why his actions are wrong. This means that Jojo cannot be thought to be 
autonomous nor can he be considered responsible for the acts he might commit. 
This idea reinforces the crucial place o f the social in the constitution o f the self:
For we are dependent on the world, both on our biology and on our 
environment, for giving us both the abilities and the opportunities to 
transcend the status of lower animals and young children and become 
responsible agents.386
W olfs account also contains an insight mentioned in Meyers’ theory o f the 
capacities necessary for the exercise o f autonomy. Autonomy is not simply the 
ability to choose the right thing; it is also the possibility o f acting in a certain way 
due to having particular skills that lead us to a particularised consequence. What 
matters for her is
the ability to appreciate the reasons why those values are bad. This 
stress on the ability to appreciate reasons -  reasons why one set of 
values deserves affirmation, while another set ought to be reconsidered 
and revised -  is all important. It is the possession or lack of this ability, 
not the desirable or undesirable nature of the acts or the values 
themselves that, on my account, makes the difference between 
responsible and non responsible agency.387
Thus, what emerges as the most important thing in W olfs account is this ability, 
which is dependent on the world, on the social structures and relationships 
around us. What matters is being able to critically evaluate one’s options. 
However, this reasonable evaluation is dependent on something else. For Wolf,
the freedom needed for responsibility involves the freedom to see things 
aright -  the freedom, if you will, to appreciate the True and the Good.388
385 W olf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics o f  Responsibility”, p. 143.
386Ibid.
387 Wolf, “Freedom within Reason”, p. 272 [emphasis mine].
388 Ibid., p. 273.
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This ability, however, is not a privileged one. According to her:
no one can pronounce whether or to what extent we have this freedom.
There can be no guarantee that one does, or that one can, see things 
aright, that one has, as it were, mentally grasped the True and Good.389
Wolf tries to further define what is True and Good by appealing to empiricism. 
For her, what is True and Good is an almost empirical matter -  there are things, 
such as scientific discoveries, that are simply true.
on this view, the Good just constitutes part of the True, for, if there are 
evaluative facts, they are plainly a subset of all the facts.390
There are certain things which are right, others are not. But does this mean that 
W olf claims there is a universal way of evaluating autonomy? Are the True and 
Good universally applicable? Not necessarily:
This position embraces the existence of non-arbitrary standards of • 
correctness for value judgements, it need not assume that these 
standards determine a unique, universally applicable, complete, and 
optimal system of values and value judgements, nor need it assume the 
availability or even the intelligibility of a culture-independent point of 
view from which these standards are understood to have been 
generated.391
What matters is that the agent be able to assess her motivations according to 
reason; that she be able to consider how and why certain options might be 
preferable to others. Again, and similarly to Friedman and Meyers, autonomy 
emerges as something that is not absolute but rather is a matter of degree. 
According to Wolf, how much reasoning is necessary in order to deem someone 
autonomous is something that will vary within different contexts.392
390 Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 120-1.
391 Ibid., pp. 124-5.
392Ibid., pp. 143-5.
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It is difficult to assess exactly how much particularistic substantivity W olfs 
notion o f autonomy contains. On the one hand, there seems to be an assumption 
that certain things are True and Good. Indeed, the very capitalisation o f these 
words seems to imply this, as does her claim that empirical facts are parallel to 
moral standards. Rational evaluation is central to being an autonomous agent, 
and rationality, in W olfs reading, means being able to evaluate how options fare 
in their social contexts. Non-chosen determinants such as upbringing need not 
deny the possibility o f autonomy so long as they
do not prevent me from a sufficiently open-minded and clear-headed 
assessment of my values to allow me to see whether they fall into the 
range of the reasonable, and as long as my blindness to some other 
reasonable alternatives does not lead me to acts o f intolerance or 
prejudice, then it seems that, for most intents and purposes, I am free 
and responsible enough.393
Here it seems that W olf is saying that intolerance and prejudice cannot constitute 
the True and the Good -  a very strong substantive reading o f what autonomy 
entails.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the capitalisation o f True and Good is 
ironic, given that she does not think that these are universally accepted or 
understood. W olf is careful to note that judgements o f value depend on the 
interpretation o f existing social norms and, as such, will vary from place to place. 
What matters is how agents evaluate their options, and whether in so doing, they 
are able to distinguish good reasons for their choice. Agents must hold the values 
they ought to, and they must appreciate the norms that surround these values. 
Correct reasoning is the crucial substantive standard, not any particular meta- 
ethical position.
Paul Benson claims that despite the substantivity in W olfs account, her theory is 
unable to solve the tension between freedom and determinism. More 
interestingly for our own purposes, Benson also maintains that there is not
393 Ibid., p. 146 [em phasis mine].
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enough explanation in W olfs account o f why her theory is about freedom per se. 
Benson believes, in my view rightly, that there is a logical mistake inherent in 
her account in that it cannot explain the place o f value in making free decisions:
Apparently Wolf holds that freedom is sufficient for being either 
blameworthy or praiseworthy, and this is why not being praiseworthy or 
blameworthy demonstrates unfreedom. But why is this? The connection 
is usually thought to run in the other direction: desert of praise or blame 
is sufficient for freedom. What is conspicuously missing from Wolfs 
essay is any discussion of why specifically freedom involves the 
competent appreciation of value.394
It seems that, for Wolf, what matters is being able to control our actions, being 
able to appreciate why holding particular positions is important or why choosing 
one option over another is preferable. For her, the social matters greatly in 
constituting this control. Indeed it is through the social norms that surround us 
that we can appreciate the normative value o f options and thus their desirability. 
For Benson, this is not enough because it does not explain why this control 
matters in the first place. Why should we want to define ourselves in relation to 
others, in relation to the social? What matters in a conception o f freedom is the 
fact that we can explain ourselves to others: we want control so that we can hold 
our opinions vis & vis others. Merely doing the right thing because one has been 
socialised into doing so has no significance in terms o f a person’s freedom. Thus, 
in order to fully understand why control is important for autonomy, we must 
consider that
one’s action is fully free only to the extent that one has the ability to 
appreciate the normative standards governing one’s conduct and to 
make competent critical evaluations, in light of those norms, of open 
courses of action.395
Benson’s concern springs from the fact that some “o f the most widely shared 
intuitions about free agency concern the diminished freedom of certain socially
394 Paul Benson, “Freedom and Value”, Journal o f  Philosophy , Vol. 84, N o. 9, (1987), p. 474.
395 Ibid., p. 475.
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marginal people”.396 What is it about the situation o f those who are socially 
marginalised that makes us believe they have less freedom than others? What is 
it about their situation that makes them particularly vulnerable? And how should 
a theory o f autonomy deal with this fact?
According to Benson, oppressive socialisation works by altering the agent’s self­
conception and self-worth. Successful oppressive socialisation permeates all 
levels o f the self, rendering the agent unable to see how, for example, unequal 
gender norms are leading her to espouse beliefs and values that she might not 
otherwise hold. Her idea o f who she is and why she is o f value is skewed towards 
a socially acceptable norm that might not be true and, indeed, might be 
damaging. This idea is echoed in Susan Babbitt’s work, who claims that:
Individuals who are discriminated against in a society are sometimes not 
aware of discrimination, they may not be aware of the full extent to 
which discriminatory practices affect them. The effects of oppression 
might be such that people are psychologically damaged, possessing 
interests and desires that reflect their subservient social status.397
The idea of unequal social norms negatively affecting an individual’s self­
conception and self-value has been much discussed in social theory, especially in 
considerations about the effects o f racism and negative stereotyping.398 As 
Matthew Festenstein points out, “we may have only the most meagre and 
degrading stereotypes with which to describe your group, and this language may 
constitute the dominant discourse which you use to think about yourselves”.399 
The effect o f oppressive socialisation in harming the individual’s autonomy in 
certain aspects, namely those under which she has experienced oppression or
396 Benson “Feminist Second Thoughts about Free A gency”, p. 51.
397 Susan Babbitt, “Feminism and Objective Interests: The Role o f  Transformation Experiences in 
Rational Deliberation”, in Feminist Epistem ologies, ed. Linda A lcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New  
York: Routledge, 1993).
398 Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance o f  
African Americans”, Journal o f  Personality and Socia l Psychology. Vol. 69, N o. 5 (1995). See 
also Fraser, Justice Interruptus; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? 
A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso Books, 2003); Axel Honneth, The Struggle 
fo r  Recognition: The M oral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); 
Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); 
James Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Redistribution”, Constellations, Vol. 7, (2000).
399 Festenstein Negotiating D iversity, p. 56.
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unequal norms, does not mean the agent is unable to be autonomous in other 
aspects. It is merely that when it comes to those aspects o f her unequal 
socialisation she is not as autonomous as she could be.
a. Strong Substantive Theories. Socialisation and Multiple Identities
Strong substantive theories signify an important departure from strict procedural 
theories and, albeit under the relational umbrella, they are still substantively 
different accounts to those provided by Friedman and Meyers. They reflect the 
intuition that autonomy could plausibly be more than the correct ordering of 
preferences or following the appropriate procedure in order to arrive at a 
decision. Autonomy emerges, in the above accounts, as something deeper, 
something over which intuitions are held on what it means to be free, what it 
means to be one’s own person. Strong substantive theories o f autonomy, 
maintaining that autonomy must mean particular sorts o f lives, uphold a positive 
defence o f the term. Autonomy per se is something o f value, something that will 
ameliorate the lives o f those who live according to its premises.
There seems to be something intuitively right about the notion o f autonomy 
being more than mere procedure. But what remains to be seen is whether its 
value is based on the particular options that are decided upon its exercise. Need 
autonomy be particularised into discrete consequences in order to have 
substantive value?
A positive aspect that emerges from the strong substantive position is the 
inclusion o f the relational idea that autonomy is something that can be held to 
different degrees in different aspects o f one’s life. As we saw in Chapter V, this 
notion is something that fares well when considering the position o f women who 
might hold more than one identity framework. They might be very autonomous 
in some respects and less so in others: strong substantivists would say that this is 
because in some areas these women might have been subjected to unequal or 
oppressive norms that prevent them from correctly appreciating what they would 
truly need or want.
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The strength o f the strong substantive position is in the claim that autonomy is 
socially developed. The social emerges as something necessary in order to 
develop those capacities that allow agents to make autonomous decisions. 
Indeed, the focus on the importance o f embodied experience shows that although 
these theorists do claim that there are choices that are simply better than others, it 
is important that people be able to experience and choose these. In order for 
something to be considered a choice it must be imagined and understood as a 
choice. Abstract enunciations o f preferred normative standpoints are not 
sufficient: it is necessary that agents be able to understand and experience the 
options available. In this sense, the context and material reality within which 
choices are made is crucial and it must provide sufficient options o f the “right” 
sort.
We have now seen the ways in which strong substantivity has some intuitively 
true axioms. But what are the main problems with it? And are these 
surmountable through the adoption o f a weak substantive approach?
For Wolf, what matters is that people choose what is True and Good for the right 
reasons. These right reasons are not fully spelled out, as they will depend on the 
social norms o f the time and, as such, will change over time and location. What 
matters is valuing certain things: the actual choices (and their content) matter not. 
This account is somewhat reminiscent of procedural accounts in so far as it 
allows for a certain degree o f content neutrality. It differs from procedural 
accounts in that W olf prioritises that agents choose for the right reasons, that they 
be able to assess the norms o f a particular time and choose accordingly. It is not 
the procedure that matters, but the ability, as Wolf puts it, “to see the world as it 
really is”.
However, as Benson maintains, this does not show why autonomy is valuable in 
and o f itself. W olfs account seems unable to fully cope with the consequences of 
oppressive socialisation. As was seen in Chapter II, oppressive socialisation 
harms the deepest level of the self, making agents internalise norms that are 
harmful to them. An agent that acts for the right reasons is autonomous,
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according to Wolf. But what if this agent had internalised “right reasons” that 
were ultimately harmful to her? For instance, in Europe in the 17th century, a 
woman might have internalised that “right reason” was being considered a 
secondary class citizen, with no power to vote or change her options. Bearing in 
mind that this thinking was considered true in medical and philosophical terms at 
the time, it seems that this woman would be considered autonomous in W olfs 
account.
For other substantive theorists there are certain things that are not right, even if 
allegedly chosen freely. But how are these to be decided? Take the example of 
female genital cutting (FGC). Strong substantivists like Stoljar and Benson 
would maintain that FGC cannot be tolerated because it is a practice based on 
unequal gender norms that are particularly harmful for women. How to evaluate 
the egalitarian content o f a decision is left somewhat under-defined. Stoljar and 
Benson do not explain exactly what is meant by equality or the forms it might 
take. Where is the threshold on which to deem a practice acceptable or not? Due 
to the weight placed by (early) Benson and Stoljar on the importance o f current 
social norms in deciding on the normative value o f a practice, it seems that this 
threshold would be decided partly by the social conventions o f the time and the 
place.400 But this surely would mean that for some women FGC could plausibly 
be considered an acceptable choice to make. If undergoing surgery would enable 
the woman to have a higher social standing, securing her position within her 
kinship or nomos group, it could be said that albeit inegalitarian, FGC 
represented an acceptable normative choice.
This in turn seems suspect. Though allegedly taking socialisation seriously, it 
seems that the process o f social change is left rather under-theorised. This 
becomes particularly obvious when considering intersectional identities. As was 
seen in Chapter III, intersectionality reinforces the idea that the social is not static 
and homogenous. Practices are socially developed because there are individuals 
who choose them, who practice them. These practices change when they are 
challenged from the inside, by those who uphold them or those who are most
400 Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation”.
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touched by them. Strong substantivists seem to forgo the fact that ‘oppressive’ 
practices are the reflections o f deeper beliefs. These deeper beliefs need 
themselves be challenged since otherwise they will find another way o f coming 
to light. Unequal gender norms are indeed problematic for women. But saying 
that they cannot be autonomously chosen seems rather far-fetched. There is a 
need to understand how individuals see and live through these norms, what kind 
o f meanings they attach to them and how they affect the agent’s own sense of 
self.
Multiple identities show how a practice can be differentially upheld. It could be 
that for some attending the mikveh is indeed a sign o f inequality: an oppressive 
practice that aims to forcibly regulate women’s sexuality. But it is more than 
that. Ritual immersion can signify a wide variety of things. As MacLeod points 
out, a cultural practice “is a subtle and evocative symbol with multiple meanings 
that cultural participants articulate, read and manipulate”.401 As Polak-Sahm 
showed, attending the mikveh can happen for a variety o f reasons. For some, 
attending is a symbol o f commitment to a certain way o f practicing belief. For 
others the mikveh symbolises a different space, dissociated from religious belief. 
Attending the mikveh could be a way o f creating sexual tension between 
partners, or a way in which women get in touch with their femininity.402 For 
others, attending the mikveh could read as a way o f conforming to unequal 
gender norms. Nonetheless, individuals might still decide to attend, despite 
disagreeing with the basis of these unequal norms. Why is this?
As Barvosa Carter has shown, ambivalence is a strategy through which to 
negotiate conflicting demands. It allows agents to place themselves within a 
variety o f different and allegedly conflicting commitments. In “feel[ing] both 
attachment and detachment to their group and interpersonal commitments”, 
agents can create the space in which to act as they wish, without for that
401 MacLeod, “Hegem onic Relations and Gender Resistance: The N ew  Veiling as 
Accommodating Protest in Cairo”, pp. 538-9.
402 The reading o f  the mikveh as a place where women can enjoy their femininity is becoming 
increasingly popular, with a number o f  mikveh-spas opening in a number o f  cities. These modern 
mikvehs offer the traditional services as well as massage services, beauty treatments, reflexology, 
henna painting, yoga classes and meditation. Some are also used as centres for the celebration o f  
bridal (hen), bat mitzvah, birthday parties and more.
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renouncing their membership and position within the identity-conferring 
group.403 So, for example, someone who does not think the norms o f family 
purity are central to her own beliefs might still autonomously choose to attend 
the mikveh. She might do so differentially: she will attend on her bat mitzvah, or 
on the eve o f her wedding, but not after every menstrual cycle. She might attend 
but not abide by the laws that state that she is forbidden from touching her 
husband during the separation period. By attending at these key times, and 
remaining ambivalent about it (i.e. not deeming it the best option for her but still 
upholding it), she will not alienate those she cares about. More importantly, 
given that ritual immersion is a pre-requisite for an Orthodox marriage, attending 
whilst remaining ambivalent will enable her to marry under the rite she prefers. 
Attending the mikveh is not a practice the agent considers to be intrinsic to her 
sense o f self, but she nonetheless upholds it because not doing so might have a 
higher price than remaining ambivalent about it.
Stoljar and Benson’s substantive theories o f autonomy seem to have an intrinsic 
feminist agenda. But theirs is the kind o f feminism that places demands without 
considering the plurality of meanings a social practice can hold, and does not 
take the way the social operates seriously enough. Its demands are a priori, 
forgoing the fact that if feminism is to be a successful project, and if  indeed the 
aim is to overcome subordination, it has to be those that are most affected that 
change these mores from within. Strong substantivity potentially reflects a form 
of ethno-centric feminism, whereby some (the more enlightened) tell others (the 
less enlightened) what they ought to do in order to achieve the elusive goal of 
equality.
However, this still does not explain what kind o f normativity is required in a 
conception o f autonomy that is able to account for the effects o f oppressive 
socialisation. The effects o f unequal socialisation go beyond the idea that women 
might choose things that are harmful to them. Oppressive socialisation affects the 
self at its deepest level: the self-conception and self-valuation an agent has of 
herself. It seems that a conception of autonomy must be more abstract in its
403 Edwina Barvosa Carter, Wealth o f  Selves: Multiple Identities, M estizo Consciousness and the 
Subject o f  Politics (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p 155.
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normative stance, less particularistic about what cannot be tolerated. Such 
abstraction would enable theorists o f autonomy to work in a variety of contexts, 
where practices are differently interpreted and lived through. But what kind of 
normative basis is required in a conception of autonomy? And is it possible to 
have normative content without being prescriptive about the contents o f a 
choice? To these questions we now turn.
2. W eak Substantive Theories of Autonomy
Weak substantive theories spring from Paul Benson’s move away from strong 
substantivity. In his revised theory o f autonomy he claims that what is specific 
about autonomy is that free agents have “a certain sense o f their own worthiness 
to act, or o f their status as agents, which is not guaranteed by their abilities to act 
freely by reflectively authorising their wills and their actions”.404 What truly 
matters is that agents respect themselves qua agents, not that they choose the 
right options, or follow what is considered to be the correct procedure. As we 
will see, weak substantive theories emerge as more ontologically self-regarding 
than the strong substantive theories we have looked at.405
For Benson, procedural theories are not enough. They cannot explain the 
importance o f socialisation in crucial ways and the value o f autonomy remains an 
exclusively instrumental affair. Through his various examples he elucidates how
agents can become dissociated from whatever regions of the will ...that 
content-neutral theories privilege as the ground of agents; genuine 
involvement in their conduct.406
Procedural theories might well describe part of what it means to be autonomous 
but they cannot show the full picture because they do not show the ways in
404 Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 12, 
(1994), p. 650.
405 Although the literature has distinguished between self-worth, self-trust and self-respect, I 
shall, for the purposes o f  this thesis, be using them synonymously.
406 Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 657.
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which autonomy is autonomy (and not merely a capacity for it). Thus, what 
really matters, what is intrinsic to a complete account o f autonomy is a sense of 
worthiness to act.
Being able to regard oneself as worthy to make decisions matters because 
autonomy is central to explaining ourselves to others.407 Self-worth is important 
to autonomy because autonomy is about being oneself, about taking decisions 
that will reflect that self. If one does not believe the self to be o f any worth then 
those decisions will be o f no normative value.
So, for Benson, being a slave or being shamed are ways in which this ability is 
harmed. If the agent does not think herself capable o f making those decisions, or 
seeing herself as a valuable source o f reason and decision-making capabilities, 
her autonomy is impaired. In order to be autonomous one must regard oneself as 
being able, competently, to make autonomous decisions. And this, albeit a highly 
individualistic take on autonomy, still has a strong social component. This is 
because the
Sense of worthiness to act which is necessary for free agency involves 
regarding oneself as being competent to answer for one’s conduct in 
light of normative demands that, from one’s point of view, others might 
appropriately apply to one’s action.408
Benson explains potential lack of self-worth with reference to oppressive 
socialisation and gives the example of people who have been bom in hierarchical 
caste systems. The same, however, could be said o f any oppressive system, such 
as the antique Catholic belief that women, albeit potentially possessing a soul, 
were unable to distinguish between good and evil, making them spiritually 
analogous to animals.409 People thus oppressed
407 See Paul Benson, “Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character o f  Responsibility”, in 
R elational Autonom y, eds. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
408 Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 660 [emphasis mine].
409 It must be noted that this 4th century belief is not dogma. It became widespread amongst 
believers in the Catholic Church after the Nicaea Concilium, and was not challenged until the 
Concilium Tridentinum (Trent Council) in the 16th century, where it was said that som e women
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will be given much reason to feel that it is not their place to answer for 
their conduct. This attitude will be one element of the broader lack of 
moral self-respect, the failure to recognise their fundamentally equal 
moral as persons, which they are like to suffer. ...But self-doubt may 
also affect these individuals in a further way ...: it may engender the 
attitude that they are not worthy of being moral interlocutors, of 
answering for their own actions in response to their betters’ appraisals 
of them. This is an attitude about one’s position or status as a moral 
agent in relationship to others, not merely about one’s abilities as an 
individual to discern various reasons and modify one’s choices 
accordingly.410
Agents must consider themselves moral equals, and they must also feel that they 
can explain themselves to others. Despite the importance attached to social 
conditions, these substantive theories remain individualistic in one important 
aspect: it is not necessary for others to deem the agent worthy, what matters is 
whether the agent considers herself capable and worthy o f making these 
appraisals. These need not agree with the social norms that govern their life- 
worlds -  as Benson points out:
if they regard themselves as worthy of acting, then, as far as freedom is 
concerned, the level of their actual recognition or appreciating of the 
norms and practices that apply to them does not matter.411
Having self-worth is not a unified characteristic that need apply to all aspects of 
an agent’s self. As Trudy Govier points out, self-trust is a matter of degree, 
always dependent on the context in which it is being applied.412 Given the 
plurality o f identifications an agent might hold, and the fact that oppressive 
socialisation might result in an agent considering herself more able to decide in 
certain aspects than in others, it can be the case that “persons’ sense o f normative
were able to distinguish between good and evil: but by no means all [ref. Dr Paula Blanco, in 
private conversation].
410 Benson, “Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character o f  Responsibility”, p. 80.
411 Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 662.
412 Trudy Govier, “Self-trust, Autonomy and Self-Esteem”, H ypatia , Vol. 8, N o. 1 (1993), p. 106.
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competence can vary depending on the normative domains in relation to which 
they assess their competence”.413 How much self-worth an agent has will vary in 
different areas o f the self.
Benson’s account does not fully negate the content neutrality o f procedural or 
relational theories. His approach
remains neutral about the source and nature of reasons to act, thereby 
allowing action generated through mechanisms that are responsive to 
emotional considerations or considerations ground in physical need to 
count as responsible.414
There is no higher self as such; there is no immaterial self prior to society. But 
the self-worth condition is not neutral in an important way “since holding certain 
attitudes would preclude the necessary sense o f worth (psychologically, if  not 
logically).”415 If an agent thinks that only individuals who have certain abilities 
are able to answer for themselves, able to explain their preferences and actions to 
others, and she thinks she does not have these abilities, she cannot be considered 
autonomous. She will not think she is worthy to act and explain herself to those 
around her. This conception limits what kind o f attitudes autonomous individuals 
can have towards themselves.
The proposed normativity points at the existence o f a more substantive quality, a 
deeper feature to autonomy that does not hinge on the way decisions are made, or 
the exact ordering of the preferences an individual holds. What matters is the 
internal conception o f the self, its own evaluation o f its capacity as an equal 
moral being, as someone capable o f making decisions and explaining these to 
others.
What makes the conception normative is that, in this view, the value o f 
autonomy is no longer merely instrumental: autonomy is not just valuable 
because it allows people to pursue that which they care about. Autonomy also
413 Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 662.
414 Benson, “Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character o f  Responsibility”, p. 83.
415 Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 664.
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has an intrinsic normative value, and it has nothing to do with a perfectly 
harmonious self:
Sometimes we value freedom precisely because it does not allow 
us to attain systematic harmony in our wills.416
This matters because individuals hold a variety o f different, and at times 
conflicting, attachments. Agents value many things, and these change over time. 
A conception of autonomy needs to respect the idea that this itself matters: that 
individuals care about these attachments and do not need them to be ordered in 
either hierarchical or logically consistent ways. Autonomy is, to an extent, a 
process. Through this process individuals develop preferences and form their 
sense o f self. A conception o f autonomy must respect that these preferences will 
not necessarily ‘fit in’ logically with one another. This is why autonomy is 
ultimately something that is deeply individual: something that asserts the 
individuality and originality o f each agent.
The value of autonomy relates directly to who the person considers herself to be, 
a deeper sense o f self than merely doing what one wants to do. Robin Dillon 
agrees with Benson on this point. For an agent to have self-worth she must
understand herself as having worth and having it independently of any 
antecedent feelings, desires, or interests; and she values valuing herself 
appropriately -  indeed, this is among her highest values as self- 
respecting. Thus, her self-conception is normative: she regards her self- 
worth as the ground of norms that govern self-valuing.417
Unlike the strong substantivists, it is not the content o f the choices or desires that 
is normative. What is normative is the way an agent considers herself, her own 
self-conception, her self-worth. The desires, preferences and choices are
4,6 Ibid., p. 667.
417 Robin Dillon, “What’s a Woman Worth? What’s Life Worth? Without Self-Respect!”, in 
M oral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, ed. Peggy DesAutels, and Margaret 
Urban Walker (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. 50.
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secondary: they are reflections o f who she is but, in order for these to have value 
to the agent, she must be able to regard herself as a being deserving o f respect.
a. Weak Substantive Theories and Self-Worth
Are weak substantive theories merely a return to ideas about higher selves? Or 
can these approaches help in creating a picture o f what autonomy means? Self- 
worth seems to be a rather vague concept. And is it really useful? According to 
Dillon, it can be, but before this it must be reconceived in terms of its object, its 
attitudes and the conduct expected out o f respecting oneself. The idea of 
respecting the self has been criticised due to its abstraction when defining what 
the morally significant features o f persons are and its ideas about unfettered 
selves, prior and independent to the realities within which they exist.418 But the 
whole point o f self-respect is not to be generic; it is to respect the self, the 
person, the particular. As Dillon maintains,
it is difficult to understand how regarding oneself in generic terms could 
constitute self-respect, or how appreciation for a capacity or the moral 
law could constitute respect for myself.419
Indeed, as she continues,
To respect a person is to treat her not as a case of generic personhood 
but as the person she is. I believe a feminist conception of recognition 
self-respect would incorporate the idea of respect for individual ‘me- 
ness’. Most central to having self-respect would be paying attention to
418 See Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” and “Law, 
Boundaries and the Bounded S e lf ’,; John Christman, “Feminism and Autonomy” in Nagging  
Questions: Feminist Ethics an d  E veryday Life, ed. Dana Bushnell (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1995); Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction o f  
Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Annette Baier, Postures o f  the Mind: 
Essays on M ind and M orals (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1985); Marilyn 
Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique” in Feminists 
Rethink the Self, ed. Diana T. Meyers (Boulder: Colorado: Westview, 1997).
419 Robin Dillon, “Toward a Feminist Conception o f  Self-Respect”, Hypatia, Vol. 7, N o. 7 
(1992), p. 57.
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myself in the fullness of my specific detail, valuing myself in my 
concrete particularity.420
The particular person should not be abstracted when thinking about the process 
o f self-respect: it is these particularities which should be appreciated, respected 
and deemed worthy. One is o f value because one is, not by virtue of how much 
one approximates an ideal. The point is to appreciate the self as a woman, as a 
Sikh, as a mother. The particularities o f embodiment are crucial in order to have 
a form o f self-worth that is not abstract in its conception.
A particularly interesting feature o f self-respect is that it should be considered to 
be a process and one that is not pre-defined:
Respecting one-self is as much anticipation as review; it functions 
somewhat like a self-fulfilling prophecy: to respect something as x is to 
make it x or at least to contribute to its becoming x. And if we seek self- 
respect without understanding what we are after, then we risk losing 
more than our way.421
This greatly resonates with ideas about non-ethnocentric feminism. The idea of 
autonomy as a necessarily emancipatory project has emerged as rather 
problematic. Indeed, this remains part o f the problem with some strong 
substantive theories o f autonomy. Who are we to decide what constitutes 
equality, what is best for other individuals, what they should or should be not be 
allowed to do? The idea o f self-respect as a process, one that requires reviewing 
and constant thought about what is required at certain times, is a move away 
from these problems. The ideal o f self-respect goes beyond the procedural 
emphasis on wholehearted embrace o f preferences. It demands that agents have a 
particular self-conception, independent o f the choices being espoused. It is not 
the preferences, or their content, that matters, but rather the agent’s conception of 
her self and her ability to choose and act. The focus is not so much on rationality
420 Ibid., p. 60.
421 Ibid., p. 57.
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or logical evaluation of options. It has to do with an emotive feeling, an almost 
intuitive belief in the self.
The view the agent holds o f her self-worth need not be a static one. As Dillon 
points out, evaluations o f self-worth
call [on] us to recognise the extent to which we are open, always in 
transition, always under construction, and it demands both that we take 
seriously the task of self-construction and that we appreciate the 
inherently social nature of the constructive activity.422
The social is crucial for self-worth. It is through the social that we become 
ourselves and it is because o f it that we need to value ourselves as human beings, 
on an equal pairing to others:
it highlights the way in which our very ability to recognise and value 
ourselves as persons depends on being recognised by others: we become 
self-respecters only because we have been and continue to be respected 
by others.423
This reformulated version o f self-worth is not a priori: it does not call for pre­
conceived ideas about what individuals are or should be like. The point is to 
value ourselves because we are, not because o f those characteristics that might fit 
in or despite those that do not.
This is one o f the points that require clarification. What do we mean when we 
talk about self-respect, self-worth? Are there not different types? Following 
Steven Darwall, Dillon differentiates between two types o f self-worth.424 Firstly, 
there is something akin to dignity: the idea o f intrinsic self-worth, or what Dillon 
calls recognition self-respect. This kind involves “responding to oneself with the 
kind o f respect all persons are owed simply because they are persons” .425 Persons
422 Ibid., p. 60.
423 Ibid., p. 61.
424 Steven Darwall, “Two Kinds o f  Respect”, Ethics, Vol. 88 (1977).
425 Dillon, “Toward a Feminist Conception o f  Self-Respect”, p. 54.
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need to be treated qua persons deserving o f moral worth and status simply 
because they are persons.
The other kind o f respect, which Darwall calls self-appraisal respect, has to do 
with “the kind o f worth or merit we may earn through what we do and become, 
which individuals can have in varying degrees, and which some may lack 
altogether”.426 It seems that this kind o f self-worth is different to the esteem we 
hold ourselves and others in by virtue o f being persons. Recognition self-respect 
is more intrinsic to the person: it runs deeper and ought to be inalienable. 
Appraisal self-respect deals instead with a different kind o f esteem in which we 
might hold ourselves: thinking one has done well in being oneself, by reflecting 
the person through choices. It is an evaluative process. This is perhaps the kind 
o f self-respect that procedural theories o f autonomy talk about when saying that 
preferences must somehow correspond with one another, that we must prioritise 
in our choices those things that are most important to us.
But are these two types o f autonomy completely dissociated? As Govier points 
out, procedural theories might indeed have an underlying need for substantivism:
Procedural autonomy has as its necessary condition a reliance on one’s 
own critical reflection and judgement, and that reliance is possible only 
if one has, and can maintain against criticism, a sense of one’s own 
basic competence and worth.427
Underlying the capacity for autonomy is the need to regard the self in a certain 
light. Individuals need to hold a positive self-worth in terms o f recognition of 
their selves. They need to value themselves as individuals, as agents o f equal 
moral worth who are deserving of equal treatment in order for their agency to be 
o f any value. Agency is central to the person, but this agency must also be 
backed up by some degree o f self-worth if it is to be o f value to the agent, if her 
decisions are to be of significance for herself and for others. Agentic decisions 
might or might not be integrated in an a priori way. As literature on multiple
427 Govier, “Self-trust, Autonomy and Self-Esteem”, p. 103.
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identities shows, what matters is that these attachments make sense to the agent 
as a whole: this in turn requires that the person value herself, as a whole, because 
o f who she is.
This is not to say that agency alone is o f no importance. This is particularly true 
when one considers that
when the oppressed are exempted from responsibility on the grounds 
that their capacities of moral perceptiveness, judgement, or imagination 
have been compromised, they feel more vulnerable, powerless and 
insecure in their moral status.428
Respecting agency, even if  it is underlied by shaky self-worth, matters because 
the meaning and value o f an action or preference can only be established with 
relation to the particularities in which it exists. Denying the value o f this instance 
o f decision-making can be gravely problematic for women -  it means denying, to 
an extent, women as moral agents and decision makers.429
Something must be said at this stage about the idea o f autonomy necessarily 
being an emancipatory process. As has been seen over previous chapters, one 
cannot deny some autonomy being present in making a decision, regardless of 
the normative particularities that it might entail. Practices are varied and cannot 
simply be termed harmful or good in an a priori way. Autonomy emerges as a 
process but one that need not have emancipatory consequences.
But is this the full story? The above might very well be true for that part of 
autonomy we call agency -  the procedural aspect o f autonomous decision­
making. However, autonomy understood in its weak substantive 
conceptualisation might indeed have something emancipatory after all. Self­
value, self-worth and self-respect could all be considered to be ways o f battling 
oppression, especially that associated to unequal social schemas that result in
428 Paul Benson, “Blame, Oppression and Diminished Moral Competence”, in M oral Psychology: 
Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, ed. Peggy DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).
429 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, p. 199.
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some people being considered to be o f less worth than others. As Govier points 
out,
having self-respect, a person can stand up when demeaned and insulted, 
holding the conviction that these reactions are not deserved. Allowing 
oneself to be exploited, manipulated, or used over a long period of time 
is seriously undermining to one’s self-respect; if one becomes solely a 
tool enabling others to achieve their ends, one’s sense that one’s own 
ends, goals, and interests have worth is unlikely to survive.430
Considered in this light, autonomy does have something emancipatory but in a 
rather more neutral conception than previous theories have maintained. 
Autonomy as emancipatory in this instance need not equate to necessarily 
choosing certain things over others. It is rather a way o f battling a certain type of 
oppression: that which affects individuals’ sense o f self.
For instance, let’s return to our earlier example. Weak substantive theories of 
autonomy might provide a better rationale for understanding the intuition many 
hold against the practice o f FGC. Underlying the idea o f FGC are notions about 
women’s sexuality. Women’s sexuality is something that ought to be regulated: 
either by the complete cutting o f the clitoris and labia (infibulation) or by 
amputating only the labia.431 Through FGC it is believed that a woman’s sexual 
desire is curtailed; her husband’s sexual pleasure is what takes precedence in 
their union. Another reason for FGC is to symbolise the status o f the woman 
within her group. In certain communities the practice is carried out in order to 
‘show’ that the woman is now worthy o f respect: she has had children, is now a 
mother, and thus has adequately fulfilled her duties.
Weak substantivists could maintain that what is wrong about these justifications 
is that they directly affect the woman’s perception o f herself. They deny the 
person her full humanity as someone worthy o f respect -  her being, her status, is
430 Govier, “Self-trust, Autonomy and Self-Esteem”, p. 110.
431 There are also less invasive forms o f  FGC whereby neither the labia nor the clitoris are 
surgically removed. These are often symbolic ceremonies that mark the passing o f  a girl into 
adulthood, or a woman into a status position after childbirth.
205
dependent on regulatory ideals that insist in the narrowing o f the scope of 
personhood that women enjoy. Through infibulation women are denied part o f 
what is theirs: their sexuality. Thus, FGC practices can create a diminished sense 
o f self that can gravely affect their self-conception. A woman who has undergone 
FGC might indeed possess agency, might even be substantively autonomous in 
certain aspects, but it can also be that her self-worth, as a woman, is deeply 
harmed by the beliefs that sustain practices like FGC.
We have seen that strong substantivism is perhaps not the best theoretical bloc to 
follow. Strong substantivism has ethno-centric resonances and is unable to take 
the social seriously enough. However, weak substantivism seems to contain 
interesting axioms that allow for non-ethnocentric feminism, without diminishing 
the importance o f the social and taking the intersectionality o f identity seriously. 
But what does this mean in terms o f autonomy? Can agency and weak 
substantivity really coexist within the same definition o f autonomy? And what 
would the consequences o f such an approach be for the study o f minorities 
within minorities?
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VII. Conclusions: the Tripartite Understanding of
Autonomy
1. The Argument So Far
In this thesis I have argued for a new conception o f autonomy that is able to 
respect the concerns o f both feminism and multiculturalism. The conception o f 
autonomy we require must be able to integrate the realities o f intersectional 
identities and the phenomenon o f socialisation. In this chapter I will explain in 
more detail how this conception, from here on referred to as the tripartite 
understanding o f autonomy, operates. The tripartite understanding has important 
consequences for some o f the questions raised throughout the previous chapters, 
including issues about the normativity and value o f autonomy, its emancipatory 
potential and feminist politics.
Following Rawls, the tripartite understanding o f autonomy is a conception, rather 
than a concept. According to Rawls, it is necessary to distinguish
the concept ...as meaning a proper balance between competing claims, 
from a conception ...as a set of related principles for identifying the 
relevant considerations which determine this balance.432
Thus understood, a concept o f autonomy would relate to the detailed 
particularities that constitute autonomy, that is, the rather more substantive 
understanding of what it means and in which conditions we can judge a person to 
be an autonomous human being. A conception of autonomy would point to the 
necessary conditions required to have a concept of autonomy: those issues that 
ought to be considered when deeming who is or is not autonomous. Thus, the 
aim o f the tripartite understanding of autonomy is not to provide an exhaustive 
study o f when we can deem someone autonomous. The aim is to provide an
432 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9.
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account o f what kind o f considerations we ought to bear in mind when 
considering whether someone is autonomous or not. It could be said that the 
differentiation between a concept and a conception o f autonomy raises important 
questions about normativity. I argue that a conception o f autonomy is still a 
normative claim, and outline the ways in which this is the case in the third 
section o f the chapter.
The term “tripartite” comes from the differential understanding o f the self 
detailed in previous chapters. The self is not understood as a unified homogenous 
entity, but is instead understood as being composed o f different parts: T ,  ‘me’ 
and finally ‘m yself, encompassing the previous two areas. The point is that the 
complex interrelationship between ‘I’, ‘me’ and ‘m yself can have important and 
fruitful insights for what autonomy means. These constituent parts o f the self 
require a differential exercise o f autonomy, as well as being characterised by 
different kinds o f autonomy. By combining the different levels o f autonomy with 
the different parts o f the self the tripartite understanding provides for a 
conception of a differentiated self that is not an a priori construct but is instead 
dependent on the social world and norms that surround individuals.
In this chapter I clarify how the tripartite understanding differs yet is 
simultaneously similar to the various conceptions o f autonomy prominent within 
feminist literature. I end with a discussion of whether this kind o f understanding 
need lead us to relativistic conclusions. Is it possible to respect choice and 
plurality whilst at the same time taking seriously the challenges posed by gender 
inequalities?
2. The Tripartite Understanding of Autonomy as a Synthesised 
Approach
Throughout this thesis I have maintained that recognising the importance o f 
socialisation need not mean denying the existence o f autonomy. Social 
construction and freedom ought not to be considered contradictory, but rather
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seen as part o f the same process. Indeed, autonomy can only be achieved and 
only makes sense when seen through the lens o f the social.
a. Insights from Procedural Theories
Procedural accounts o f autonomy maintain that the content of a decision is o f no 
importance when evaluating whether an agent is free. Hierarchical accounts, such 
as the one proposed by Harry Frankfurt, maintain that what matters is whether 
desires are correctly ordered: that we be able to tell what really matters to us. 
Historical accounts, o f the kind proposed by Gerald Dworkin and John 
Christman, are also “time slice” approaches in the sense o f focusing on the 
particular instance o f decision-making, but they include the question of how an 
agent comes to have particular preferences. They aim to redress the inability of 
hierarchical accounts to consider the potential problems caused by oppressive 
socialisation. What matters for a historical account is that the agent be aware o f 
how she came to have a preference, the reasons why she espouses a certain 
choice over others. If, knowing how she came to form this preference, she would 
still espouse it at that particular time, the choice is deemed autonomous.
Though unable to reflect all that we mean when we claim someone is 
autonomous, procedural accounts can still be considered useful for a variety o f 
reasons. Firstly, they are able to respect the first person perspective, that is, they 
respect the intuition that autonomy is something individual, something that will 
be practiced by different people in different ways. Christman’s version of 
historico-procedural autonomy is dependent on exercising what he calls 
“externalist rationality”, that the person herself, not those around her, agrees with 
the reasons through which she came to have a particular preference. This honours 
the idea o f autonomy being a way of being, or even becoming, one’s own person.
Secondly, and linked to this, is the notion that personal choices ought to be 
respected. This is important given that we must respect individuals as moral 
agents and decision makers. By not having any a priori normative content, 
proceduralism is able to encompass, and indeed respect, the plurality that
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characterises lives. Many choices are available and, although we might not agree 
with all o f them, we must not forget that normatively objectionable choices are 
choices nonetheless. This is o f particular importance when dealing with 
multiculturalism, where what constitutes a choice is not obvious. It may be even 
more so when dealing with gendered practices for, as Mahmood points out, an 
embodied practice is not always easy to interpret. Its meanings and significance 
will be context dependent, and we cannot judge practices without understanding 
the way choices are lived, how they relate to the norms by which agents organise 
their lives and the meanings they attach to the choices.
In order to explore the kinds of injury specific to women located in 
particular historical and cultural situations, it is not enough to simply 
point, for example, that a tradition of female piety or modesty serves to 
give legitimacy to women’s subordination. Rather, it is only by 
exploring these traditions in relation to the practical engagements and 
forms of life in which they are embedded that we can come to 
understand the significance of that subordination to women who 
embody it.433
This is resonant o f procedural autonomy in so far as proceduralism supports 
internalist rationality, where it is the agent herself who recognises what a choice 
is and what it is not. This allows women themselves to interpret the practices 
they are engaged in.
The tripartite understanding o f autonomy respects and tries to include these 
insights from procedural theories. However, it takes issue with proceduralism in 
two important ways. First, it is less rationalistic. Unlike in Frankfurt’s account, 
there are no choices that are considered to be more important than others: choices 
are not hierarchically ordered so that certain ones have more bearing on the 
conception o f the self upheld. A choice will be considered a choice as long as the 
agent herself considers it to be. How agents decide what choices are is not 
overtly rationalistic either: no premium is placed on the rationality o f agents.
433 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the D ocile Agent: Some Reflections on the 
Egyptian Islamic Revival”, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2001), p. 225.
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Agents might deem a choice worthwhile due to its inter-subjective relevance, 
because it matters to their relationships with others. There is no clear structure 
that needs to be followed, what matters is that the agents are aware o f what their 
options are and how they feel about them.
The other crucial difference is an emphasis on the need to consider the effects o f 
oppressive or unequal socialisation. As has been argued, procedural theorists can 
consider any choice to be reasonable regardless o f its content. Even historico- 
proceduralists do not pay enough attention to the way oppressive socialisation 
works, given their reliance on the agent’s ability to realise the condition of 
oppression herself. By contrast, the tripartite understanding respects content 
neutrality but refuses to see all instances o f choice-making as equally 
worthwhile. For an agent to be considered autonomous she must have a certain 
conception o f self-worth that informs her decision-making. This respects the 
insight provided by Benson on the ways oppressive socialisation can affect an 
agent’s own conception o f her self, and is more helpful when dealing with cases 
where “the distinction between the subject’s own desires and socially prescribed 
performances cannot be easily presumed”.434
b. Insights from Substantive Theories
Substantive theories o f autonomy have been seen as an alternative to procedural 
accounts. The tripartite understanding o f autonomy shares the concern o f 
theorists such as Wolf, Stoljar and Benson, who point out that in order to be able 
to take into account the effects o f oppressive and unequal forms o f socialisation a 
theory o f autonomy must contain a substantive element. However, the tripartite 
understanding o f autonomy differs from the strong substantive positions 
espoused by Stoljar and (early) Benson. These theorists maintain that autonomy 
can only refer to those choices which are considered to be “good”. In Stoljar’s 
case this depends on whether the option is considered to be gender equal, while 
for Benson it depends on the agent being aware of the appropriate normative
434 Mahmood, The Subject o f  Freedom, p. 31.
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standard that ought to govern the action. This understanding o f substantivism has 
been argued to be inadequate since what we define as gender equal or the 
appropriate normative standard, seems overly dependent on the social norms that 
operate at any given time. As J.S. Mill pointed out in On Liberty, even scientific 
discoveries can be proven to be only part o f the truth. The idea o f infallibility is a 
dangerous one that can have pernicious consequences in the future.435
W olfs position cannot be accused o f infallibility. Indeed, she is careful to point 
out that beliefs and values change over time. However, her prioritisation o f the 
rational ability to evaluate the normative value o f different choices seems unable 
to explain why that ability is the defining one o f autonomy. It is also unable to 
account for cases o f deep oppressive socialisation.
This thesis argues that Benson’s later position is better able to illuminate what 
kind o f normativity might be necessary in a theory o f autonomy -  normativity 
where content is left under-defined, making it more abstract but nonetheless 
more able to accommodate the plurality that characterises social lives. According 
to Benson, in order to be autonomous the agent must have some notion o f her 
worthiness to act, i.e. she must be aware o f how she herself has value, by virtue 
of being an equal person. This kind o f substantivity is normative in so far as 
autonomy is not merely an instrumental capacity or way o f acting: autonomy has 
value in and o f itself. Autonomy thus conceived is central to the agent, without 
requiring a perfectly harmonious self. Agents might be more or less autonomous 
in different areas and how much autonomy they have can change over time. As 
such, this kind o f substantivity is able to rule out certain decisions that are not 
autonomous, in decisions that the agent does not believe herself to be worthy of 
making, without necessarily restricting too heavily the kinds o f choices an 
autonomous agent might make. My understanding of autonomy includes this 
insight in an attempt to adequately conceptualise autonomy in a way that is 
sensitive to the effects o f oppressive socialisation, whilst remaining agnostic 
about the possibilities of embodied action. Choices are not ruled out a priori -  as 
has been seen through the analysis o f proceduralism, the reality o f embodied
435 John S. Mill, On Liberty a n d  Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 21.
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experience requires that we consider every case as a distinct one. This 
understanding does not rule out certain choices but rather places a pre-requisite 
on these: that they be formed under conditions where the agent feels herself to be 
an equal and worthy human being.
c. Insights From and Beyond Relational Theories
As has been seen, relational theories have emerged as a different way of 
conceptualising autonomy. Relational theories focus on the importance of 
embodied experience as a crucial aspect in the development o f autonomy and can 
be either procedural or substantive. I argue, however, that Friedman’s revised 
procedural model is less useful than Meyers’ autonomy competency, given that 
the former’s reliance on proceduralism included some strong normative provisos 
that did not merge well with her content neutrality. For Meyers, autonomy is not 
simply the making o f a decision or the espousal o f a preference. In order to be 
able to be autonomous agents need to develop certain skills, or competencies, 
such as self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction. These skills are 
developed through social interaction and engagement. According to relational 
theories, the social is crucial in order to make us fully able human beings.
However, these competencies are themselves not neutral. Agents need to have 
been able to acquire them through conducive social environments. As such, it 
emerges that although autonomy competencies might well be a necessary 
element in autonomy, they are not as neutral as it might have been thought. There 
is a certain substantivity that operates in the very study o f the skills necessary for 
autonomy. This is where the tripartite understanding o f autonomy goes further 
than the relational theories previously discussed. The tripartite understanding 
defended here takes the combination o f proceduralism and substantivity to be a 
necessary characteristic o f a relational theory o f autonomy. As Sumi Madhok 
notes, “both procedural and substantive accounts have merit and a synthetic 
solution combining elements o f both these accounts contributes to thinking on
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autonomy in oppressive contexts”.436 The tripartite understanding is a first step 
towards seeing how autonomy can be conceptualised in a way that respects 
choice without underplaying the importance o f the social. It is necessary to be 
sensitive about inequality, as seen through the lens of oppressive or unequal 
socialisation, whilst at the same time being wary in our theoretical enterprise 
about essentialising identities. The tripartite understanding incorporates and 
redefines some o f the insights o f both proceduralism and substantivism so as to 
provide an account o f what embodied autonomy might look like.
3. The Tripartite Understanding of Autonomy
a. What Is It?
The name ‘tripartite’ springs from seeing the self not as a monolithic 
undifferentiated entity but one that holds a variety o f different identifications. 
Crucial to the tripartite understanding is that identifications might be reflected 
and considered to different extents: not all identity characteristics are considered 
in the same level o f detail. These different levels o f reflection on identifications 
are symbolised in the different areas o f the self: the ‘me’, the ‘I’, and the 
‘m yself.
The term ‘m e’ indicates the self as the generalised other, that is, the 
identifications all agents hold regardless o f how much thought they have put into 
them.437 Considering oneself to be English or Scottish need not mean that one 
has devoted much time to thinking about what it means to be English, or whether 
one agrees with all the associated traits o f that identity. The ‘me’ is a way of 
participating in a collective identity and one that matters to individuals by 
allowing them to partake and make sense o f the world around them. It is through
436 Sumi Madhok, “Autonomy, Gendered Subordination and Transcultural D ialogue”, Journal o f  
G lobal Ethics, Vol. 3, N o. 3 (2007), p. 349.
437 In speaking o f  “generalised other” I am following W allace’s definition rather than Benhabib’s. 
That said, the conception o f  autonomy being proposed here would fall under what she would 
term the “concrete” other, given that the ‘m e’ must always be considered in relation to the ‘I’ and 
‘M y se lf.
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the ‘me’ that individuals participate in social life in the first instance. There is no 
need for this to happen on a deep level but, nonetheless, these identifications are 
of great importance in the constitution o f the self.
The T ,  on the other hand, is the response o f an individual to her ‘me’, so her 
particular views on how her identities operate and which characteristics she 
agrees with, disagrees with or even feels ambivalent about. The T  is thus the 
most singular and unique way o f being, representing the deep level o f 
consciousness required to think about and evaluate one’s preferences. Not all 
‘me’s’ have associated T’s’, indeed, it seems too demanding, as well as rather 
unrealistic, to expect all identifications to be considered in such level of detail.
‘M yself can be considered to represent the totality o f our identifications, that is, 
all those things that we consider ourselves to be, regardless o f the amount of 
critical reflection that some o f these identities might have necessitated. ‘M yself 
includes both the ‘I* and the ‘me’: together these come to be the particular 
individual that is unique and different from other human beings.
It follows that we exercise autonomy differently in different areas o f the self. We 
might pay a lot o f attention to exactly how we agree and disagree with being 
considered a feminist (the ‘I’ in relation to the ‘me’) as well as considering what 
we define feminism to be (the ‘I’ creating its own standards and its singularly 
unique way o f being). We might not pay as much attention, however, to how we 
feel about, and how we agree and disagree with, being identified as British. We 
might be more autonomous in certain aspects o f the self -  we do not always 
exercise autonomy to the same degree. However, this kind o f differential use, 
and the kind o f  capacities required might also mean that autonomy cannot be 
considered in a singular way. There might be different kinds o f autonomy, all of 
which are necessary but yet are distinct and singular. The aim now is to see how 
these different conceptions o f autonomy might function together, and whether by 
thinking o f autonomy in such a way we might arrive at a more productive and 
realistic account o f what it means to be oneself.
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b. How Does It Work?
There are four considerations relevant to how the tripartite understanding of 
autonomy works. These four areas must all be considered when evaluating what 
autonomy means and how it functions. They operate simultaneously and help to 
understand what autonomy is and the different ways in which it operates. Figure 
3 provides a visual schema o f this.
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Figure 3 -  The Tripartite U nderstanding o f  A utonom y
In the first case, we need to be clear about the different areas o f the self that 
autonomy pertains to. There is ‘me’, that albeit crucial requires a lower level o f 
reflection, and T ,  which demands a higher level of reflection. These are shown 
in red in the diagram. Together these come to form ‘m yself, the individual as a 
unique and singularly different person, characterised by a deep shade o f red. The 
distinction between the ‘me’, ‘m yself and T  reminds us that individuals do not 
consider or reflect in the same detail about all their identifications. Indeed, it 
seems unjustifiably demanding to expect that we devote very high levels o f
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consideration to absolutely all our identifications. The way decisions are made 
varies from area to area.438
A further consideration is the timeframe. As has been seen, theorists o f autonomy 
occasionally talk at cross purposes. Some focus on the status o f the agent at a 
particular moment, while others consider autonomy as something that takes place 
over long periods o f time. How long an identification has been held is a pertinent 
consideration since it will affect how much reflection is required o f the agent. 
Meyers’ distinction between episodic, narrow and broadly programmatic kinds of 
autonomy is o f  particular use here. Each category has a particular timeframe that 
affects the kind o f autonomy that would be required in order to make a decision.
Episodic autonomy is the one with the shortest timeframe. It is symbolised by a 
light green colour in the diagram. The kind o f reflection it requires need not be 
high, but the fact that the agent chooses to identify with or espouse an option can 
still be considered a way o f exercising agency. This kind o f autonomy, exercised 
in particular moments, especially resonates with the kind o f autonomy that 
procedural theorists subscribe to. The agent must be aware o f how she came to 
form her preferences defined in terms o f a particular collective identity, or her 
‘me’. For example, she will need to know that she considers herself English 
because she was bom or grew up in England. She feels English because 
throughout her life she has experienced a variety of reasons for which she feels 
that she identifies with that characteristic. Episodic autonomy might be 
something repeated through time (such as feeling English throughout one’s life), 
but the basic point is that it does not require the level of reflection that the ‘I’ 
does.
438 It must also be noted that the conception an individual has o f  the different areas o f  her self, 
that is her ‘m e’, ‘m y se lf and ‘I’, are themselves language dependent. How w e think o f  different 
areas could be different in different languages. This might be particularly true o f  those who are 
either bi or multilingual and thus are used to operating within various linguistic frameworks. As 
Charlemagne noted, “to have another language is to possess a second soul ...I know when I speak 
Spanish I slip into another mode, almost into another personality. I don’t understand the 
mechanics o f  it, but I know it to be true.” Indeed, the conception o f ‘m y se lf might be different in 
different languages.
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Another timeframe is indicated by the mid-green colour -  narrowly 
programmatic autonomy. For Meyers, this kind o f autonomy is exercised in one 
particular area of one’s life, such as choice o f career. As can be seen from the 
diagram, a narrowly programmatic choice can be part o f either the ‘me’ or, if the 
decision has certain substantive properties, such as self-worth, part o f the ‘I’. For 
instance, an individual might decide to pursue her A-levels and then go on to 
university in order to ensure that she is able to attain her ultimate goal, such as 
being a doctor. This kind of autonomy might be true o f that particular area 
(desire for further education, desire for a particular career), but it might not be 
true o f other areas o f her life, such as her religion, her political beliefs and so 
forth.
In this case, a narrowly programmatic ‘m e’ decision will be characterised by the 
exercise o f either one or two out o f the three possible different kinds of 
autonomy (agency, capabilities or self-worth). In terms o f procedural decision­
making agency will always be present, e.g. the agent wants to be a doctor 
because she believes it is important to relieve human suffering and this is 
important to her because she witnessed the painful death o f her grandmother. 
Combined with agency she might also exercise the capabilities o f self-discovery, 
self-definition and/or self-direction. In order to make the decision to be a doctor, 
to be religious, or to espouse a certain political programme, it is also useful to 
have certain capacities.
This is where Meyers’ relational approach matters as well -  the qualities o f self- 
discovery, self-definition and self-direction will help the agent in making her 
decision. When deciding matters about her professional career, an agent must 
have a certain degree of self-discovery. She needs to be able to judge what it is 
she is interested in, discovering what in particular she enjoys doing or would 
enjoy doing in the future. Similarly, she must also have a certain level o f self­
definition. She might not know straight away what kind o f doctor she wants to be 
but needs to allow herself to discover, and judge, what it is she wants to 
specialise in. The agent would also require a degree o f self-direction, in so far as 
she will need to study, and pursue certain options if she truly wants to be a
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practising doctor. Together these qualities will ensure that the agent is able to 
consider and potentially follow her decisions in that area o f her life.
As can be seen from the diagram, a narrowly programmatic decision can also 
form part o f the agent’s T .  In this sense, the narrowly programmatic T  
decisions are more substantive, requiring a deeper level o f consideration than 
those that pertain to the ‘m e’. If  the agent, aside from agency and capacities, also 
has a strong sense o f self-worth, for instance she thinks she wants to be a doctor 
because she can, she is capable and she considers herself to have the right 
qualities, it will make the narrowly programmatic decision one that pertains to 
her ‘I’. Her decision to be a doctor is one that informs her conception o f who she 
is, and what matters to her in a deep way, touching on the most substantive kind 
o f autonomy that might be exercised.
The final kind o f timeframe to be considered is that o f broadly programmatic 
decisions, shown by a dark green colour in the diagram. These decisions are, 
according to Meyers, the rough equivalent o f a life plan. Here the decisions are 
more general and have to do with general qualities an agent might desire to have 
throughout her life. For example, she might want to be an honest person. This 
decision will, if truly broadly programmatic, have implications in other aspects 
o f her life. It might mean that the agent will avoid lying to those she cares about, 
or will be honest with her taxes. Broadly programmatic autonomy how the 
person wants to live and what kind o f relationships she wants to have. It is not 
greatly different from the types o f autonomy narrowly programmatic decisions 
require: there is a need to have certain capacities in order not just to reflect, but 
also to decide and judge which courses of action are most suitable when 
considering one’s life-long ambitions. However, in order for the decision to truly 
be part o f the ‘I’, broadly programmatic autonomy also requires a certain amount 
of self-worth. The agent needs to feel that she is able and entitled to make these 
decisions about her life. These are the kind of decisions that reflect her equal 
standing as a person and decisions which she is able to competently make.
The third consideration relevant to an understanding o f autonomy is a 
consideration o f the kind o f autonomy exercised. In this sense the requirements
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of autonomy are met through a combination o f procedural, relational and 
substantive insights. Procedural autonomy or agency requires a minimum amount 
of reflection, whereas substantivism requires a certain conception o f the self to 
underlie the chosen decisions. The relational account includes some capacities 
that would be necessary in order to make adequate decisions. These three kinds 
of autonomy reveal the different characteristics of the decision-making 
enterprise, but these alone, without further development in terms o f the 
timeframe and area o f the self in which they operate, are not very useful.
The final consideration that ought to apply to an understanding o f autonomy is a 
consideration o f the degree to which autonomy is exercised. In this sense 
autonomy is not a zero-sum quality o f individuals but instead falls within a 
continuum. Agents have varying levels o f autonomy in different areas o f the self, 
depending on how able they are to exercise the kind o f autonomy required. Such 
an understanding implies that, although maybe possible to consider the aggregate 
level o f autonomy o f an individual, it is perhaps more interesting to look at the 
different areas in which autonomy is being exercised. One agent might perhaps 
be very able to make episodic decisions that relate to her ‘me’. That does not 
mean that she is necessarily more autonomous than someone who’s ‘me’ is 
relatively under-defined but has a carefully considered ‘I’ supported by a strong 
substantive consideration of herself. Ultimately, this means that autonomy varies: 
there are different kinds that might be exercised to a different degree. The 
importance o f the degree is variable and is related to the area o f the self to which 
it pertains.
c. Crucial Insights
So far we have seen how the tripartite understanding o f  autonomy can be 
understood and the key areas that it must be sensitive to. However, what are its 
key insights? What are the key considerations that the tripartite conception 
brings?
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i. On the Relation between Reason and Emotion
One of the insights is that reason cannot be solely responsible for autonomous 
actions. Attachments and emotions also help configure the person. As Nussbaum 
points out, “emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological 
mechanism o f a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy 
parts, o f this creature’s reasoning itself’.439 This thesis argues that reason alone 
cannot be the defining characteristic o f autonomy. In order to reflect how 
individuals actually make decisions, it is necessary to consider reason as 
tempered or mediated by emotion. The idea is not simply that emotions matter 
too, but rather that reason cannot be fully understood without reference to 
various other factors, such as emotions, that affect the analysis. As Raia 
Prokhovnik argues, reason and emotion are inter-dependent. Both exist and are 
exercised amidst social practices: both are acquired through the social but are not 
determined by it.440 Reason and emotion remain distinct concepts but nonetheless 
overlap. For her,
emotions play a crucial role in knowledge because the production of 
knowledge, the discussion of ideas, and the recognition of a piece of 
theorising as knowledge all involve social activities expressed in 
particular social practices which are interpersonal and require 
‘emotional engagement’.441
Susan Mendus argues that even if thought to be historically commonplace, the 
dissociation o f reason and emotion as distinct and potentially contradictory 
rationales can be severely limiting. Neither is it as clear cut in Enlightenment 
thinkers as is often claimed. Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Harriet 
Taylor and Immanuel Kant all “understand emotion, and especially the emotion 
o f love, as something which when properly conceptualized, makes essential
439 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals o f  Thought: The Intelligence o f  Emotions, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 3. See also Martha Nussbaum, L o v e ’s  Knowledge: Essays 
on Philosophy an d Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
440 Raia Prokhovnik, Rational Woman: A Feminist Critique o f  D ichotom y  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 99-100.
441 Ibid., p. 83.
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reference to reason and provides an important complement to it”.442 As 
Prokhovnik argues, a dichotomy is created when reason is linked to man, and 
emotion to women:
the two dichotomies, of man/woman and reason/emotion, have worked 
together, ‘rational man’ being a potent symbol of the modem age. But 
the definition of ‘rational man’ has depended upon ‘emotional, that is, 
irrational woman’ as an inferior counterpoint. The narrow and exclusive 
meanings of man/woman and reason/emotion have led to the rationalist 
myth that disembodied and disembedded reason is a higher faculty, 
separate and necessarily distinct from accompanying emotion, 
perception, reflection, memory, and deliberation upon felt experience.443
The prevalence o f these dichotomies has limited the ways in which we can 
conceive our relationship not only to reason and emotion, but to our actual 
bodies. The body becomes secondary to mind, limiting the alleged importance of 
embodiment, and the particularities within which individuals exist. However, we 
do not value autonomy simply because we are “reasonable” -  autonomy matters 
because it enables individuals to pursue those things they care about. Individuals 
are embodied, and their material situation in the world affects how they make 
decisions.
By treating emotion as a necessary element in reasoning, it is possible to 
destabilise the mind/body dichotomy:
Mind, body and emotion are interconnected, but emotion, while lodged 
in the mind, straddles the mind/body dichotomy through its relation to 
affect.444
The body emerges as a necessary vessel for the mind. We are not merely 
“floating minds” but rather are embodied and situated individuals.
442 Susan Mendus, Feminism and Emotion: Readings in M oral and P olitica l Philosophy, 
(Basingstoke: Hampshire, 2000), p. 2.
443 Prokhovnik, Rational Woman, p. 20.
444 Ibid., p. 58.
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The understanding o f autonomy defended here does not prioritise reason over 
emotion. It shares Prokhovnik’s insight that reason and emotion, whilst distinct, 
are nonetheless mutually necessary in order to render the possibilities o f choice 
intelligible. This conception o f autonomy does not demand that agents consider 
their options in any particular way, using a specific kind o f rationality. It merely 
demands that some consideration is given to options. Whether this consideration 
is strictly rational, or one mediated by personal emotion or attachment, makes no 
difference to whether the preference can be considered autonomous. The realities 
of lived experience are such that agents will not consider all their identifications 
in the same manner, nor will they devote the same level o f detail to all. The 
epistemology o f identification is one that includes both reason and emotion 
without prioritising either, thus providing for a truer account o f identity 
development.
ii. Process as Distinct from Action
The conception o f autonomy suggested here makes a strong distinction between 
autonomy and action. As Madhok points out, this is of particular use when 
thinking about oppressive social contexts: “an insistence upon autonomy as the 
ability o f persons to act upon their (critically reflected) beliefs and values places 
obstacles in the way o f conceptually understanding autonomy within conditions 
of subordination.”445 Indeed, there is a difference between thinking o f autonomy 
as a process and thinking of autonomy as action. Thinking o f autonomy as being 
necessarily able to act and carry out one’s wishes ignores the fact that “persons 
do not always act in accordance with their preferred desires or preferences and 
this in turn creates a methodological imperative for us to evolve and design 
arguments that would recognise ‘preferred preferences’ in ways other than 
action” 446
445 Madhok, “Autonomy, Gendered Subordination and Transcultural D ialogue”, p. 338 [emphasis 
mine].
446 Ibid., pg. 344.
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As I argued in Chapter III, agents do not always act on their preferences. 
Autonomy as a process and autonomy as action are two distinct things, and the 
differences ought to be considered in order to gain clarity on both processes. 
Autonomy as a thought process is crucial to the person -  the way in which 
individuals consider their preferred identifications and preferences. But these 
preferences need not be acted upon. Demanding that they are is asking too much 
of autonomy: there is a variety o f possible intervening factors that could prevent 
the exercise o f these preferences.
For instance, an individual might have a strong preference, shown in her 
narrowly programmatic decision, to become a doctor. She will have employed 
her capacities, as well as possibly exercised a substantive form o f autonomy, in 
order to reach the decision that being a doctor is what she desires to do, what she 
believes will bring her happiness and enable her to use her talents. Whether or 
not the agent then becomes a doctor ought not to be the concern o f autonomy. 
She might not be able to undergo medical training due to a variety o f factors. For 
reasons not o f  her own choosing she might not have access to sufficient income 
in order to fund the many years of training. She might face other constraints such 
as her A-level results not being high enough to be accepted into any medical 
training course, or a family member might fall sick and she feels the duty to care 
for her relative in a way that precludes her ability to study for the necessary 
hours required. Saying that this individual is not autonomous in her decision to 
become a doctor, because she is unable to become a doctor, seems to place the 
burden o f proof in the wrong place. It is not her desires which are not 
autonomous but rather the circumstances that preclude her from exercising her 
autonomously chosen preference.
Distinguishing between autonomy as a process and the exercise o f autonomous 
preferences can help policy makers. The Stasi Commission in France 
recommended a ban on veils in schools on three separate grounds:
(l.)They violated the French principle o f lai’cit6 as conspicuous religious 
symbols.
(2.) Veils were inegalitarian and often not autonomously chosen.
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(3.) They were a sorry consequence o f growing fundamentalism.
It is the second reason that the tripartite understanding o f autonomy finds most 
problematic. Women should not be forced to veil if they do not wish to do so. 
The problem with the findings o f the Commission, however, is that they assumed 
that most o f those choosing to veil were doing so for non-autonomous reasons, 
namely, “the strong pressure to do so” by elder brothers or other family 
members. This reflected what the Stasi Commission perceived to be the third 
problem -  a growing (male) fundamentalism.447 The tripartite understanding of 
autonomy would encourage careful consideration o f those statements about the 
non-autonomous character o f the choice, and the claim that veiling is forced 
upon women. There is clearly a need to address circumstances where women are 
being forced, against their autonomous wishes, to do something. However, these 
circumstances cannot be equated with a lack o f autonomy: the thought process 
and the exercise o f its conclusions remain two distinct things.
It is only by differentiating between autonomy as a process and the exercise of 
autonomous preferences that we can begin to consider the institutional provisions 
needed, and better understand the kinds o f inequalities that women face. As 
Mahmood mentions, there is a need to understand how women themselves 
understand processes o f subordination in order to appreciate their significance. 
This is crucial in order to understand and explain “the force a discourse 
commands” 448 Practices might indeed be problematic on egalitarian grounds, but 
we must remember that these are grounded on beliefs and discourses which 
might be more persistent and unshakeable than the practices themselves. By 
respecting autonomy as a process, and differentiating it from the realm o f action, 
it becomes easier to think about inequality in a deeper way, in a way that enables 
us to remain conscious o f the necessity to see practices as supported and 
informed by discourses and beliefs.
447 Patrick Weil, “Lifting the V eil o f  Ignorance”, Policy Network, Community and Inequality 
Working Group, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2004). See also Stasi, Laicite et R ipublique. Rapport de la 
commission de reflexion sur I 'application du principe de laicite dans la  Republique.
448 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the D ocile Agent: Some Reflections on the 
Egyptian Islamic Revival”, p. 210.
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iii. The Plural Self
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that acknowledging intersectionality has 
consequences for a theory o f autonomy. In particular, the self cannot be 
conceived in a rigid or static way. A theory o f autonomy must be able to 
recognise that agents have a variety o f identifications that might at times conflict 
with one another.
A tripartite understanding of autonomy is able to think o f autonomy without 
demanding that the agent be conceived o f as a static, homogenous or neatly 
integrated being. This understanding respects the different strategies that 
characterise intersectionality. It makes no demands on the coherence of an 
agent’s worldview, nor does it require that the agent act upon her preferences. 
The skills necessary to negotiate between different identifications, such as the 
ability to syncretise between various endorsements, or the ability to “world- 
travel” between these in different social settings, are constitutive of the autonomy 
competencies discussed earlier. There is a need for a certain level o f self- 
discovery in so far as the agent needs to be aware o f at least some of her 
identifications. How deeply she considers these is a different matter, which 
depends on whether they form part of her ‘I* or her ‘me’.
Syncretising, that is, creating one’s own set o f outlooks from a variety of 
perspectives, is not a problem. There is no requirement for unity or coherence of 
preferences. How agents create and think about their ‘me’s’ and T s ’ is an 
individual process. Similarly, the negotiating process o f ‘world travelling’ does 
not pose any problems to the tripartite understanding o f autonomy. The focus on 
the process o f autonomy, rather than the consequent actions, means there is no 
challenge for autonomy if  an agent acts differently in different social settings. 
Indeed, doing so may embody the very capacities for autonomy, in terms o f 
being able to discover, define and direct one’s actions considering the social 
environment.
Furthermore, the fact that the tripartite understanding makes no demands in terms 
of coherence allows us to think o f ambivalence as an enabling strategy. As has
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been seen, it is sometimes more productive not to act in cases o f oppressive 
socialisation. Remaining ambivalent about the harmful or negative characteristics 
that a social identity might entail, the ascriptive characteristics o f a ‘me’ can 
mean that the ‘I’, the self as an individual and equal agent, is preserved.
The tripartite understanding does not posit ambivalence and autonomy as 
contradictory or conflicting. Autonomy need not be an integration of desires or 
preferences. Rather, it can reflect the process whereby identifications are 
negotiated and internalised, the process whereby the social comes to inform the 
self. Being an internalist process that takes place within the agent, and one that 
differentiates between thought and action, there is no need to think o f autonomy 
as something coherent and with definite consequences. Autonomy emerges as an 
internal process that agents experience.
4. Potential Issues
Having established some of the key insights o f the tripartite understanding of 
autonomy, it remains to be seen what some o f its potentially problematic issues 
might be.
a. Relativism
One dilemma that arises constantly in feminist literature on autonomy relates to 
its open-endedness. A conception o f autonomy must be open enough to 
encompass a wide variety of experiences, in order to avoid paternalism or 
cultural dominance. However, other problems arise when the conceptualisation is 
too broad. Taking socialisation seriously requires that we note how unequal and 
oppressive forms o f socialisation can constrain and harm an agent’s autonomy. 
Oppressive social norms affect the way agents conceive themselves. Agents 
might internalise social perceptions about their unsuitability to make decisions, 
and might think that choosing certain unequal options is the best thing they can 
do because that is the way things “are”:
227
To internalise material is to incorporate it into the structure of the self, 
that is, into the modes of perception and self-perception that enable one 
to distinguish oneself from other selves and from other things. 
...Subordination is internalised and becomes integral to individualised, 
subordinated identities.449
In my discussion of intersectional identities I have argued that even when these 
identities are harmful, agents can still consider themselves as other than just 
subordinated beings. The self might be subordinated in one aspect or area of her 
life, but not in others. But, even allowing for this, a theory o f autonomy must still 
be aware o f the dangers associated with oppressive social norms, and must be 
able to criticise the effects o f inequality on agents.
On this issue the tripartite understanding o f autonomy appears rather open-ended. 
One o f its most attractive features is its respect for plurality: choices need not 
have a pre-determined substantive content. This respects the numerous 
embodiments, allowing for a variety o f different meanings to be attached to 
preferences and for these to be respected as viable options for agents. However, 
this risks the possibility o f falling into moral relativism, claiming that any choice 
is autonomous, regardless o f its content or its significance. Strong relativism is 
dangerous given its tendency to “easily accept status quo institutions”.450 Indeed, 
when trying to be sensitive about the particularities o f interpretation and 
translation o f different practices, there is a danger that one might just argue 
difference away, claiming that ‘this is the way we (they) do things around here 
(there)’.
According to Sawitri Saharso and Veit Bader, there are four key characteristics 
that typify strong relativism. Firstly, such a position assumes that “all cognitive 
and normative knowledge is contextual at a meta-level in four ways: ...it is 
embedded in social positions, fields and modes o f knowledge, cultural frames 
and history.”451 There is absolute knowledge, but it is always locally contingent.
449 Meyers, Gender in the M irror , pp. 6-7.
450 Sawitri Saharso and Veit Bader, “Introduction: Contextualised Morality and Ethno-Religious 
Diversity”, Ethical Theory an d  M oral Practice, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2004), p. 109.
451 Ibid., p. 110.
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Absolute knowledge is true because there are people that believe that it is true. 
Strong relativists would also maintain that, given the importance o f context and 
the social, universal principles are impossible. People do not necessarily agree 
with each other. However, what each person believes is taken to be true and 
uncontestable. Thus, universalism is impossible since people will never agree to 
accept views they disagree with. This leads to the belief that criticism o f moral 
intuitions is impossible, given that there is no standard on which to judge. 
Judging can only be done from the ‘inside’, by those who truly understand the 
meaning o f what is being analysed. Finally, on an institutional level, strong 
relativists would maintain that there is little that should be done to change or 
criticise existing institutions. They are simply different, and there can be no 
claim that one way o f doing things is better than another, given the impossibility 
of having universal judgement.
The tripartite understanding o f autonomy does not fall under strong relativism 
given that it does contain a critical stance towards certain issues. Instead, it is 
universal and under-defined. Its strength lies in the fact that it is not simply a 
proceduralist theory, and has self-worth as a central substantive commitment. 
Autonomy is not simply a matter o f having the right skills or being aware o f why 
one prefers certain options over others. The skills and the procedure matter 
because the person matters: it is the agent’s own conception of herself that 
validates her decisions as autonomous ones. This in turn means taking a 
normative stance: not all decisions can be judged autonomous. Whether they are 
or not depends on whether they are based on a belief in the agents’ own capacity 
to make that decision for herself as a free and equal person. This remains open 
enough, however, to allow for a good level of plurality. It provides what we 
might describe as a form o f soft relativism.
The substantive clause can be o f particular use to women living in unequal social 
environments. In particular, the normative commitment to the equality o f persons 
has consequences for normative critical possibilities and imagination. It allows 
for the critique of existing realities, without necessarily claiming that those who 
live under unequal conditions are non-autonomous. It restates autonomy as an
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emancipatory skill, but one where the particularities are left sufficiently under­
defined to accommodate the plurality and diversity that characterises social life.
According to Bader and Saharso, “recognition o f the ...under-determinacy of 
principles is part and parcel o f any reasonable moral theory. General and abstract 
moral principles have to be specified to be applicable in various contexts and 
cases.”452 In order for normative principles to work, they must be allowed to 
integrate with existing frameworks and cultural references. This idea is premised 
on the notion that “our interpretations are embedded in and shaped by 
institutional contexts, and our articulation of principles themselves cannot be 
fully separated from general (cultural, linguistic) frameworks inevitably 
embedded in historical societal and cultural contexts”.453 Change will indeed 
happen but it cannot be an imposed change. There must be a number of strategies 
that allow for the negotiation of the old and the new so as to create new 
possibilities o f engagement.
Unlike strong relativism, the form of soft relativism being espoused does not 
assume that all knowledge is true knowledge. Indeed, the tripartite version of 
autonomy holds that there are better forms o f knowledge and being -  such as the 
belief in self-worth by virtue o f being an equal human being. Albeit remaining 
agnostic about most instances of knowledge, the substantive element does 
privilege a certain conception o f the self above others: the self as an equal and 
worthy o f respect.
Strong relativism argues that universalism is impossible. This is not the position I 
have argued in this thesis. The tripartite understanding o f autonomy is ultimately 
a universalist conception, though one that insists on “relating] principles to 
different contexts and cases to explain and develop their meaning. Principles 
though abstract and in need o f some specification, are not indeterminate in a 
strict sense but under-determined: liberty or equality may not exactly formulate 
what is positively required in different contexts and cases but clearly exclude any
452 Ibid., p. 108.
453 r U ’,A
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serious lack o f freedom such as slavery.”454 There is a clear form o f universal ism 
operating. The particularities of its operation, however, are left under-defined.
Strong relativism maintains that it is impossible to criticise moral institutions, 
whereas soft relativists “criticize the elitist bias o f insider knowledge and insist 
on a continuous back and forth between internally contested contextual moral 
intuitions in a wide variety o f contexts and cases on the one hand, and theoretical 
or reconstructive criticism on the other” 455 This is indeed one o f the features of 
the tripartite understanding o f autonomy. By considering the way identifications 
and commitments conflict and merge, as well as having the possibility of 
evaluating these through the lens o f a substantive understanding o f  the self and 
its worth, there is a continuous dialogue taking place between the held 
commitments and preferences, and the agent’s very own sense o f self. Criticism 
takes a central position for the autonomous self -  but it is an internalist form of 
dialogical critique, one that happens within the self in relation to her 
identifications and social surroundings.
Strong relativists are sceptical about the possibility o f critique or change of 
existing institutions. The substantive normative commitments o f a soft relativist 
would disagree: albeit maintaining that there cannot be a single solution or 
institutional setting for all cases, there is still “a legitimate variety of morally 
permissible institutions” 456 This in turn leads us to the emancipatory potential of 
the tripartite understanding of autonomy. How can an under-defined 
understanding o f autonomy lead to change? And what is the epistemology o f this 
change?
b. Non-Ethnocentric Feminism and Emancipatory Politics
We have established that the tripartite understanding o f autonomy is not a 
relativist conception. It does not accept all choices as autonomous. However,
454 ibid.
455 Ibid., pp. 110-1.
456 Ibid., p. 111.
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what is its potential as an emancipatory tool? How can it espouse a feminism that 
is not paternalistic? As we saw in Chapter I, Chambers argues that feminism 
commits us to banning certain practices. I have argued, by contrast, that this is 
paternalistic, ignoring the multiplicity o f meanings a single practice might entail. 
There is a need to consider how women themselves consider these practices.
I have argued that a commitment to feminism means that practices must not be 
thought of in a binary way -  as either emancipatory or subordinating.457 There is 
a need to consider what other factors might lead women to espouse allegedly 
unequal preferences. As Sumi Madhok and Madhavi Sunder point out, we must 
consider “the particularities o f social and historical circumstance in which 
persons fulfil their moral obligations and their choices”.458 Some choices might 
indeed be unequal, or non-autonomously espoused. But others might not be, as 
long as they are understood within the particularities o f their enunciation. Sunder 
remains committed to the emancipatory potential intrinsic to autonomy. For her, 
it is crucial that we look at how women themselves consider their preferences, 
regarding the process o f  autonomy as one that can (but might need not 
necessarily be) conducive to emancipatory politics. Contra Chambers, she 
maintains that there are many ways in which paternalism can be challenged. 
Sunder claims that instituting top-down approaches, such as state-wide bans, 
ignores how women themselves are challenging oppressive norms and practices:
women are nonetheless claiming their rights to challenge religious and 
cultural authorities and to imagine religious community on more 
egalitarian and democratic terms.459
Recognising that the social is intrinsic to the formation o f human beings as 
autonomous agents also means recognising that the social is constituted by the 
sum o f the individuals that participate in its practices. We must be able to 
account for and respect the various forms o f agency that can lead to change in 
these norms. We must remember that laws are themselves created by agents. This
457 Mahmood, Politics o f  P iety , p. 14.
458 Madhok, “Autonomy, Gendered Subordination and Transcultural D ialogue”, p. 349.
459 Sunder, “Piercing the V eil”, p. 1403.
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means that the people making the laws need to understand the egalitarian 
commitment but, furthermore and more importantly, in order for a law to be 
effective, the people who live under it must be able to appreciate the rationale 
and meaning of the law.
Within the feminist literature, it is now commonly argued that resistance is better 
achieved from within rather than by top-down measures. For example, both 
Madhok and Sunder use examples from the international sphere to show how it is 
possible to have progressive change in conditions o f extreme subordination. 
They hold that a strategy based on allowing the agents themselves to experience, 
understand and redefine a concept is a more productive form o f feminist 
emancipatory politics. Sunder uses the example of the organisation Women 
Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML).460 Its objective is to provide women with 
access to both equality and community, urging Muslim women themselves to 
redefine what matters to them and why, and to think o f alternative ways o f 
honouring ethical commitments in ways that are not contradictory with their 
equality as women and as human beings. Quoting from the WLUML website, 
Sunder writes: “the essential issue is who has the power to define what women’s 
identities should be... it is time to challenge -  both politically as well as 
personally -  those who define what the identity o f women should be as 
Muslims.”461
In order to have any sort o f emancipatory change, it is necessary that women 
themselves think about their identities and commitments, as it is these that will 
ultimately perpetrate or change the existing expectations and social norms that 
govern lives. Using the example of Human Rights Manuals, Sunder explains that 
merely expecting people (not just women) to follow what are considered “outside 
norms”, abstract legal terms, will result in little change given the difficulty o f 
translation. The problem of translation is not simply o f language but rather one 
that relates to the difficulty of persons understanding reality-removed- 
abstraction. Following the guidelines set by the 1995 Fourth World Conference 
on Women, the new manuals are expected to follow the strategies o f “translation,
460 http://www.wluinl.org/english/index.shtml.
461 Sunder, “Piercing the V eil”, p. 1440.
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textualism, constructivism and reconstructivism”.462 The laws need to be 
explained with reference to already existing norms and texts. This enables 
women themselves to interpret the claims and consider their own necessities. 
This is a form o f feminism from within, meaning that
rights are not imposed from outside or above a community, but rather 
are derived from the process of women negotiating conflicts within the 
community.463
This process o f translation focuses on how abstract principles can be made 
contextual. This is crucial,
given that the precondition for communication between two persons is a 
common language and that language is a culturally defined system of 
signs and symbols, a rejection of the specific cultural articulation of 
one’s society will handicap the ability of a woman’s movement to
• • 464communicate its message.
Indeed, as Farida Shaheed notes, “where women’s movements operate outside 
the cultural parameters o f their society, the exponents o f a patriarchal system find 
it easy to discredit the movement by simply labelling it ‘westernised’ or an agent 
o f cultural imperialism” 465
Chapter II showed why the social is crucial in understanding how individuals 
react to norms and practices. The emancipatory potential o f the tripartite 
understanding o f autonomy lies within the ability o f individuals to think about 
(socially based) identifications in ways that are relevant to them. The thought is 
that individuals need to experience resonance in order to understand abstract 
processes. A choice needs to be thought o f as a choice in order for it to really be 
a choice, that is, a possible course o f action. As Benson mentions, this
462 Ibid., p.1445.
463 Ibid., p. 1449.
464 Farida Shaheed, “The Articulation o f  Patriarchy: Legal Systems, Islam and Women”, in 
Women and Islam: C ritical Concepts in Sociology, Vol. / ,  ed. Haideh Moghissi (London, 
Routledge, 2005), p. 239.
465 Ibid.
234
encourages us to complement the search through the resources of 
women’s own lives with the intentional creating of practices and forms 
of relationship which may give rise to new opportunities for normative 
disclosure.466
An example of how contextual feminism can operate is provided by recent 
developments in the use of mikvehs. Although primarily sites for ritual 
immersion, and highly evocative o f unequal gender relations in Orthodox 
Judaism, some centres have begun to provide other services.467 Amongst these 
are classes for young women on sexual and marital relations, hygiene, 
contraception and divorce. Young women in very pious areas rarely have access 
to these kinds o f information, and the fact that it is the balaniyot (the women in 
charge o f the mikveh) who provide the classes means that the young women are 
more likely to accept and understand that individual rights do not necessarily 
contradict ritual commandments or piety.468
Madhok’s experience with the Women’s Development Programme and sathins in 
India also shows how this contextualised feminism can operate.469 Through their 
participation in the programme, she notes, women were “introduced to the 
modem idea o f autonomy and language of individual rights”.470 This, in turn, led 
to “attempts not only to rethink many of the moral rules informing their own 
moral frameworks, but also selectively absorb many o f these ‘new’ ideas in ways 
which do not clutter their existing moral priorities and commitments” 471
Madhok’s description o f this process closely resembles the relationship of the 
‘me’ and ‘I’ that has been explored in this thesis. Their ‘I’ is being developed by
466Benson, “Feminist Second Thoughts about Free Agency”, p. 61.
467 This is true o f  mikvehs in very pious areas, such as Mea Shearim in Jerusalem and Borough 
Park in N ew  York.
468 Jewish law does protect the integrity o f  the individual. However, wom en’s knowledge o f  their 
own status in law is often incomplete, given that women are forbidden from studying the Torah. 
Women are allowed to study other parts o f  law, in particular those that relate to their own status, 
but the combination o f  poverty and high birth-rates in Orthodox communities mean that few  
women are able to devote their time to studying.
469 According to Madhok, sathins are primary workers within a state-sponsored development 
programme for women in Rajasthan known as the W omen’s Development Programme (WDP). 
The sathins are mostly semi-literate or illiterate and are mainly low caste.
470 Madhok, “Autonomy, Gendered Subordination and Transcultural D ialogue”, p. 340.
471 Ibid., p. 341.
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virtue o f considering the ways in which social norms and laws apply to them, and 
which ones they think relevant. In rethinking and absorbing certain ideas but not 
others, or interpreting ideas in ways that suit their situated position, the sathins 
seem to be displaying some o f the capacities necessary for autonomy. They are 
themselves discovering and defining norms in ways that are comfortable and 
useful for them. They are syncretising various ideas which might theoretically 
appear to be contradictory but if redefined and adapted to their framework can be 
o f use. They are also experiencing world-travelling in so far as they might be 
choosing to adopt certain ideas, but not others, choosing selectively, in order to 
be able to remain committed to values and preferences that are important to 
them.
The tripartite understanding o f autonomy, with its focus on the mechanisms of 
intersectionality, helps the development o f ‘feminism from within’ strategies. As 
Sunder points out:
While traditional human rights to identity presume that identity will be 
imposed within groups (albeit freely chosen from among groups), the 
activists I highlighted here seek to expand choice within identity groups.
This claim presupposes not only that identity groups are plural, but that 
they should be, in order to allow individuals more room to negotiate 
their membership in the group -  from the traditional end of the spectrum 
to the radical.472
Bringing in an understanding o f intersectionality helps highlight the possibilities 
for negotiation that exist within already existing cultural frameworks. Cultures 
do not appear as static or rigid, but rather the approach emphasises how they are 
constituted by individuals who themselves challenge or uphold traditions which 
change over time.
Focusing on autonomy as a potential tool for change, without being prescriptive 
about the particular outcomes it is meant to achieve, is particularly relevant to the 
problems I began with: the problems of minorities within minorities in the
472 Sunder, “Piercing the V eil”, p. 1463.
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practices o f multiculturalism. As Saharso notes, “good feminism might well 
require acts o f multiculturalism”.473 Changing laws can be part o f the solution to 
a more equal society but this must be coupled with change in the people who are 
meant to uphold them.
Indeed, there are three problems with top-down approaches that lead to the 
conclusion that ‘feminism from within’ should be considered a leading force for 
egalitarian change. In the first instance, the banning o f practices means denying 
women a choice. It is overly paternalist to assume that choosing egalitarian 
commitments is the necessary sign o f autonomy, and seems to presume that there 
is only one ‘right’ way to behave. Banning without considering the multiple 
meanings o f a practice does not respect plurality. This denies women the 
possibility o f choosing -  a central aim o f feminist politics -  but also denies the 
pluralism multiculturalism is meant to respect.
Secondly, making a practice illegal can sometimes close down avenues for 
women’s autonomy. As Saharso notes when discussing sex-selective abortion 
and hymen reconstructive surgery, it is often women who request these practices, 
as a way o f negotiating between different and conflicting identities. In the case o f 
hymen reconstruction, for example, the request comes from women who have 
had pre-marital sex, whilst at the same time belonging -  and wanting to belong -  
to a group that considers pre-marital virginity (of women) a necessary condition 
for respect within the community. In such instances, one might even say that in 
choosing to have hymen repair surgery, the women are developing their ‘I’. They 
endorse certain elements o f their identities but not others, and choosing hymen 
repair is a way o f negotiating between these conflicting demands.
The third point is that merely changing the laws can reinforce old ways of 
thinking as regards the presumed patriarchy o f minority cultures versus the 
liberalism o f majority ones. When laws are changed from outside the community 
there seems to be a presumption o f homogeneity within the community. As we 
have seen throughout this thesis, this is a troubling assumption to make. Cultures
473 Saharso, “Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics o f  Multiculturalism”, p. 199.
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are not static, homogeneous entities that require regulation by either the state or 
the respected community elders. By encouraging dialogue and debate to flourish 
within, women might find new and satisfactory ways o f combining their various 
commitments.
Vehement and indiscriminate attacks on traditional practices may make 
a community group defensive, thereby weakening the position of 
minority women in their attempts to launch an Internal challenge to 
harmful practices. It is essential that minority women are given an 
opportunity to formulate a criticism of their practices from within their 
own tradition. Minority women have the potential to be the most 
effective and devastating social critics of the traditional practices that 
harm them. Their knowledge and experience -  and the ability to speak 
the language of the group -  give them an authority that cannot be 
replicated by outsiders.474
This echoes what Saharso and Verhaar term “contextual” thinking, which 
potentially results “in solutions that are more widely acceptable”.475 Contextual 
thinking in multicultural affaires is important because, as Monica Mookherjee 
reminds us,
a) women’s positive interests, goals and priorities are not always 
synonymous with liberal interests; and (b) the vulnerabilities that they 
experience can also often depend on the specificities of their cultures. 
Therefore, contextual responses to women’s rights are required in 
contemporary multicultural states, which recognise the interplay 
between the universal and the particular in an account of justice that is 
concerned with redressing hierarchical group relations and prompting 
civic equality.476
Ultimately, the tripartite understanding o f autonomy is a relational way of 
thinking about our various attachments. It is a normative understanding that has
474 Malik, “The Branch on Which We Sit; Multiculturalism, M inority Women and Family Law”, 
p. 219.
475 Saharso and Verhaar, “Headscarves in the Police Force and th e  Court: D oes Context Matter?”,
pp. 68-86.
476 Mookherjee, W om en’s  Rights as Multicultural Claims, p. 58.
emancipatory potential in so far as it encourages a positive sense of self -  a 
perhaps basic, but nonetheless crucial, objective necessary for a non-paternalist 
form o f egalitarianism. Equality is intrinsic, in so far as the definition o f self- 
worth is one that hinges on the view o f the self as an equal and capable human 
being. However, the practical implications of this view o f equality are left under­
defined, in ways that continue to respect plurality.
This under-definition is what enables new possibilities of thought and action, 
allowing us to
displace static representations so that we may dream on and unhinge the 
unconscious connections we make between race, sex, and desire, 
connections that ensnare us in hierarchies.477
5. Conclusions
Virginia W oolfs A Room o f  One ’s Own is evocative o f some o f the issues this 
thesis deals with.478 For Woolf, women required two things if they were to 
produce work o f a high quality. Firstly, they required the economic ability to 
have their own room. Analogously, multiculturalism stresses that certain rights 
are required for minorities to be able to be truly equal to the majority, in terms of 
their ability to access and participate in their societies. Secondly, a room also 
refers to the freedom to be able to create, the space where women can develop 
their artistic license. It is here where W oolfs title is particularly reminiscent o f 
the concerns o f this thesis. Having one’s own room, one’s own space where one 
can be oneself, is similar to the idea of autonomy. Individuals need their own 
space in order to be able to be themselves, to imagine, to dream, to create.
However, rooms are not just dissociated entities, scattered around and with no 
connection to one another. Rooms are normally within houses -  in this case a 
house would be analogous to society. Households (very much like societies and
477 Cornell, At the H eart o f  Freedom, p. 25.
478 Virgina W oolf, A Room o f  O ne's Own (London: Penguin, 1945).
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states) are defined by certain rules and expectations. There are some things 
which are permissible; there are some that are not. But neither states nor 
households can be defined only through their laws. Emotions, attachments and 
love very often form part o f the relations within houses. Both rules and emotions 
will inform what happens in the private space o f the room, one’s own self. In a 
way, this thesis looks at the relations between a room and the house it is within. 
How does the social inform ourselves? And what does that mean in terms o f the 
rules and regulations that ought to operate over the house?
One norm that operates in our “home” is freedom. The liberty to do what we 
want is considered a central value in our societies. We value freedom because it 
enables us the liberty to do what we want -  so long as we have the means to do 
those things. While the primacy o f freedom is central, questions arise when 
individuals exercise it to choose things that are perceived as being harmful. This 
is especially true in societies that are culturally, religiously and ethnically plural.
Autonomy emerges as one o f the central criteria that define the permissibility of 
a practice. It is not easy to understand why individuals might freely choose things 
that are harmful. Indeed, there is a tendency to assume that these cannot possibly 
be freely chosen -  they are the effects o f  coercion and thus should be disallowed 
in a bid to protect the freedom of those who are being forced to engage in these 
practices.
This thesis has argued that autonomy is, and should be, a consideration when 
thinking about the permissibility o f different practices. However, in order not to 
assume that all unequal practices and choices are forced, it is necessary to pay 
attention to what considerations are central. Given the realities o f social life, and 
the plurality it encompasses, it is crucial to have a conception o f autonomy that 
respects the many options individuals might have, and how they interpret the 
meaning and significance o f these. Autonomy needs to be understood in a plural 
way so as to make sense o f the ways in which individuals live and make 
decisions. However, oppressive forms o f socialisation, because o f their effect on 
the self-conception o f individuals, might harm individuals’ abilities to be 
autonomous. There are instances where autonomy is not present, and a
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conception o f autonomy needs to be able to account for these cases without being 
prescriptive about the ways inequality and oppression might manifest itself.
I have argued that content neutrality is a good way o f respecting plurality. 
However, content neutrality alone is not sufficient. Content neutrality without 
reference to some other substantive commitment can be dangerous, leading to a 
form o f relativism where all instances o f decision-making can be considered 
autonomous. Furthermore, autonomy is more than an instance o f decision­
making: it is the process whereby individuals come to be themselves. As such, it 
must contain reference to something other than how we come to make decisions. 
I argue that holding self-worth as the necessary substantive underpinning in a 
conception o f autonomy allows the conception to be both egalitarian without 
being prescriptive about the form this egalitarianism must take. Self-worth 
matters because it is through it that individuals can truly form the self­
conceptions, plans and preferences that really matter to them. By combining 
agnosticism on the content o f choices with the substantive commitment to self- 
worth it is possible to delineate the starting points o f a conception of autonomy 
capable o f respecting plurality without being relativistic.
This conception respects the reality o f concrete embodiment. Rationality is a 
part, but by no means the defining feature, o f autonomous deliberation. Emotions 
and attachments also play a role, allowing for the conception to be truer to the 
ways individuals actually make decisions. Autonomy emerges as something 
internal, distinct from action, and thus truly honours the intuition that it is a 
highly individual, personal process.
The tripartite conception o f autonomy does not hold that autonomy necessarily 
leads to happiness or equality. It can potentially be emancipatory, in so far as it is 
a useful consideration when thinking about ‘feminism from within’ strategies 
that seek to find solutions and approaches that ground universality within 
specific embodiment. Ultimately, a commitment to self-worth respects the moral 
equality o f persons whilst allowing the space for various commitments and 
interpretations to exist within multicultural frameworks. Equality needs to 
respect the “room o f one’s own”, the autonomy that agents display and their own
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interpretations and understandings o f choices in order for it to be a truly fair 
endeavour.
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